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Abstract 
 
We examine stock market reactions around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. We find a 
symmetric and transitory price response accompanied by a significant increase in trading volume 
on the effective date. Firms added to the Nasdaq-100 Index experience significant increases in 
institutional ownership, the number of market makers, and the number of shareholders. In 
contrast, firms removed from the index show significant decreases in the number of institutional 
shareholders. Additions to the Nasdaq-100 Index also show significant increases in four liquidity 
measures, whereas deletions demonstrate significant decreases in two liquidity measures. These 
changes in liquidity are related to the abnormal return on the announcement day. Taken together, 
the results suggest support for the price pressure, liquidity, and investor awareness hypotheses.  
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1 Introduction 
      A large body of literature examines stock price effects of changes to US indexes such as the 
S&P 500 Index (e.g., Chen, Noronha, and Singal, 2004) and the Russell 2000 Index (e.g., 
Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan, 2004). However, these indexes contain stocks from different US 
stock exchanges. Several studies (e.g., Masulis and Shivakumar, 2002; Elliott and Warr, 2003; 
Kappou, Brooks, and Ward, 2010) show that stocks that are listed on different stock exchanges 
are more likely to have experienced different price effects relative to one specific event. To avoid 
potential confounding effects, we study the price reactions of stocks added to or removed from 
the Nasdaq-100 Index from 1997 to 2010, as the index only includes stocks that are primarily 
traded on the Nasdaq stock exchange. 
      We are motivated to perform a standard event study on price effects around the Nasdaq-100 
Index primarily based on two aspects, the differences between changes to the Nasdaq-100 index 
and changes to other indexes and the differences between the Nasdaq stock exchange (Nasdaq) 
and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
      Compared with other indexes such as the S&P 500 Index, the Nasdaq-100 Index also has 
some characteristics that motivate this study. First, the way the Nasdaq-100 Index is formed is 
important. The Nasdaq-100 Index changes are performed in two ways: regular index 
reconstitutions, which are primarily based on market values on an annual basis, and irregular 
index reconstitutions, which are similar to the S&P 500 Index changes. Secondly, the Nasdaq-
100 Index reconstitutions only include pure additions and pure deletions, while deletions from 
the S&P 500 Index include pure deletions, which are directly removed from the S&P index 
family, and downward deletions, which are shifted to S&P 400 Index. Thirdly, international 
securities are allowed to be included in the Nasdaq-100 Index; in contrast, the S&P 500 Index 
only includes the U.S. based securities. 
      In addition, several studies suggest difference between the Nasdaq and the NYSE. Jain and 
Kim (2006) found positive price reactions for firms switching from the Nasdaq to the NYSE. 
Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) found that Nasdaq-listed stocks 
have, on average, higher execution costs than the NYSE-listed stocks. Elliott and Warr (2003) 
also reported that NYSE-listed and Nasdaq-listed stocks experience different price reactions 
following the S&P 500 Index reconstitutions.  
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      In this thesis, we find symmetric and temporary price effects for firms added to or removed 
from the Nasdaq-100 Index, which are consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. In addition, 
the result of trading volume analysis suggests the price pressure hypothesis. We only observe 
significant market reactions on the effective date, and the trading volume reverts to the normal 
level typically within 10 trading days following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions.  
      To evaluate changes in the investor recognitions, we use the number of institutional 
shareholders, the percentage of institutional shareholdings, the number of market makers, and the 
number of all shareholders as proxies.  
      The result of institutional ownership analysis provides an explanation for significant changes 
in trading volume we observed on the effective date. To minimize the tracking errors, index 
tracking fund managers are more likely to adjust their portfolio on the effective date as a result of 
the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. Firms added to the Nasdaq-100 Index experience 
significant increases in the number of institutional shareholders and the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings, while firms removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index only experience 
significant decrease in the number of institutional shareholders.  
      Additionally, the number of market makers and the number of all shareholders significantly 
increase for stocks added to the Nasdaq-100 Index; on the other hand, there are no significant 
changes in the number of market makers and the number of all shareholders. Consistent with the 
investor awareness hypothesis, more individual investors are aware of the existence of stocks 
added to the index, while the awareness does not easily diminish as stocks are removed from the 
index. 
      According to the liquidity analysis, firms added to the Nasdaq-100 Index generally 
experience permanent improvements in liquidity following the Nasdaq-100 Index 
reconstitutions. For regular deletions, these firms typically experience significant decreases in 
dollar volume and illiquidity ratio, while changes in the other two liquidity measures, relative 
spread and zero return ratio, are not significantly different from zero.  
      As we find transitory price increases (decreases) for stocks added to (removed from) the 
Nasdaq-100 Index and these firms also experience significant changes in liquidity following the 
Nsadq-100 Index reconstitutions. A regression analysis is used to examine whether changes in 
liquidity are associated with the abnormal returns on the announcement date. The result suggests 
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a positive relation between changes in liquidity and abnormal returns on the announcement date 
around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitution. 
      The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review. 
Section 3 describes why we choose the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. Section 4 describes 
the construction of our sample. From section 5 to section 9 present methods and results of 
abnormal return analysis, trading volume analysis, analysis of the number of shareholders and 
market makers, liquidity analysis and regression analysis. Section 10 contains a summary and 
conclusion. 
    
2 Literature Review 
      So far several hypotheses have been used to explain the price effects around index changes, 
including the information signaling hypothesis, the price pressure hypothesis, the imperfect 
substitutes hypothesis, the liquidity hypothesis, and the investor awareness hypothesis. These 
five hypotheses are briefly described below. 
 
2.1 Information Signaling Hypothesis 
      The information signaling hypothesis is primarily based on the efficient market hypothesis. 
In an efficient market, security prices fully reflect the available information corresponding to 
their current fundamental values. Instantaneously security prices adjust to the arrival of new 
information regarding changes in fundamental values. 
      The information signaling hypothesis suggests that index change announcements convey new 
fundamental information related to affected stocks. The release of the new information leads to 
permanent price effects for both additions and deletions. Hence, market participants quickly 
respond to the index revisions by evaluating the new information on the announcement date.  
      In addition, the long term demand curves under this hypothesis are assumed to be perfectly 
elastic, indicating that all stocks traded in the market are perfect substitutes for one another. 
Hence there is no price impact caused by large changes in quantity demanded such as block 
trades.  
      Several previous studies have attempted to test this hypothesis by investigating the S&P 500 
Index revisions. Jain (1987) found that the S&P 500 Index change announcements contain 
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information content. Besides the S&P 500 Index, Jain also examined the price performance of 
supplementary indexes published by Standard & Poor’s.  
      Index fund managers who are tracking the S&P 500 Index do not purchase stocks included in 
the supplementary indexes. Both stocks added to the S&P 500 Index and those included in 
supplementary indexes experiences significant excess stock returns. However, there is no 
significant difference between the abnormal returns experienced by the two different groups of 
stocks, which implies that the abnormal returns are not associated with the increase in trading 
volume.  
      Dhillon and Johnson (1991) also found support for the information signaling hypothesis by 
examining both common stocks and their related instruments. Over the period from 1978 to 
1983, stocks added to S&P 500 Index experience permanent price effects, but there is no 
significant difference between the abnormal returns of stocks that do or do not have traded 
options. Additionally, they found that bond prices are positively related to the abnormal returns 
of affected stocks.   
      Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov, and Yu (2003) found that the behavior of the S&P 500 
Index additions is consistent with the information signaling hypothesis. Firms newly added to the 
S&P 500 Index experience significant increases in the analyst’s earning per share forecasts and 
also significant improvements in the actual realized earnings. They argued that the S&P 500 
inclusions may result in either enhanced monitoring or increased cost in managerial reputation, 
but nevertheless improves the firm’s future operating performance.  
 
2.2 Price Pressure Hypothesis 
      As stated above, large-block trades do not affect stock prices under the information signaling 
hypothesis, for it is assumed that the demand curve for stocks is perfectly elastic. In contrast to 
the information signaling hypothesis, the price pressure hypothesis and the imperfect substitutes 
hypothesis have been developed and tested from a different perspective.  
      Both hypotheses predict that the price impacts following the changes in an index composition 
are associated with large transactions instead of the release of new information. The long run 
supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, as it is determined by the number of outstanding 
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shares. Hence, the relationship between the stock prices and large trading volume might be 
explained by different shapes of the demand curve.  
      The price pressure hypothesis, discussed here, suggests that the demand curve is downward 
sloping for the short term, whereas it is still horizontal in the long run. Instead, the imperfect 
substitutes hypothesis, discussed in the following section, suggests that both short run and long 
run demand curves for securities are downward sloping.  
      Compared to other hypotheses, only the price pressure hypothesis predicts transitory price 
effects for the stocks added to or removed from an index. In order to minimize the tracking error, 
index fund managers increase the quantity demanded for added stocks on the listing date, forcing 
the stock prices to increase above the market equilibrium. A higher price level subsequently 
persuades other investors to sell the stocks that they otherwise would not trade. These passive 
sellers are compensated for their liquidity services when the stock prices go back to the original 
level before the index reconstitution. For stocks removed from the index, the opposite price 
pattern is observed. 
      For instance, the behavior of the S&P Index Committee is generally consistent with the price 
pressure hypothesis. When Standard & Poor started to publicly announce the changes in the 
compositions of the S&P 500 Index, the announcement was usually made after the market close 
on Wednesday. The changes in index then became effective at the market open on the next 
trading day.  Since October 1989, Standard & Poor has started to announce the changes at least 
one trading day before the effective date in order to ease the order imbalance. 
      In support of this hypothesis, Harris and Gurel (1986) examined price and volume data for 
firms added to or deleted from the index over the period from 1973 to 1983. They argued that the 
S&P 500 Index revisions do not convey information about the expected future performance of 
the affected firms. They found that the added stocks experience over 3 percent increase 
immediately after the announcement, accompanied by the significant abnormal trading volume. 
This price effect, however, is nearly completely reversed after two weeks.  
      Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) also found evidence that supports the price pressure 
hypothesis by analyzing the stock prices and trading volume surrounding the S&P 500 Index 
reconstitutions since October 1989. The additions (deletions) experience significantly positive 
(negative) abnormal returns between the announcement date and the trading day before the 
7 
 
effective date. The significant price reversal is then observed on and after the effective date, 
which is consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. 
      The findings of Elliott and Warr (2003) can also be viewed as the evidence for the price 
pressure hypothesis, even though the purport of their article is to compare the price effects for 
additions of NYSE- and Nasdaq-listed firms to the S&P 500 Index. They found an immediate 
price reversal for NYSE stocks but a partial price reversal for Nasdaq stocks during the S&P 500 
Index change.  
      Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004) also found that stocks added to or removed from the 
Russell 2000 Index experiences significant changes in stock prices, trading volume, and 
institutional ownership. The highly transitory nature of the abnormal returns strongly supports 
the price pressure hypothesis. 
 
2.3 Imperfect Substitutes Hypothesis 
      The imperfect substitutes hypothesis, or the downward sloping demand curve hypothesis, 
posits that each security in the market is unique, indicating stocks are no longer perfect 
substitutes for one another. The changes in demand for affected stocks due to index 
reconstitutions shift the downward-sloping demand curve to a new equilibrium price level, and 
hence, this hypothesis predicts permanent price effects for all additions and deletions. 
      For stocks added to an index, an increase in demand shifts the demand curve upward, 
resulting in a shortage for these stocks. So the stock prices rise, and thus causing an increase in 
the quantity supplied for respective stocks to satisfy the excess demand. The increased stock 
prices and trade volume are expected to be stable. In the case of deletions, stock prices and trade 
volume permanently change in opposite directions. 
      Recall that the long run supply for stocks is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, so there is no 
change in supply when demand changes. Instead, a change in the quantity supplied for affected 
stocks does occur – a movement along the vertical supply curve.  
      In order to examine the imperfect substitutes hypothesis, numerous studies have usually 
taken into account the market reactions to the event that is devoid of information. Shleifer (1986) 
found that the stock prices of firms added to the S&P 500 Index permanently increase 
approximately 3%. The excess returns, however, are not related to the S&P’s bond ratings, which 
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is inconsistent with the information signaling hypothesis. A plausible explanation for the finding 
is that the demand curve for stocks slopes downward. 
      Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) also found support for imperfect substitutes hypothesis by 
studying the effect of TSE’s redefinition of the public float. They found a permanent price 
increase for stocks whose index weights significantly increase. Meanwhile, this event does not 
affect the bid-ask spread, where it is associated with neither transaction cost nor information 
effects.  In addition, the float redefinition does not involve additions to the TSE 300 Index, 
confirming the absence of information. The results altogether suggest the imperfect substitutes 
hypothesis. 
      To analyze the market demand curve for stocks, Biktimirov (2004) examined the conversion 
of the TIPs 35 and TIPs 100 exchange-traded funds into the i60 Fund. He found that forty stocks 
of the TIPs 100 Fund that are removed from the i60 Fund experience permanent price decrease, 
accompanied by the significant abnormal trading volume.  
      Biktimirov (2004) argued that the conversion of the funds is an information-free event, in 
which neither additions nor deletions are involved. The investors have already been aware of the 
event through the major Canadian newspapers for a long time. Additionally, he did not find 
significant changes in bid-ask spread, so the liquidity of stocks is not affected by the event. 
Hence, the finding also provides support for the imperfect substitutes hypothesis.  
 
2.4 Liquidity Hypothesis 
      The liquidity hypothesis is another theory that suggests permanent price effects for stocks 
added to or deleted from an index. The liquidity is typically measured by the bid-ask spread, 
where a lower bid-ask spread following index inclusions triggers the stock price increase. There 
have been two distinct assumptions of the price behavior under the liquidity hypothesis: 
information effects and transaction cost. 
      For additions to an index, an increase in the ownership breadth is normally associated with an 
improvement in monitoring. The enhanced scrutiny might lead to reduced information 
asymmetry, thus decreasing the bid-ask spread. 
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      In addition, index inclusions usually experience a significant increase in trading volume. An 
increase in trading volume is expected to reduce the transaction cost, which also tends to 
decrease the bid-ask spread.  
      In contrast, index additions may also negatively affect the liquidity, as index fund managers 
are considered to be buy-and-hold investors. As a consequence of increased institutional 
ownership, the number of floating shares should fall.  
      In this context, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) found a highly significant positive 
relationship between the stock liquidity and the stock value. They argued that investors require a 
lower expected return when stock liquidity improves, eventually leading to an increase in the 
firm value. 
      By examining changes in stock liquidity, Erwin and Miller (1998) found a significant 
decrease in the bid-ask spread for the non-optioned stocks added to the S&P 500 Index. These 
stocks experience a significant and permanent increase in share price and trading volume.  
      Conversely, the optioned stocks experience a permanent increase in trading volume but only 
a temporary increase in share price. Erwin and Miller (1998) argued that the enhanced liquidity 
of non-optioned stocks can be explained by the increased information production, whereas the 
additions that have options may not facilitate information production due to the arbitrage trading 
between the option and underlying stock. 
      Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) investigated the further effects of improved stock liquidity 
and found a positive relationship between the stock liquidity and investment opportunities. They 
offered an explanation that an improvement in stock liquidity decreases the cost of capital, and 
hence, increase the net present value of financial projects, which results in increased growth 
opportunities for firms. 
 
2.5 Investor Awareness Hypothesis 
      All hypotheses described above predict symmetric price effects for both additions and 
deletions, either permanent or transitory. Contrarily, the investor awareness hypothesis, 
formalized by Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004), is the only hypothesis that suggests 
asymmetric price effects – a permanent price increase for index inclusions, but a transitory price 
decrease for stocks removed from the index. 
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      Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) suggest that the asymmetric price effects are attributed to 
the asymmetric changes in investor recognitions around changes in index constitution. Stocks 
added to an index experience a permanent price increase due to a significant increase in investor 
recognition, since more investors are aware of the existence of these stocks. The subsequent 
enhanced monitoring may also force the firms to operate more efficiently.  
      On the other hand, the deleted stocks only experience a temporary price decrease. A plausible 
explanation offered by Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) is that the awareness for stocks 
removed from the index does not easily diminish.  
      They also presented a negative relationship between the abnormal return and Merton’s 
shadow cost, a proxy used in Merton’s model of investor recognitions. Furthermore, they found 
that the change in the number of shareholders is significantly positively related to the abnormal 
returns, which is consistent with the investor awareness hypothesis. 
      Elliott, Van Ness, Walker, and Warr (2006) conducted an analytical survey of different 
hypotheses by multivariate tests. They found that increased investor awareness is the primary 
explanation for the positive price responses following the index inclusions.       
      Zhou (2011) provided more pronounced evidence for the investor awareness hypothesis by 
examining subgroups of additions to the S&P 500 Index over the period from 1962 through 
2008. He found a permanent price increase for the first-time additions to S&P Index family, 
whereas reentry additions, stocks dropped from and later re-added to S&P 500, experience only 
transitory price increases. He argued that the asymmetric changes in investor awareness 
contribute to the asymmetric price revaluations among subgroups of additions to the S&P 500 
Index. 
 
2.6 Summary 
      To summarize, at least five hypotheses have been offered in the literature to explain the price 
effects around index changes. Yet the perfect explanation for the subsequent phenomena has still 
not been available. The information signaling hypothesis, the imperfect substitutes hypothesis, 
and the liquidity hypothesis predict permanent price effects for all additions and deletions, while 
the price pressure hypothesis implies transitory price effects. On the contrary, only the investor 
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awareness hypothesis suggests asymmetric price effects – a permanent price increase for added 
stocks but a temporary price decrease for deleted stocks.  
 
3 Why Nasdaq-100 Index Changes? 
      To distinguish among the competing hypotheses, we examine changes to the Nasdaq-100 
Index from two points of view. First, we analyze differences between changes to the Nasdaq-100 
Index and changes to the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 Indexes. Secondly, we examine 
differences between the Nasdaq and the NYSE. 
 
3.1 The Nasdaq-100 Index 
      The Nasdaq-100 Index, first published in January 1985, includes the 100 largest domestic 
and international nonfinancial securities listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market. The index represents 
companies across major industries such as computer hardware and software, 
telecommunications, retail and wholesale trade, and biotechnology.  
      The Nasdaq-100 Index is currently calculated using modified capitalization-weight 
methodology, switching from a straight capitalization-weight methodology in 1998
1
.  Retaining 
the common economic features, the new methodology emphasizes enhanced diversification. The 
index is rebalanced with corresponding adjustment procedures on the quarterly basis.
2
  
      A weight rebalancing is performed, if the current weight of the single largest market 
capitalization index security is over 24%. The weights of stocks whose individual current 
weights exceed 1% are scaled down, setting the adjusted weight of the largest security equal to 
20%. In addition, the total weight of securities, whose individual current weights are greater than 
4.5%, could exceed 48%. The same procedure is applied to set the adjusted total weight equal to 
40%. 
      To be included in the index, companies must meet the following criteria, which are stated on 
the Nasdaq official website: 
                                                          
1
 For more information, please refer to “Annual changes to the Nasdaq-100 Index, New index share product on the 
Nasdaq-100 Index. (December 14, 1998). PR Newswire. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis database.” and “Nasdaq-100 
Index special rebalance FAQs. Retrieved from 
https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/docs/NDXSpecialRebalanceFAQ.pdf.” 
2
 For more information, please refer to “Nasdaq-100 Index Methodology. Retrieved from 
https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/docs/methodology_NDX.pdf. ” 
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Initial Eligibility Criteria 
To be eligible for initial inclusion in the Index, a security must be listed on the Nasdaq Stock 
Market and meet the following criteria:  
 the security’s U.S. listing must be exclusively on the Nasdaq National Market (unless the 
security was dually listed on another U.S. market prior to January 1, 2004 and has 
continuously maintained such listing);  
 the security must be of a non-financial company;  
 the security may not be issued by an issuer currently in bankruptcy proceedings;  
 the security must have average daily trading volume of at least 200,000 shares;  
 if the issuer of the security is organized under the laws of a jurisdiction outside the U.S., 
then such security must have listed options on a recognized options market in the U.S. or 
be eligible for listed-options trading on a recognized options market in the U.S.;  
 only one class of security per issuer is allowed;  
 the issuer of the security may not have entered into a definitive agreement or other 
arrangement which would likely result in the security no longer being Index eligible;  
 the issuer of the security may not have annual financial statements with an audit opinion 
that is currently withdrawn;  
 the issuer of the security must have "seasoned" on NASDAQ or another recognized 
market (generally, a company is considered to be seasoned if it has been listed on a 
market for at least two years; in the case of spin-offs, the operating history of the spin-off 
will be considered); and  
 if the security would otherwise qualify to be in the top 25% of the securities included in 
the Index by market capitalization for the six prior consecutive month-ends, then a one-
year "seasoning" criterion would apply.  
 
Continued Eligibility Criteria 
To be eligible for continued inclusion in the Index, the following criteria apply:  
 the security’s U.S. listing must be exclusively on the Nasdaq National Market (unless the 
security was dually listed on another U.S. market prior to January 1, 2004 and has 
continuously maintained such listing);  
 the security must be of a non-financial company;  
 the security may not be issued by an issuer currently in bankruptcy proceedings;  
 the security must have average daily trading volume of at least 200,000 shares (measured 
annually during the ranking review process);  
 if the issuer of the security is organized under the laws of a jurisdiction outside the U.S., 
then such security must have listed options on a recognized options market in the U.S. or 
be eligible for listed-options trading on a recognized options market in the U.S. 
(measured annually during the ranking review process);  
 the security must have an adjusted market capitalization equal to or exceeding 0.10% of 
the aggregate adjusted market capitalization of the Index at each month- end. In the event 
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a company does not meet this criterion for two consecutive month-ends, it will be 
removed from the Index effective after the close of trading on the third Friday of the 
following month; and  
 the issuer of the security may not have annual financial statements with an audit opinion 
that is currently withdrawn.  
 
      Securities that do not meet the criteria are replaced by other eligible securities at any time of 
a year. The replacements can also occur in annual changes to the Nasdaq-100 Index, which was 
first implemented in 1993
3
. Index-eligible stocks are annually ranked primarily based on the 
market capitalization. The current index members that are ranked in the top 100 are maintained.  
A stock is also maintained if it is ranked between top 101 and 125, but previously ranked within 
top 100. Other stocks that do not meet the eligibility criteria will be replaced by non-index stocks 
that have the largest market capitalization. 
      The Nasdaq-100 Index is widely followed by several Exchange-Traded Funds (ETF). For 
instance, the market value of PowerShares QQQ Trust, Series 1 is $23,190,059,500 on July 1, 
2011 market closed. Meanwhile, the market values of Ultra QQQ and UltraShortQQQ are 
$915,957,000 and $ 489,677,400 respectively. 
 
 
3.2 Differences between changes to the Nasdaq-100 Index and changes to the S&P 500 and 
the Russell 2000 Indexes 
3.2.1 Index changes 
      The way in which indices are formed can create an opportunity for arbitrage trades. Chen, 
Noronha, and Singal (2006) found that index tracking investors suffer losses around index 
changes. These losses account for a significant proportion of the abnormal returns experienced 
by stocks added to or removed from the index. They argued that changes to the S&P 500 Index 
are irregular and unpredictable, so index tracking investors are better served. 
      In contrast, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2006) found that investors tracking the Russell 2000 
Index suffer higher losses. Changes to the Russell 2000 Index are predictable because of fixed-
time changes and objective criteria. Similarly, Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004) suggested 
that the predictability of the Russell 2000 Index offers relative advantages for research on the 
                                                          
3
 For more information, please refer to “Annual Changes to the Nasdaq-100 Index. (December 11, 2000). PR 
Newswire. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.” 
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impacts of index changes, compared with the S&P 500 Index changes. Potential announcement 
effects could be eliminated on the announcement date, and changes of the liquidity and 
information costs should occur before the date. 
      The Nasdaq-100 Index changes are performed in two ways: regular index changes and 
irregular index changes. Regular index changes are primarily based on the market capitalizations 
on an annual basis. The public announcement is usually released via a major press release in 
early December and changes become effective after market close on the third Friday of 
December.  
      The market capitalizations are calculated using the Nasdaq official closing price on the last 
trading day of October, and shares outstanding from a public SEC document available on 
EDGAR as of the end of November.
4
 Given that data is generally known by all investors, regular 
index changes are typically predictable. 
      In contrast, irregular index changes can randomly occur, if securities no longer meet the 
eligibility criteria. Neither specific time nor reasons are publicly known until they are released, 
so irregular index changes are generally unpredictable. 
      According to the information signaling hypothesis, stock prices are adjusted to new 
fundamental information around index changes. The predictability of regular index 
reconstitutions may lead to complete changes of stock prices before the announcement date. On 
the other hand, significant changes in both abnormal returns and trading volume are expected on 
the announcement date for irregular index changes.  
 
3.2.2 Existence of index family 
      Given the S&P index family, additions to the S&P 500 Index are divided into two subgroups 
including pure additions, companies added directly to the S&P 500 Index, and upward additions, 
additions to the S&P 500 Index that moved from the mid-cap S&P 400 Index or the small-cap 
S&P 600 Index. Deletions from the S&P 500 Index also have respective subgroups. 
      Recent studies have taken into account the aspect by differentiating between “pure additions 
(deletions)” and “additions from (deletions to) another index”. For example, Zhou (2011) found 
                                                          
4
 For more information, please refer to “Nasdaq announces the annual re-ranking of the Nasdaq-100 Index. 
(December 11, 2009). Globe Newswire. Retrieved from Nasdaq OMX.” and “Annual changes to Nasdaq-100 Index. 
(December 11, 2000). Business Wire. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis database.”. 
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a significant difference of 5.224% in cumulative abnormal returns between pure additions and 
upward additions to the S&P 500 Index. Additionally, the cumulative abnormal returns for pure 
deletions (-15.89%) were significantly lower than that of downward deletions (-7.36%) around 
index changes. 
      Hence, different groups of revisions to the S&P 500 Index can experience different price 
effects. However, the Nasdaq-100 Index revisions only include pure additions and pure 
deletions. Whether fewer groups of revisions have an influence on our study are unknown, but 
the difference motivates us to focus on the Nasdaq-100 Index changes. 
 
3.2.3 International securities 
      Candidate companies for the S&P 500 Index must be based in the United States. On the 
contrary, the Nasdaq-100 Index includes both domestic and international securities
5
, as long as 
they meet the eligibility criteria.  
      Normally it is hard for U.S. investors to learn about non-US companies. Hence, U.S. market 
participants could be sensitive to any news with respect to international securities, and the 
corresponding market reactions will affect respective stock prices. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
found that foreign companies that cross list on U.S. exchanges experience an increase in stock 
prices. Consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, they argued that an increase in 
shareholder base is associated with a decrease in the cost of capital. The increased shareholder 
base and raised capital around the cross listing period leads to the excess returns. 
      In addition, Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002) found an increase in both analyst coverage and 
forecast accuracy for non-US companies that cross list on U.S. exchanges, compared with other 
eligible companies that do not. As changes in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy occur at the 
time of listing, they argued that cross listing improves non-US companies’ information 
environment, and hence, increases their market values. 
       In contrast to the S&P 500 Index, eligible international securities are allowed to be added to 
the Nasdaq-100 Index. In comparison of changes in price effects and investor recognitions 
between domestic and international securities, we could examine the investor awareness 
hypothesis.   
                                                          
5
 For more information, please refer to “Annual Changes To Nasdaq-100 Index. (Dec 29, 1997). Business Wire. 
Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.” 
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3.2.4 Summary 
       Unlike changes to the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 Indexes, the Nasdaq-100 Index is 
reconstituted in two ways:  regular index changes and irregular index changes. We can examine 
the information signaling hypothesis by differentiating between regular and irregular index 
changes. 
      Compared with S&P 500 Index, the Nasdaq-100 Index revisions include fewer subgroups, 
which are pure additions and pure deletions. We are motivated to examine whether the difference 
affects price effects around the Nasdaq-100 Index changes.   
       The U.S. investors are expected to be sensitive to news about the international securities, 
which can be included in the Nasdaq-100 Index. We could examine the investor awareness 
hypothesis by comparing changes in price effects and investor recognitions between domestic 
and international securities. 
 
3.3 Differences between the Nasdaq and the NYSE 
3.3.1 Introduction 
      There are two main stock exchange markets in the United States: the NYSE and the Nasdaq. 
The NYSE, located in 11 Wall Street in New York City, is the largest equity market by market 
capitalization in the world. The second largest equity market in the United States is the Nasdaq, 
found in 1971, which is also considered the first electronic stock market in the world.   
      Because of different market structures, usually one specialist is assigned to each security 
listed on the NYSE, while a Nasdaq stock generally has more than one dealer. The NYSE 
maintains a physical trading floor for all market participants; on the other hand, a computer-
linked system is used in the Nasdaq. 
      The multiplicity of market makers in the Nasdaq Stock Market results in the competitiveness 
of dealer pricing. Continuous markets in a Nasdaq stock requires each dealer to electronically 
post bid-ask quotes at least once per day.  
      Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2002) provide analysis of the nature and evolution of the dealer 
market for Nasdaq stocks. They found that the top three Nasdaq dealers combined execute the 
majority of daily trading volume. Besides that, a dominant dealer, who accounts for 
approximately half of the trade executions, is not always the same dealer every day. Given that 
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the NYSE specialist handles the similar fraction of daily trading volume, Ellis, Michaely, and 
O’Hara (2002) argued that the dealer market is more competitive than the specialist market.   
       Conversely, other studies present different findings regarding whether exchange listing 
affects stock performance mainly based on three aspects: investor awareness, trading costs, and 
stock price reactions. 
 
3.3.2 Investor awareness 
      Several studies have examined the link between exchange listing and investor awareness. 
Enhanced visibility is usually considered one of the major motives for companies to switch from 
the Nasdaq to the NYSE. To test this motive, Baker, Powell, and Weaver (1999) compared 
visibility of pre- with post-listing period of companies that listed on the NYSE. A regression 
analysis suggested that the improved visibility is primarily attributed to the increased market 
capitalization rather than exchange listing.  
      On the contrary, Kadlec and McConnell (1994) argued that exchange listing can affect 
investor recognition. They found that stocks that listed on the NYSE during 1980s experience 
abnormal returns of approximately 5 percent around the listing announcement. The excess 
returns are associated with an increase in the number of both registered shareholders and 
institutional shareholders.  
      Consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, Jain and Kim (2006) found that 
companies that switch from the Nasdaq to the NYSE experience positive price reactions. A 
simultaneous system of equations is used to test whether listing on the NYSE improves investor 
awareness and liquidity. They argued that the significant price increases are mainly explained by 
the enhanced investor awareness, and the improved liquidity provides a partial explanation. 
      Nasdaq-listed stocks could experience lower level of investor awareness than NYSE-listed 
stocks. Therefore any improvement in investor awareness related to additions to the Nasdaq-100 
Index could be easier to detect, but additional improvements in investor awareness have limited 
impacts on NYSE stocks that are highly visible to begin with. 
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3.3.3 Execution costs  
      Some studies argue that execution costs for Nasdaq stocks are higher than that for 
comparable NYSE stocks. Huang and Stoll (1996) found that execution costs, measured by the 
quoted spreads, are twice high as for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE stocks. The discrepancy can 
be explained by certain Nasdaq market structures such as internalization, preferencing of order 
flow, and the alternative interdealer trading system. These factors limit Nasdaq dealers’ incentive 
to compete, so they are reluctant to narrow the bid-ask spreads. 
      Consistent with findings provided by Huang and Stoll (1996), Bessembinder and Kaufman 
(1997) found that execution costs are, on average, lower for NYSE-listed than for Nasdaq-listed 
stocks. The differences in execution costs for small- and medium- cap stocks are more 
pronounced than that for large-cap stocks. They suggested two possible explanations for this 
discrepancy: larger inventory or order processing costs incurred by Nasdaq dealers, or larger 
economic profits earned by those dealers.  
      The early comparisons of execution costs for NYSE stocks and matched Nasdaq stocks 
provide evidence that trading costs for Nasdaq stocks are generally higher. Substantial market 
reforms, however, have been implemented since 1997, some of which can lead to decreases in 
trading costs on both exchanges.  
      For instance, the new limit order display rule allows public limit orders to compete with 
Nasdaq dealers, and the subsequently increased competitive pressure on Nasdaq dealers results 
in spread reductions. Weston (2000) found that differences between NYSE and Nasdaq spreads 
have been greatly diminished after the new reforms. However the bid-ask spread for Nasdaq 
stocks are still significantly higher by approximately two to three cents than that for NYSE 
stocks. 
      The 2001 stock market decimalization is another structural change that affects the bid-ask 
spread for both NYSE stocks and Nasdaq stocks. Bessembinder (2003) found that quoted bid-ask 
spread dramatically declined on each market after decimalization, and hence, execution costs for 
large-cap stocks are overall quite similar across the NYSE and Nasdaq. However, execution 
costs for small and medium capitalization stocks are still lower on the NYSE than the Nasdaq.  
      Nasdaq stocks are generally less liquid than NYSE stocks during the pre-reform period. 
Although Securities and Exchange Commission has implemented a new set of regulations since 
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1997, small but significant differences in execution costs for Nasdaq stocks and comparable 
NYSE stocks still remain. As a result, any improvements in liquidity surrounding the index 
changes could be easier to detect for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE stocks.  
 
3.3.4 Stock price reactions 
      A few studies suggested that different market structures lead to different price reactions to 
specific events. Any factors that result in different stock price reactions should be cautiously 
taken into account, because some hypotheses regarding index changes suggest different price 
patterns such as “permanent” versus “transitory” and “symmetric” versus “asymmetric”. 
      Elliott and Warr (2003) found that the NYSE-listed and the Nasdaq-listed stocks experience 
different price reactions around the S&P 500 Index changes. To be added to the S&P 500 Index, 
Nasdaq stocks experience a 2.5% higher abnormal return than NYSE stocks. For NYSE stocks, 
the price effect is reversed immediately on the first post-listing day, while there is a partial price 
reversal for Nasdaq stocks. Elliott and Warr (2003) argued that the different price effects can be 
attributed to the Nasdaq dispersed dealer system.  
      Differences between the NYSE specialist system and the Nasdaq dealer system also affect 
overnight abnormal returns around index changes. A daily abnormal return surrounding index 
changes is normally calculated on a close-to-close basis. However, the abnormal return is 
essentially composed of two parts: daytime price changes and overnight price changes. The 
behavior of investors has a primary influence on stock prices during trading hours. On the 
contrary, market makers play an important role during non-trading hours, because the next 
trading day’s opening prices are essentially affected by the opening procedure of a particular 
stock market.  
      Masulis and Shivakumar (2002) found different speed of price adjustments to overnight news 
on the NYSE/AMEX and the Nasdaq, which can be explained by difference in opening price-
setting mechanisms. The price reaction to NYSE/AMEX overnight announcements primarily 
occurs over the first trading day rather than at the open. However, the price reaction to Nasdaq 
overnight announcements is concentrated between the first quote and the official open, with an 
insignificant return over the reminder of the trading day. 
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      Kappou, Brooks, and Ward (2010) provide more pronounced evidence for the effect of 
overnight price reactions around the S&P 500 Index changes. As announcement of the S&P 500 
Index is typically released after market close, the first trading opportunity takes place at market 
open on the next trading day. Usually the opening prices of added stocks significantly increase, 
leading to lower actual trading profits. 
      Additions of NYSE- and Nasdaq-listed companies to the S&P 500 Index experience 
significantly different average abnormal returns on the first trading day after the announcement, 
most of which occur overnight. The overnight abnormal return for Nasdaq stocks is 6.65% on 
average, compared with 4.2% realized by NYSE stocks. Furthermore, Nasdaq stocks experience 
an overnight abnormal return of -1.15% between ED close to ED+1 open, which is significantly 
different from the one of -0.04% for NYSE stocks.  
      To avoid potential confounding effects, it is plausible to conduct research regarding index 
changes on stocks that are listed on the same stock exchange. 
 
3.3.5 Summary 
      As Nasdaq stocks are generally less liquid and have lower investor awareness compared with 
NYSE stocks, any improvements in liquidity or investor awareness around index changes could 
be easier to detect for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE stocks. Additionally, difference between 
NYSE specialist system and Nasdaq dealer system leads to different price reactions. To avoid 
potential confounding effects on a research regarding index changes, it is reasonable to examine 
stocks that listed on the same stock market. 
 
4 Sample Selection 
4.1 Introduction 
      The sample period extends from 1997 to 2010. The Nasdaq-100 Index changes are performed 
in two ways, including regular index changes that are based on the annual ranking review and 
irregular index changes that occur throughout a year. As a result of the absence of index family, 
the Nasdaq-100 Index changes only include pure addition and pure deletion. Hence, stocks added 
to or removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index are divided into four groups as follows: 
1. Regular additions are stocks added to the Nasdaq-100 Index that are caused by regular 
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index changes. 
2. Irregular additions are stocks added to the Nasdaq-100 Index that are caused by 
irregular index changes. 
3. Regular deletions are stocks removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index that are caused by 
regular index changes. 
4. Irregular deletions are stocks removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index that are caused by 
irregular index changes. 
   
      To examine potential effects associated with the S&P 500 Index, whether affected companies 
are members of the S&P 500 Index is taken into account.  
      Effective dates of historical component changes to the Nasdaq-100 Index between 1995 and 
2008 are obtained from the Nasdaq official website. Another list of component changes with 
corresponding effective dates between 2004 and 2010 is obtained from the COMPUSTAT 
database. All announcement dates and effective dates are verified using the LexisNexis database. 
If there is more than one official announcement, only the date of the earliest one is considered 
the announcement date. The first official announcement for irregular index changes is on June 
27, 1997, and the first one for regular index changes is in 1997. We obtain daily stock return 
from the CRSP database and daily returns of Nasdaq-100 Index and Nasdaq composite Index 
from the Bloomberg Terminal. 
      One special case that we cannot locate any official announcement is that of Lincare Holdings 
Inc. became a component of the Nasdaq-100 Index, effective on July 24, 2002. We used the 
announcement from the Nasdaq Press Release, which was released on July 22, 2002.  
      Mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, switching to other stock exchanges, delisting from the 
Nasdaq, and any other restructures that could affect the stock performance are currently 
considered confounding events.  
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4.2 Initial Sample 
The initial sample consists of 205 pure additions and 205 deletions from 1997 to 2010. Out 
of 205 additions and deletions, 136 are caused by regular index changes and 69 by irregular 
index changes.  
 
4.2.1 Regular additions 
      The initial sample of regular additions consists of 136 additions. 13 companies were 
members of the S&P 500 Index before they were added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. 2 companies 
were added to the two indices on the same day. 121 companies were not members of the S&P 
500 Index when they were added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. For the Non S&P 500 Index 
members, 17 companies were non-US based, while the other 104 companies were based in the 
USA. 
 
4.2.2 Irregular additions 
The initial sample of irregular additions consists of 69 additions. 2 companies that were 
involved in merger are dropped from the initial sample. Specifically, Versign Inc. added to the 
Nasdaq-100 Index on June 1, 2000. The company merged with Network Solution Inc., which 
was a component of the Index previously. On November 15, 2002, Comcast corp. merged with 
other companies to form a new company and replaced the former company in the Nasdaq-100 
Index.  
Out of the rest 67 companies, 4 companies were members of the S&P 500 Index before they 
were added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. 63 companies were not members of the S&P 500 Index 
when they were added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. Out of these 63 companies, 8 companies were 
non-US based, while 55 companies were US-based companies. 
 
4.2.3 Regular deletions 
      The initial sample of regular deletions consists of 136 deletions. 27 companies were members 
of the S&P 500 Index before they were added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. 109 companies were not 
members of the S&P 500 Index when they were added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. For those non 
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S&P 500 Index members, 6 companies were non-US based, and 103 companies were based 
inside the US. 
 
4.2.4 Irregular deletions 
The initial sample of irregular deletions consists of 69 deletions. To avoid the survivorship 
bias, we drop 39 companies from the sample because of mergers. To avoid the confounding 
effects that could be caused by different stock exchanges, we dropped a further 19 companies 
that were switched to NYSE, 4 companies that were delisting from the Nasdaq and 1 company 
that was switched to NASD over the Counter Bulletin Board. Additionally, 3 companies that 
were under chapter 11 are excluded from the sample.  
For the remaining 3 companies, we cannot find the reasons for 2 deletions including Tellabs 
Inc., which was removed from the Index on May 19, 2008, and UAL Corp., which was removed 
from the Index on July 21, 2008. In addition, Gemstar TC Guide International Inc. was deleted 
from the Nasdaq-100 Index on Dec 16, 2002, because of failure to file timely periodic financial 
reports. However, the security was still being traded on the Nasdaq after deletion.  
 
4.2.5 Final sample 
      The final sample consists of 136 regular additions, 67 irregular additions, and 136 regular 
deletions from 1997 to 2010. Nearly all the irregular deletions are involved in confounding 
events, so irregular deletions are not included in the final sample.  
 
5 Abnormal Return Analysis 
      In this section, we examine the returns behavior of stocks that are added to or removed from 
the Nasdaq-100 Index. As discussed before, there are three potential announcement dates for the 
regular changes to the Nasdaq-100 Index including the first trading day of November (AD1), the 
last trading day of November (AD2), and the actual announcement date (AD3). For irregular 
index reconstitutions, there is only one announcement date (AD). The effective date (ED) is 
defined as one trading day before the securities are added to or removed from the Nasdaq-100 
Index. The abnormal return analysis extends from one trading day before AD1 to 40 days after 
ED for regular index reconstitutions, and one trading day before AD to 40 days after ED for 
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irregular additions. The abnormal return analyses are performed on the full sample, and the 
affected securities differentiated by the S&P500 Index membership as well as the location of the 
company headquarters.  
      If significant abnormal returns are observed, we first analyze whether they are asymmetric, 
predicted by the investor awareness hypothesis, or symmetric, which are in accord with other 
hypotheses. If abnormal returns are symmetric, we then examine whether they are transitory, as 
predicted by the price pressure hypothesis, or permanent, which are supported by other 
hypotheses. The abnormal return is defined as follows: 
 
 
(1)  
      For day t,   is the rate of abnormal return on stock i,  is the rate of observed return of 
stock i, and  is the rate of expected return if the event does not occur for stock i.  
      Consistent with Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) and Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004), we 
examine the abnormal returns around three potential announcement dates and the effective date 
using the market-adjusted return. The Nasdaq Composite Index is used as the market proxy. 
                  (2)  
 
      The market-adjusted return has several advantages: 
1. It does not require a separate estimation period, thus avoiding the possible bias due to the 
choice of the estimation period. 
2. It does not require any assumption about the linkage between the past and the future. 
3. It is easy to use. 
4. It provides the largest sample size. 
      However, the use of the simple market-adjusted return may provide biased results, because 
they do not consider the sensitivity to market risk for each particular security.  
      For the robustness check, we also calculate the abnormal returns using the market model, 
where the parameters are estimated by the method of the ordinary least squares using the daily 
data from 41 to 240 days after the effective date with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market 
proxy. The method assumes that security returns follow a single factor market model: 
 
 
(3)  
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      For day t,  is the rate of return on stock i,  is the rate of return of the Nasdaq 
Composite Index. 
      Next, we estimate the rate of expected return as: 
 
 
(4)  
      Where  and  are ordinary least squares estimates of  and . 
      Unlike the market-adjusted return measurement, the market model requires a separate 
estimation period to estimate the parameters. A post-event estimation period may introduce a 
survivorship bias for deletions and decrease our sample size. However, Edmister, Graham, and 
Pirie (1994) suggest that parameter estimates can be biased using a pre-event estimation period, 
as stocks in the sample could experience a recent run-up in value compared with other stocks in 
the population. Particularly, regular changes to the Nasdaq-100 Index are primarily based on the 
market values of securities. Firms added to the index are more likely to have experienced 
increases in their market values during the pre-event estimation period than other firms in the 
whole population. The reverse is true for securities that are deleted from the index.  
      To compare and confirm our results, we report both market-adjusted abnormal return and 
market model abnormal returns. In addition to the student’s t-test, we also report two 
nonparametric tests, including the generalized sign test and the rank test to assess the 
significance of abnormal returns. These nonparametric tests do not require a symmetrical 
distribution of security abnormal returns for correct specification and are insensitive to the 
magnitude of abnormal returns. 
       For the robustness check, we also perform the analysis using Fama-French time-series 
model. The results are not quantitatively different. To save space, our discussions are based on 
the market-adjusted abnormal return and market model abnormal returns. 
      The average market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns and the market model abnormal 
returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy for stocks added to or removed 
from the Nasdaq-100 Index are reported in Tables 1 - 13 (Page 45 – 73). The results of the 
market-adjusted returns, the market model abnormal returns, and Fama-French time-series model 
abnormal returns are shown in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C, respectively. We will briefly 
describe each table in the following sections. 
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5.1 Regular Additions 
5.1.1 Full sample of regular additions 
      Table 1 summarizes results of abnormal return analysis for the full sample of regular 
additions. As shown in Panel A, significantly positive abnormal returns are only observed on 
AD3 among all three potential announcement dates. Specifically, these firms experience 
significantly positive 1.08% on AD3, which is significant by three statistical tests. The abnormal 
return on ED is not significantly different from zero. The cumulative abnormal return over the 
period from AD2+1 to AD3-1 is 3.66% according to the t-test and the rank test, suggesting the 
cumulative abnormal return over the period from AD3 to ED+40 is insignificant. 
     Consistent with the market-adjusted returns, all three statistical tests support that additions 
experience a significant abnormal return of 0.76% on AD3, as seen in Panel B. In contrast to the 
market-adjusted returns, these firms also gain 0.61% and 0.89% on AD1 and AD2 based on all 
three statistical tests. Consistent with results from Panel A, the cumulative abnormal return over 
the period AD3 to ED+40 is insignificant from zero, suggesting a complete price reversal. 
 
5.1.2 Regular additions that are members of the S&P 500 Index  
      The S&P 500 Index is the most widely followed index in the world. Stocks that are members 
of the S&P 500 Index could be tracked by a large amount of index tracking funds, which could 
weaken the price effects around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions.  Hence, we differentiate 
our sample around the Nasdaq-100 Index by the S&P 500 Index membership. 
      Results of the abnormal return analysis for regular additions that are members of the S&P 
500 Index are reported in Table 2. Based on Panel A, no significant abnormal returns are 
observed on either three potential announcement dates or the effective dates. All three statistical 
tests suggest that these firms gain 2.43% on the AD1-1. On every other trading day, we do not 
observe any market reactions. 
      Turning to the results using market model abnormal returns in Panel B, the t-test suggests 
that these firms gain 1.65% on ED+1. Even though the abnormal returns on three potential 
announcement dates and the effective date are not insignificant, these securities still experience a 
string of positive returns. The insignificant results could be driven by the small sample size 
(N=13).  
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5.1.3 Regular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are domestic securities 
      For stocks that are not members of the S&P 500 Index, we further differentiate them by the 
locations of the companies’ headquarters. A firm is considered a domestic security if the 
headquarters is located inside the United Sates, or it is otherwise classified as an international 
security. The relevant information is provided by the Nasdaq official announcements for the 
Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. Results for regular additions that are not  members of the S&P 
500 Index and are domestic securities are reported in the Table3. 
      As shown in Panel A, these firms gain 1.08% on AD3. In addition, a significantly positive 
cumulative abnormal return of 4.43% is observed over the period from AD2+1 to AD3-1. 
Nevertheless, we do not observe any significant cumulative abnormal returns over subsequent 
periods from AD3 to ED+40, and hence, the price effects are not permanent. 
     Based on the Panel B, the average abnormal returns of these firms on AD2 and AD3 are 0.84% 
and 0.76%, respectively. Besides, the cumulative abnormal return from AD2+1 to AD3-1 is 
2.73%. However, we do not observe any permanent price effects following the reconstitutions. 
 
5.1.4 Regular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are international 
securities 
      Table 4 summarizes results of abnormal return analysis for regular additions that are not 
members of the S&P500 Index and are international securities. Based on both measurements, 
these firms typically do not experience significant price effects on every trading day around the 
Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. However, these firms also gain positive returns on nearly all 
three announcement dates and the effective date, and the market-adjusted abnormal return on 
AD3 are marginally significant.  As a result, the insignificant results could be driven by the small 
sample size (N=17). 
 
5.2 Regular Deletions 
5.2.1 Full sample of regular deletions 
      Results of abnormal return analysis for full sample of regular deletions are reported in Table 
5. These firms lose 1.38% on AD3 as seen in Panel A. The cumulative abnormal return over the 
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period from AD3 to ED+40 is insignificant. However, these firms experience significantly 
positive returns of 2.01% and 0.82% on AD1 and AD2, respectively. 
      The market model abnormal returns suggest similar results. These firms lose 1.51% on AD3, 
following -0.63% on ED+1. In contrast, these firms gain, on average, 1.82% on AD1. The 
cumulative abnormal returns over the period from AD3 to ED+40 are insignificant, which is 
consistent with the market-adjust returns.   
 
5.2.2 Regular deletions that are members of the S&P 500 index  
      Table 6 summarizes results for regular deletions that are the S&P 500 Index members. 
Similar to the results for regular additions that are members of the S&P 500 Index, we do not 
observe significant market reactions on AD2, AD3, and ED, and also no permanent price effects 
following the reconstitutions. However, these firms experience significantly positive returns on 
AD1 based on both measurements.  
 
5.2.3 Regular deletions that are not members of the S&P 500 index and are domestic securities 
      Results for regular deletions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are domestic 
securities are shown in Table 7. Based on the Panel A, these firms experience significantly 
negative abnormal returns of 3.55% over the period from AD2+1 to AD3-1 and lose a further 
1.49% on AD3. The cumulative abnormal return over the period from AD3 to ED+40 is 
insignificant. 
      As shown in Panel B, these firms experience a significantly negative return of 1.64% on 
AD3. The price effects immediately reverse on ED, and these firms gain 1.53%. Over the period 
from AD3 to ED, we do not observe any significant cumulative abnormal return. 
 
5.2.4 Regular deletions that are not members of the S&P 500 index and are international 
securities 
      Table 8 summarizes results of abnormal return analysis for regular deletions that are not 
members of the S&P 500 Index and are international securities. No significant price effects are 
observed on three potential announcement dates and the effective date. Based on the market-
adjusted abnormal return measurement, these firms experience a permanent price increase over 
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the period from AD3 to ED+40. However, the sample size is too small for making a strong 
conclusion. 
 
5.2.5 Further analysis for regular deletions experiencing unexpected significantly positive 
returns on AD1  
      As we observe unexpected significantly positive returns primarily on AD1 for regular 
deletions, we perform the abnormal return analysis for regular deletions on an annual basis. The 
results are shown in Table 9. We find that the significant results are primarily driven by the year 
1998 and the year 2002. Regular deletions gain 10.29% and 11.85% in 1998 and 2002, 
respectively. In any other year, results are not significantly different from zero and mostly 
negative.  
       These unexpected significantly positive returns could be attributed to confounding events 
happened around the event dates. Based on information retrieved from the LexisNexis, we find 
that the G7 and IMF announced an implementation of further policies to avoid global economic 
deterioration and volatility in international financial markets on October 31, 1998. In addition, on 
October 31, 2002 the U.S. government released the third quarter GDP report that the U.S. 
economy experienced 3.1% increase in the summer. As a result, share prices closed sharply 
higher on the trading day following these dates, or specifically, AD1 in our case.  
 
5.3 Summary for Regular Reconstitutions 
      We observe unexpected significantly positive abnormal returns on AD1 for regular deletions, 
which could be caused by the confounding events based on our further analysis. Ignoring AD1 
and AD2, we observe significant increases (decreases) on the actual announcement date (AD3), 
and the insignificant price effects on the effective date for regular index reconstitutions based on 
the full sample analysis. We also differentiate securities by the S&P 500 Index membership, the 
insignificant results could be driven by the small sample size. Similar insignificant results are 
found for the international securities, and we cannot make a strong conclusion based on the small 
sample size. In light of the cumulative abnormal return over the period from AD3 to ED+40, all 
groups, except regular additions that are members of the S&P 500 Index, show insignificance, 
and hence, the results are consistent with the price pressure hypothesis.  
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5.4 Irregular Additions 
5.4.1 Full sample of irregular additions 
      Table 10 summarizes results for the full sample of irregular additions. As shown in Panel A, 
these firms, on average, experience a significantly positive gain of 1.11% on the announcement 
date. However, the announcement date effects are fully reversed on ED+1. The cumulative 
abnormal return over the period from the AD to ED+40 is insignificant, suggesting the absence 
of a permanent effect. 
       The market model abnormal returns suggest similar results, as seen in Panel B. These firms 
experience 1.28% and 1.73% on AD and AD+1. On ED, these firms gain an extra 1%. The price 
reversal starts on ED+1, which is a significantly negative 1.37%. The cumulative abnormal 
returns over the subsequent period from AD to ED+40 are not significantly different from zero, 
which is consistent with the results from market-adjusted abnormal returns.  
 
5.4.2 Irregular additions that are members of the S&P 500 index  
      Results for irregular additions that are members of the S&P 500 Index are shown in Table 11.      
Though the sample size consists of only 4 stocks, an interesting observation is still worth 
discussing. These firms experience significant increases on the effective date by using both 
measurements. Recall that we observe significant market responses on neither three 
announcement dates nor the effective date for regular additions (deletions) that are members of 
the S&P 500 Index. A possible explanation is that irregular additions are not predictable, and 
thus there may not be enough arbitraging trades to offset the trades made by institutional 
shareholders on the effective date. Instead, quasi-arbitragers are more prepared for the regular 
Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions, so we do not observe any significant abnormal returns for 
regular additions (deletions). 
 
5.4.3 Irregular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 index and are domestic securities 
      Table 12 summarizes results for irregular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 
Index and are domestic securities. As seen in Panel A, these firms, on average, gain 2.34% on 
AD+1. The price effects start reversing on ED+1. The cumulative abnormal return over the 
period from AD to ED+40 is insignificant.  
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      Turning to the results from the market model abnormal returns, these firms experience a 
significant increase of 1.09% on the announcement date, and an additional gain of 2.51% 
between AD+1 and ED-1. On ED+1, the announcement date effects partially reverse, and these 
firms lose 1.38%. The cumulative abnormal return over the period following the reconstitutions 
is insignificant. 
 
5.4.4 Irregular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 index and are international 
securities 
      Results for irregular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are 
international securities are reported in Table 13. Insignificantly positive abnormal returns are 
observed on AD and ED based on both measurements. According to the market-adjusted 
abnormal returns, these firms lose 6.21% between AD+1 and ED-1. However, the sample size of 
only 8 firms is too small to make any strong conclusion. 
 
5.4.5 Summary 
      For full sample analysis, we observe significant average abnormal return on the 
announcement date, and the price effects fully reversed one trading day after the effective date. 
The securities that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are domestic securities display the 
similar trend. Securities that are members of the S&P 500 Index experience significant return 
only on the effective date. We assume that arbitragers are not well prepared for the unpredictable 
irregular reconstitutions; however, the sample size is too small for making a strong conclusion. 
The international securities do not show significant market response on each trading day, which 
could be driven by the small sample size. The absence of permanent price effects for all four 
groups is consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
      The regular additions generally do not display significant increase on AD1 or AD2, while the 
regular deletions primarily experience unexpected significantly positive returns on AD1 because 
of the confounding events. In addition, we still observe significant market reactions on the actual 
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announcement date for regular index reconstitutions. Hence, the regular index reconstitutions 
may not be fully predictable.  
      For both regular and irregular index reconstitutions, securities added to or removed from the 
Nasdaq-100 index display strong market reactions on the actual announcement date and the price 
effects are fully reversed within 40 days after the effective date. Though we normally observe 
insignificant price effects on the event dates for securities that are members of the S&P 500 
Index, the results could be driven by small sample size. Additionally, we cannot make a strong 
conclusion for international securities because of small sample size. 
      We observe symmetric and temporary price effects for regular additions and regular 
deletions, and temporary price effects for irregular additions. Hence, we suggest price pressure 
hypothesis to explain returns behavior around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. Whereas 
Elliott and Warr (2003) find partial price reversal for Nasdaq stocks, we found the price effects 
fully reversed within 40 days after the effective date. 
  
6 Trading Volume Analysis 
     To examine whether there are changes in trading volume around the Nasdaq-100 Index 
reconstitutions, we analyze the trading volume following the similar method used by Campbell 
and Wasley (1996).  
      Ajinkya and Jain (1989) and Cready and Ramanan (1991) describe the importance of log 
transformation of the volume data, and hence, we first use a log-transformation of raw volume 
data: 
         
       
    
           (5)  
      For day t,      is the number of shares traded for stock i, and      is the number of share 
outstanding for stock i. The small constant of 0.000255 is added to avoid the natural log of zero 
in case that trading volume on a given day is zero.  
     Next, the abnormal trading volume is calculated using the market model: 
             (    )                   (6)  
      Where    and    are ordinary least squares estimates.      is the market volume for day t, 
which is calculated as 
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      Where N is the number of Nasdaq securities traded on day t, which are available in the CRSP 
database.  
      For the reasons as proposed by Campbell and Wasley (1996) find that the non-parametric test 
statistic is more powerful to examine abnormal trading volume than the parametric test statistic, 
the non-parametric rank test is used to evaluate the significance of changes over the pre- and 
post-event periods. For the robustness check, we use both pre- and post-event estimation periods, 
and the results are not quantitatively different. We also differentiate our sample by the S&P 500 
Index membership, and further differentiate securities that are not members of the S&P 500 
Index by the location of their headquarters. We do not find any significantly different results. 
Below we describe the results based on the pre-event estimation period. 
      Results of trading volume analysis for firms added to or removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index 
are reported in Tables 14 - 19 (Page 74 - 84). We do not observe any significant reactions on the 
announcement dates. All groups primarily display significant trading volume on the effective 
date. As seen in Table 14, the average trading volume on the effective date for regular additions 
(full sample) significantly increases 119.93%, and 95.92% for regular deletions (full sample).  
With reference to Table 17, irregular additions (full sample) display a significant increase of 
132.63% on the effective, following 68.74% on the ED+1. On each trading day following the 
reconstitutions, abnormal trading volume is generally insignificant. 
      To summarize, trading volume of firms added to or removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index 
significantly increases on the effective date and then returns to the normal level within 10 days 
following the reconstitutions. The volume effects we observed are also consistent with the price 
pressure hypothesis.       
 
7 Analysis of the Number of Shareholders and Market Makers 
      Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) suggest the investor awareness hypothesis to explain the 
price reactions to the S&P 500 Index reconstitutions. However, there is no direct measure to 
examine investor awareness. Consistent with Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004), we use the 
number of institutional shareholders, the percentage of institutional shareholdings, and number 
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of all shareholders as proxies for investor awareness. In addition, we also examine changes in the 
number of market makers for stocks added to or removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index.  
  
7.1 Institutional Ownership 
      Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004) report that institutional ownership significantly 
changes following the Russell 2000 Index changes. Specifically, firms directly added to the 
Russell 2000 Index and firms shifted from the Russell 2000 Index to the Russell 1000 Index 
experience significant increase in both the number of institutional shareholders and the 
percentage of institution shareholding, and the reverse is true for firms removed from the Russell 
Indexes or shifted from the Russell 1000 Index to the Russell 2000 Index. In addition, Shankar 
and Miller (2006) find a significant increase in both indicators for firms directly added to the 
S&P 600 index and firms moving up from the S&P 600 Index to the S&P 500 Index; on the 
other hand, firms moving down from the S&P 500 Index and S&P 400 Index to the S&P 600 
Index experience a significant decrease in the number of institutional shareholders and an 
insignificant change in institutional shareholdings.  
      Following the method used by Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004) and Shankar and 
Miller (2006), we examine whether firms experience changes in institutional ownership around 
the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions.  We manually collected data pertaining to institutional 
ownership including the number of institutional shareholders, the number of shares they hold, 
and the number of the outstanding shares for two months before the announcement date and two 
months after the effective date from the S&P’s Security Owner’s Stock Guide. The percentage of 
institutional shareholding is then calculated by dividing the number of outstanding shares by the 
number of shares held by institutional owners. Firms whose data are not available during the 
period are dropped from our sample, leaving 91 regular additions, 96 regular deletions, and 45 
irregular additions from 1997 to 2006. 
      We calculate the average of both the number of institutional shareholders and the percentage 
of institutional shareholding for the two month period preceding and the same average of both 
indicators for two months following the index reconstitutions for each firm. To assess the 
significance of changes in institutional ownership, we use the parametric t-test, the sign test and 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test. 
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      In addition to the full sample analysis, we also differentiate our sample by the S&P 500 
Index membership. For regular additions, 5 firms are members of the S&P 500 Index. Among 
the remaining 86 companies that are not S&P 500 Index members, 76 firms are domestic and 10 
are foreign firms. For regular deletions, 22 firms are members of the S&P 500 Index and 74 
firms are not. For firms that are not members of the S&P 500 Index, 71 firms are domestic and 3 
firms are foreign firms. For irregular additions, 4 firms are members of the S&P 500 Index and 
41 firms are not. For firms that are not members of the S&P 500 Index, 35 firms are domestic 
and 6 firms are foreign firms.  
 
7.1.1 Discussion 
      Table 20 (Page 86) reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of all three groups. We 
observe increases in both indicators for both regular additions and irregular additions, and 
decreases for the regular deletions. 
      Table 21 (Page 87) presents the examination of significance of changes in institutional 
ownership. Both regular additions and irregular additions experience significant increases in 
institutional ownership. On the other hand, regular deletions lose 15.46 institutional shareholders 
following the index reconstitutions, but changes of the percentage of institutional shareholders 
are not significantly different from zero. 
      Table 22 (Page 88) reports descriptive statistic for 9 subsets based on the differentiation by 
S&P 500 Index membership and the locations of firm headquarters. In general, firms added to 
the Nasdaq-100 Index show increases in both indicators and a decreasing trend is observed for 
the regular deletions. Firms that are members of the S&P 500 Index roughly have more than 
twice as many institutional shareholders as the firms that are not members of the index. This 
result can be explained by a larger following of the S&P 500 Index by institutional investors.  
      Table 23 (Page 90) presents the evaluation of significance of changes institutional ownership 
of different subgroups of additions and deletions. For regular additions, firms that are members 
of the S&P 500 Index significantly gain 60.2 institutional shareholders. For firms that are not 
S&P 500 Index members, domestic firms gain around 46 institutional shareholders following the 
reconstitutions. Correspondingly, the percentage of institutional shareholding significantly 
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increases by 2.10%. We do not observe significant changes in the institutional ownership for 
international firms.  
      Turning to the regular deletions, we do not find significant changes in institutional ownership 
following the reconstitutions for both the S&P 500 Index members and foreign firms. Domestic 
securities that are not members of the S&P 500 Index only experience a significant decrease in 
the number of institutional shareholders. Specifically, those firms lose 25 institutional 
shareholders following the reconstitutions.  
      For irregular addition, the 4 firms that are members of the S&P 500 Index gain 157.63 
institutional shareholders and 20.33% of institutional shareholdings. However, these results are 
not significantly different from zero primarily due to a very small sample size. Domestic firms 
that are not members of the S&P 500 Index experience significant gain in institutional 
shareholders (59.6 shareholders) and percentage of institutional ownership (2.60%) following the 
index reconstitutions. International securities show significant gain of 67 institutional 
shareholders following the reconstitution. The percentage of institutional shareholdings is not 
statistically significant. 
 
7.1.2 Conclusions 
      In general, firms added to the Nasdaq-100 Index experience significant increases in both 
indicators of institutional ownership and only the number of institutional shareholders 
significantly decrease for the firms that are removed from the index.  
      Firms that are members of the S&P 500 Index display significant, or insignificant but 
extremely large changes in institutional ownership, which could be driven by the small sample 
size. In addition, we cannot make any strong conclusion for international securities also because 
of the small sample size. Domestic firms that are not members of the S&P 500 Index experience 
significant increases in both the number of institutional shareholders and the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings when they are added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. In contrast, we only 
find a significant decrease in the number of institutional shareholders for regular deletions, but 
the change in the percentage of institutional shareholdings is insignificant. Our findings are 
similar to the results provided by Shankar and Miller (2006), as they find that securities that are 
shifted from the S&P 500 Index to the S&P 400 Index only experience a significant decrease in 
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the number of institutional shareholders but the change in the percentage of institutional 
shareholdings is not significantly different from zero.  
 
7.2 All Shareholders 
      According to the investor awareness hypothesis, more investors become aware of the 
existence of a stock following its index addition. For a stock removed from the Nasdaq-100 
Index, the number of all shareholders is expected to remain at the same level or slightly decrease, 
as awareness does not easily diminish. 
      To evaluate the changes in the number of all shareholders, we use the same method as 
suggested by Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004). For the pre-event period, the number of 
shareholders is obtained as close as possible to the announcement date. For the post-event period, 
the number of shareholders is obtained at least nine month after the effective date. The data on 
the number of all investors are obtained from the Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database. 
Because data is not available for all securities, the sample size used in this analysis is smaller 
than the initial sample size. 
      Changes in the number of all shareholders around the Nasdaq-100 Index are reported in 
Table 24 (Page 91), while the evaluation of the changes is shown in Table 25 (Page 91). A large 
difference between the mean and median for all three samples suggest that the data is not 
normally distributed. Therefore, we focus on the results of the two non-parametric tests that do 
not require the assumption of normality distribution.   
      Regular additions experience significant increase in the number of all shareholders based on 
the non-parametric tests. For regular deletions, we do not observe significant decrease in the 
number of all shareholders following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. In addition, irregular 
additions experience significant increase in the number of all shareholders based on the signed-
rank test. This increase is also significant at the 10% level by both the t-test and the sign test. 
      Results of changes in the number of all shareholders are consistent with the results reported 
by Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004). A possible explanation could be that investors become 
aware of the existence of a stock when it is added to the Nasdaq-100 Index. However, awareness 
does not easily diminish when a stock is removed from the index. 
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7.3 Market Makers 
      In addition to the analyses of Institutional ownership and all shareholders, we examine 
changes in the number of market makers around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. As 
discussed in the previous sections, a Nasdaq-listed stock generally has more than one dealer. 
Hence, it is plausible to assess the significance of changes in the number of market makers as 
stocks added to or removed from the Nasdaq-100 Index. 
      The number of market makers in the pre-event period is obtained in two months prior to the 
month of the announcement date. The number of market makers in the post-event period is 
collected in two months after the month of the effective date. The difference of changes in the 
number of market makers is defined as the average of both the number of market makers for two 
months before the month of the announcement date minus average of both indicators for two 
months following the month of the effective date for each firm. We collect the data from the 
CRSP database for the period from the year 1997 to the year 2010. To assess the significance of 
changes in the number of market makers, we use the parametric t-test, the sign test and the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test. 
      Results are reported in Tables 26 – 29 (Page 92 – 94). In general, securities added to the 
Nasdaq-100 Index experience a significant increase in the number of market makers, while the 
number of market makers for securities removed from the index remains at the similar level.  
      We also perform the sub-sample analysis using the same method. For stocks added to the 
Nasdaq-100 Index, we normally do not observe that the S&P 500 Index members and 
international securities experience increases in the number of market makers. The results could 
be explained by the small sample sizes for these stocks. For stocks removed from the Nasdaq-
100 Index, changes in the number of market makers are still insignificant in terms of sub-sample 
analysis, which is consistent with the results of the full sample analysis. 
      The results of changes in the number of market makers are consistent with results of changes 
in the number of all shareholders. For stocks added to the Nasdaq-100 Index, increases in the 
number of market makers can be attributed to increases in the investor recognitions, explained by 
the increase in the number of all shareholders. On the other hand, the awareness does not easily 
diminish, when a stock is removed from the index. Therefore, we do not observe significant 
decreases in the number of all shareholders and the number of market makers. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
      To summarize, stocks added to the Nasdaq-100 Index experience significant increase in the 
number of institutional shareholder, institutional shareholdings, the number of all shareholders, 
and the number of market makers. On the other hand, stocks removed from the index only 
experience significant decrease in the number of institutional shareholders.  
      A possible explanation for changes in institutional ownership is that the index tracking 
investors are likely to adjust their portfolio following the index changes to minimize the tracking 
errors. In addition, changes in the number of all shareholders and the number of market makers 
could be attributed to changes in the investor recognition. 
 
8 Liquidity Analysis 
      To determine if price effects following the index changes are associated with changes in 
liquidity, we perform the liquidity analysis for companies added to or removed from the Nasdaq-
100 Index. In this section, we examine changes in liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread, 
the dollar volume, the illiquidity ratio, and the zero-return ratio.  
      Similar to Erwin and Miller (1998) and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), the bid-
ask spread measurement includes the absolute spread and the relative spread. The absolute 
spread is calculated as the differences between the daily closing ask and bid prices. The relative 
spread is calculated by dividing the absolute closing bid-ask spreads by the average of closing 
bid and ask prices. A higher spread represents a greater transaction cost, which is associated with 
lower liquidity. 
      The dollar volume is the number of shares multiplied by the closing execution price. To 
approximate a normal distribution, we calculate the natural logarithm of dollar volume. 
      The illiquidity ratio is calculated by dividing the average of the daily absolute security return 
by its daily trading volume in dollars on a given day: 
        
 
  
∑
      
       
  
   
 (8)  
      Where        is the illiquidity ratio for security i,    is the number of days over the pre- or 
post-event periods,      is the rate of return for stock i on day t, and         is the respective 
trading volume in dollars for security i on day t.  
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      As suggested by Amihud (2002), the illiquidity ratio can be regarded as one of empirical 
proxies that estimate illiquidity. A more liquid security is expected to be associated with a 
smaller illiquidity ratio. 
      The zero-return ratio, suggested by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), is the proportion 
of zero-return days over the total number of trading days.  A lower zero-return ratio indicates a 
more liquid security. 
      We calculate the mean changes in each liquidity measure and assess the significance in 
changes over the pre- and post-reconstitution period by the paired t-test, the sign test, and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. Similar to Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004), the pre-event 
period ends 30 trading days before the announcement date, and the post-event period begins 60 
trading days after the effective dates. For robustness checks, we perform our analysis using 270-
day, 180-day, and 90-day for pre- and post-event periods. Specifically, we compare the (AD-300, 
AD-31), the (AD-210, AD-31), and the (AD-120, AD-31) periods with the (ED+61, ED+330), 
the (ED+61, ED+240), and the (ED+61, ED+150) periods, respectively. The results for changes 
in liquidity, which are reported in Tables 30 - 32 (Page 95 - 97), using three different periods are 
not quantitatively different. Therefore, we discuss results only based on the 270-day period.  
 
8.1 Discussion 
      Table 30 reports changes in liquidity for regular additions following the Nasdaq-100 Index 
reconstitutions. For the full sample, all five measurements display significant increase in 
liquidity following the index reconstitutions. Turning to the S&P 500 Index members, these 
firms only experience significant changes in dollar volume and illiquidity ratio. For firms that are 
not members of the S&P 500 Index members, domestic firms display similar results to the full 
sample. The liquidity for these firms permanently increases, supported by five measurements, 
following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions.  All liquidity measurements except the zero 
return ratio shows that the liquidity of international securities permanently increases. 
      Changes in liquidity for regular deletions around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions are 
reported in Table 31. Based on the full sample analysis, the dollar volume and the illiquidity ratio 
measurements show that regular deletion experience decrease in liquidity, while the absolute 
spread display significant increase in liquidity. Domestic firms that are not members of S&P 500 
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Index experience similar results. For both the S&P 500 members and international securities, we 
do not observe significant changes in liquidity, which could be driven by the small sample size. 
      Table 32 summarizes changes in liquidity for irregular additions surrounding the Nasdaq-100 
Index reconstitutions. For the full sample, firms experience permanent increase in liquidity 
following the index reconstitutions. Additionally, we observe the similar phenomena for 
domestic firms that are not the S&P 500 Index members. Though we do not find significant 
changes in liquidity for both firms that are members of S&P 500 Index and international 
securities, the sample size is too small to make strong conclusions. 
         
8.2 Conclusions 
      Taken together, the liquidity analysis suggests that firms added to or removed from the 
Nasdaq-100 Index experience permanent increase or decrease in liquidity. For the S&P 500 
members and international securities, we generally do not observe significant changes, which 
could be driven by the small sample size.  
 
9 Regression Analysis 
      In this section, we examine whether changes in liquidity are associated with the abnormal 
returns on the announcement date by using the regression analysis. We perform the same 
analysis on both regular index changes and irregular index changes.  
      The dependent variable is the market-adjusted abnormal return on the announcement date. As 
independent variables we use four liquidity measures which we discussed in liquidity analysis 
section. These liquidity measures are relative bid-ask spread, dollar volume, illiquidity ratio, and 
zero-return ratio. In addition, we use four control variables, which are firm size and three dummy 
variables. Firm size is defined as the market value of each particular security on the day AD-30.  
International security dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is an international security, and 
zero otherwise. S&P 500 Index membership dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is a 
member of S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. For the analysis on the regular index changes, 
we add another dummy variable, which is equal to one for regular additions, and zero for regular 
deletions. Results of regression analysis are reported in Tables 33 – 35 (Page 98 – 101). 
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      Table 33 Panel A and Panel B present results of regression analysis for regular additions 
group and regular deletions group, respectively. According to Table 33 Panel A, coefficients of 
relative spread, dollar volume, and illiquidity ratio are significantly different from zero. 
However, the coefficient of zero-return ratio is insignificant. Turning to Panel B, coefficients of 
four liquidity measures are significantly different from zero. In addition, firm size is positively 
related to announcement date abnormal returns based on both Panel A and Panel B. On the other 
hand, international security dummy variable and S&P 500 Index membership dummy variable 
are not significantly different from zero. 
      To compare and confirm the results of Table 33, we also perform the same regression 
analysis for regular index changes, which are the combination of both regular additions group 
and regular deletions group. Results are reported in Table 34. Similar to the results of regression 
analysis for either regular additions group or regular deletions group, coefficients of four 
liquidity measures are significantly different from zero. More specifically, dollar volume is 
positively related to the announcement date abnormal returns, while relative bid-ask spread, 
illiquidity ratio, and zero-return ratios are negatively related to the announcement date abnormal 
returns. The regression analysis results suggest that improvements in liquidity are associated 
with greater announcement date abnormal returns, and the vice versa. 
      Firm size factor has a significantly positive relation with the announcement date abnormal 
return, indicating that a firm with larger market-cap could experience a higher abnormal return 
on the announcement date around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions.  
      Coefficients of both international security dummy variable and S&P 500 Index membership 
dummy variable are not significantly different from zero, suggesting that whether a security is an 
international security or a member of S&P 500 Index is not related to the announcement date 
abnormal returns. 
      A significantly positive coefficient of regular addition dummy variable suggests that regular 
additions will experience higher abnormal returns as liquidity improves than do regular 
deletions.  
      Table 35 presents results of regression analysis for the irregular additions group. Similar to 
the results for regular index changes, coefficient of the dollar volume is significantly different 
from zero and has a positive sign, while coefficient of the relative bid-ask spread is partially 
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significant and has a negative sign. In addition, firm size factor is still positively related to the 
announcement date abnormal return, and coefficients of two dummy variables are insignificant. 
However, unlike the results for regular index changes, coefficients of both illiquidity ration and 
zero-return ratio are not significant.  
      Results of the regression analysis suggest a positive relation between changes in liquidity and 
abnormal returns on the announcement date around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitution. 
 
10 Conclusions 
      We examine the changes in price effects, trading volume, institutional ownership, the number 
of market makers, the number of all shareholders, and liquidity around the Nasdaq-100 Index 
reconstitutions. Table 36 (Page 102) reports a summary of results of our analysis. 
      We find a symmetric and transitory price increases (decreases) for firms added to (removed 
from) the Nasdaq-100 Index. The volume effects are also temporary; significant reactions are 
only observed on the effective date and trading volume return to the normal level within 10 
trading days following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions.  
      Firms added to the Nasdaq-100 index experience significant increase in the number of 
institutional shareholders and the percentage of institutional shareholdings, while firms removed 
from the index only experience significant decrease in the number of institutional shareholders.  
      The symmetric and transitory price effects and volume effects are consistent with the price 
pressure hypothesis. Significant changes in volume on the effective date are confirmed by the 
results of institutional ownership analysis. Hence, there are arbitrage opportunities for individual 
investors in the market. To acquire short-term profits, individual investors could purchase (sell) 
stocks added to (removed from) the Nasdaq-100 Index on the announcement date, and then sell 
(purchase) them before or on the effective date. For those index-tracking investors, they should 
adjust their portfolio before the effective date, as suggested by Chen, Noronha, and Singal 
(2006). Though the tracking error would increase, they could reduce losses caused by those 
potential arbitragers. 
      The number of market makers and the number of all shareholders significantly increase for 
stocks added to the Nasdaq-100 Index, while these two indicators remain at the similar level for 
regular deletions following the index reconstitutions. More individual investors are aware of the 
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existence of securities as they are added to the Nasaq-100 Index, motivating more market makers 
to trade these stocks. On the other hand, the removal of stocks from the index does not lessen the 
awareness, and regular deletions do not experience significant decrease in two indicators. The 
result is consistent with the investor awareness hypothesis.  
      The liquidity analysis suggests stocks added to the Nasdaq-100 Index experience permanent 
improvement in liquidity following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions. For the regular 
deletions, we find these firms experience decrease in liquidity following the index changes. More 
specifically, the dollar volume and the illiquidity ratio significantly decrease as stocks removed 
from the Nasdaq-100 Index. According the regression analysis, the changes in liquidity are 
positively related to the abnormal return on the announcement date.        
      For further analysis, we suggest that researchers should increase the sample size, because we 
cannot make strong conclusions for analysis of both securities that are S&P 500 Index members 
and international securities as a result of small sample size. In addition, a standard event study on 
other stock exchanges such as the NYSE could be used to compare with our findings.  
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Appendix-Tables 
Table 1 Regular additions (full sample) 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=136) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.88%   2.081* 0.972 1.004 
AD1 0.53% 1.256 1.315 1.001 
AD1+1 -0.30% -0.714 -1.601 -1.047 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.12% -0.614 0.972 -2.310* 
AD2-1 -0.35% -0.833 -1.086 -0.925 
AD2 0.45% 1.058 1.487 0.898 
AD2+1 0.83% 1.958 1.144 0.762 
AD2+1, AD3-1 3.66% 2.916** 1.315 2.731** 
AD3-1 0.92% 2.163* 1.315 1.479 
AD3 1.08% 2.546* 3.888*** 2.698** 
AD3+1 -0.19% -0.458 -1.429 -1.168 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.18% 0.214 0.286 -1.790 
ED-1 0.75% 1.760 2.173* 1.470 
ED 0.62% 1.458 0.801 0.573 
ED+1 0.30% 0.714 -0.057 -0.068 
AD1, ED+20 (N=129) 5.04% 1.511 1.632 -2.312* 
AD1, ED+30 (N=129) 5.44% 1.501 1.809 -1.920 
AD1, ED+40 (N=129) 6.32% 1.622 1.280 -1.626 
AD2, ED+20 (N=129) 5.88% 2.190* 2.513* -1.951 
AD2, ED+30 (N=129) 6.29% 2.068* 2.513* -0.635 
AD2, ED+40 (N=129) 7.16% 2.133* 2.689** -1.222 
AD3, ED+20 (N=129) 1.37% 0.599 0.047 -2.789** 
AD3, ED+30 (N=129) 1.77% 0.658 1.280 -2.589* 
AD3, ED+40 (N=129) 2.65% 0.869 1.456 -2.480* 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=129) -0.13% -0.062 -0.833 -2.672** 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=129) 0.28% 0.110 0.047 -2.885** 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=129) 1.15% 0.399 0.400 -2.851** 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=128) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.14% 0.370 -0.187 -0.423 
AD1 0.61% 1.650 2.289* 2.090* 
AD1+1 -0.43% -1.178 -0.187 -0.703 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.62% -1.031 0.344 -0.798 
AD2-1 -0.23% -0.629 -1.071 -0.160 
AD2 0.89% 2.412* 2.289* 2.123* 
AD2+1 0.57% 1.544 1.759 0.807 
AD2+1, AD3-1 2.21% 2.020* 0.167 3.261** 
AD3-1 0.44% 1.191 2.112* 1.565 
AD3 0.76% 2.065* 3.527*** 3.218** 
AD3+1 0.06% 0.154 -0.187 -0.102 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.74% 1.032 1.051 -1.956 
ED-1 0.67% 1.819 2.997** 1.880 
ED 0.75% 2.034* 1.582 1.123 
ED+1 0.37% 0.999 1.582 0.815 
AD1, ED+20 1.94% 0.711 0.697 -0.190 
AD1, ED+30 2.11% 0.712 1.228 0.374 
AD1, ED+40 3.05% 0.956 1.582 0.831 
AD2, ED+20 2.96% 1.346 1.228 -0.521 
AD2, ED+30 3.13% 1.258 1.051 0.974 
AD2, ED+40 4.06% 1.480 1.935 0.754 
AD3, ED+20 -0.14% -0.076 0.167 -1.509 
AD3, ED+30 0.03% 0.013 1.051 -0.347 
AD3, ED+40 0.96% 0.387 1.582 -0.047 
ED ,  ED+20 -1.64% -0.974 -1.425 -1.571 
ED ,  ED+30 -1.47% -0.717 -0.187 -1.357 
ED ,  ED+40 -0.54% -0.228 0.697 -0.841 
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Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=128) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.23% 0.610 -0.420 -0.308 
AD1 0.67% 1.772 2.223* 2.186* 
AD1+1 -0.55% -1.451 0.461 -0.671 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.44% -0.888 0.109 -0.738 
AD2-1 -0.21% -0.546 -0.596 -0.194 
AD2 0.78% 2.073* 1.518 1.771 
AD2+1 0.62% 1.641 2.399* 1.080 
AD2+1, AD3-1 2.45% 2.180* 1.166 3.305** 
AD3-1 0.56% 1.467 2.047* 1.762 
AD3 0.60% 1.595 3.632*** 2.769** 
AD3+1 -0.03% -0.092 0.109 -0.217 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.71% 0.967 0.637 -1.688 
ED-1 0.79% 2.083* 2.751** 2.085* 
ED 0.63% 1.667 1.166 0.748 
ED+1 0.49% 1.290 1.694 1.176 
AD1, ED+20  1.04% 0.371 1.870 -0.367 
AD1, ED+30  0.82% 0.270 1.342 -0.044 
AD1, ED+40  1.66% 0.506 1.518 0.612 
AD2, ED+20  1.81% 0.801 0.989 -0.836 
AD2, ED+30  1.59% 0.622 0.461 0.551 
AD2, ED+40  2.42% 0.859 2.047* 0.446 
AD3, ED+20  -1.43% -0.743 -1.301 -1.847 
AD3, ED+30  -1.65% -0.727 -0.596 -0.943 
AD3, ED+40  -0.81% -0.317 1.518 -0.623 
ED ,  ED+20  -2.74% -1.583 -1.477 -1.929 
ED ,  ED+30  -2.96% -1.407 -0.244 -1.874 
ED ,  ED+40  -2.13% -0.879 0.461 -1.283 
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Table 2 Regular additions that are members of the S&P 500 Index 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=13) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 2.43% 2.707** 2.965** 2.652** 
AD1 0.37% 0.413 0.191 0.273 
AD1+1 -0.07% -0.076 0.191 0.051 
AD1+1, AD2-1 1.09% 0.281 1.300 0.088 
AD2-1 -1.07% -1.189 -0.919 -1.362 
AD2 1.10% 1.229 0.745 1.002 
AD2+1 1.96% 2.182* 0.745 1.164 
AD2+1, AD3-1 2.19% 0.898 -0.919 -0.065 
AD3-1 1.01% 1.120 -0.919 0.184 
AD3 0.60% 0.670 0.745 0.690 
AD3+1 -0.03% -0.032 0.191 0.200 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.24% -0.137 0.191 -0.123 
ED-1 -0.01% -0.006 0.745 0.180 
ED 0.68% 0.757 0.745 0.209 
ED+1 0.72% 0.799 0.745 0.623 
AD1, ED+20 (N=10) 11.51% 1.415 2.463* 0.653 
AD1, ED+30 (N=10) 13.92% 1.571 2.463* 0.063 
AD1, ED+40 (N=10) 15.92% 1.670 2.463* 0.624 
AD2, ED+20 (N=10) 10.39% 1.597 0.565 0.460 
AD2, ED+30 (N=10) 12.81% 1.731 1.198 0.559 
AD2, ED+40 (N=10) 14.80% 1.808 1.830 0.778 
AD3, ED+20 (N=10) 6.38% 1.129 1.198 0.834 
AD3, ED+30 (N=10) 8.79% 1.322 1.198 0.763 
AD3, ED+40 (N=10) 10.79% 1.434 1.830 0.640 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=10) 5.21% 1.024 0.565 0.548 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=10) 7.62% 1.233 1.198 0.521 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=10) 9.62% 1.353 1.198 0.415 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=10) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 1.73% 2.511* 1.399 1.356 
AD1 0.78% 1.126 1.399 1.378 
AD1+1 -0.71% -1.027 0.133 -0.560 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -0.46% -0.156 0.133 -0.125 
AD2-1 -1.30% -1.881 -2.399* -2.102* 
AD2 1.77% 2.556* 0.133 0.951 
AD2+1 1.79% 2.589** 0.766 1.182 
AD2+1, AD3-1 0.88% 0.468 0.133 0.190 
AD3-1 0.67% 0.965 0.133 0.484 
AD3 0.66% 0.963 1.399 0.847 
AD3+1 0.21% 0.305 1.399 0.989 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.93% 0.683 0.133 1.536 
ED-1 0.16% 0.232 1.399 0.523 
ED 0.71% 1.025 -0.500 -1.068 
ED+1 1.65% 2.383* 2.032* 2.456* 
AD1, ED+20 8.18% 1.618 1.399 1.251 
AD1, ED+30 9.61% 1.744 1.399 0.602 
AD1, ED+40 12.16% 2.051* 1.399 1.386 
AD2, ED+20 7.87% 1.942 0.766 1.138 
AD2, ED+30 9.29% 2.020* 1.399 1.162 
AD2, ED+40 11.84% 2.324* 2.032* 1.551 
AD3, ED+20 5.22% 1.485 0.766 1.433 
AD3, ED+30 6.64% 1.606 2.032* 1.380 
AD3, ED+40 9.19% 1.964* 2.032* 1.471 
ED ,  ED+20 3.62% 1.145 0.766 0.861 
ED ,  ED+30 5.05% 1.313 1.399 0.910 
ED ,  ED+40 7.59% 1.717 2.032* 1.086 
 
 
  
50 
 
Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=10) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 1.79% 2.582** 0.777 1.644 
AD1 0.86% 1.244 1.410 1.416 
AD1+1 -0.86% -1.235 0.144 -0.338 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -0.85% -0.286 0.144 -0.304 
AD2-1 -1.28% -1.843 -1.755 -2.124* 
AD2 1.70% 2.446* 0.144 0.728 
AD2+1 1.72% 2.477* 0.777 1.307 
AD2+1, AD3-1 0.45% 0.238 0.144 -0.051 
AD3-1 0.59% 0.850 0.144 0.544 
AD3 0.40% 0.572 2.043* 0.743 
AD3+1 0.23% 0.329 1.410 1.017 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.70% 0.512 0.144 1.275 
ED-1 0.13% 0.190 0.777 0.473 
ED 0.59% 0.855 -0.489 -1.143 
ED+1 1.71% 2.466* 2.043* 2.650** 
AD1, ED+20  5.12% 1.006 0.777 0.989 
AD1, ED+30  5.95% 1.074 0.144 0.162 
AD1, ED+40  8.01% 1.343 0.144 1.046 
AD2, ED+20  5.11% 1.254 0.144 0.809 
AD2, ED+30 5.94% 1.283 1.410 0.657 
AD2, ED+40  7.99% 1.560 2.043* 1.145 
AD3, ED+20  2.96% 0.836 0.144 1.080 
AD3, ED+30  3.79% 0.910 1.410 0.932 
AD3, ED+40  5.84% 1.241 2.043* 1.030 
ED ,  ED+20  1.86% 0.583 0.144 0.567 
ED ,  ED+30 2.69% 0.695 0.777 0.508 
ED ,  ED+40  4.74% 1.066 2.043 0.676 
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Table 3 Regular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are domestic securities 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=104) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.68% 1.290 -0.391 0.125 
AD1 0.56% 1.068 1.179 0.858 
AD1+1 -0.54% -1.031 -2.156* -1.476 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.60% -0.710 0.394 -2.394* 
AD2-1 -0.39% -0.749 -0.979 -0.762 
AD2 0.43% 0.821 1.179 0.850 
AD2+1 0.67% 1.272 0.786 0.447 
AD2+1, AD3-1 4.43% 2.828** 1.963* 2.609** 
AD3-1 0.99% 1.878 1.375 1.424 
AD3 1.08% 2.053* 3.336*** 2.173* 
AD3+1 -0.08% -0.146 -1.175 -0.870 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.69% 0.676 1.375 -0.910 
ED-1 0.91% 1.729 2.355* 1.518 
ED 0.67% 1.280 0.590 0.574 
ED+1 0.23% 0.445 -0.194 -0.172 
AD1, ED+20 (N=103) 4.02% 1.021 0.886 -2.334* 
AD1, ED+30 (N=103) 3.79% 0.887 1.083 -2.510* 
AD1, ED+40 (N=103) 4.11% 0.894 0.492 -2.003* 
AD2, ED+20 (N=103) 5.13% 1.620 2.463* -1.988* 
AD2, ED+30 (N=103) 4.91% 1.369 2.463* -1.263 
AD2, ED+40 (N=103) 5.22% 1.319 1.872 -1.518 
AD3, ED+20 (N=103) 0.12% 0.044 -0.691 -3.116** 
AD3, ED+30 (N=103) -0.10% -0.033 0.886 -2.978** 
AD3, ED+40 (N=103) 0.21% 0.058 0.689 -3.043** 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=103) -1.63% -0.672 -1.479 -2.943** 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=103) -1.86% -0.628 -0.297 -3.316** 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=103) -1.54% -0.454 -0.099 -3.334*** 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=102) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 -0.01% -0.028 -0.488 -0.669 
AD1 0.55% 1.249 1.692 1.544 
AD1+1 -0.59% -1.333 -0.884 -1.088 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.94% -1.025 -0.290 -0.817 
AD2-1 -0.21% -0.472 -0.686 0.205 
AD2 0.84% 1.903 2.286* 2.046* 
AD2+1 0.38% 0.861 1.295 0.338 
AD2+1, AD3-1 2.73% 2.067* 0.899 3.398*** 
AD3-1 0.54% 1.216 1.890 1.676 
AD3 0.76% 1.729 3.078** 2.877** 
AD3+1 0.11% 0.240 -0.488 -0.247 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.96% 1.131 1.692 -0.812 
ED-1 0.78% 1.769 2.880** 2.104* 
ED 0.79% 1.791 1.890 1.418 
ED+1 0.19% 0.420 0.899 0.233 
AD1, ED+20 0.86% 0.263 0.305 -0.114 
AD1, ED+30 0.47% 0.132 0.899 -0.140 
AD1, ED+40 0.81% 0.211 1.097 0.507 
AD2, ED+20 2.25% 0.852 1.097 -0.405 
AD2, ED+30 1.86% 0.622 0.503 0.526 
AD2, ED+40 2.19% 0.666 1.493 0.538 
AD3, ED+20 -1.32% -0.591 -0.091 -1.818 
AD3, ED+30 -1.72% -0.650 0.305 -0.779 
AD3, ED+40 -1.38% -0.462 0.701 -0.691 
ED ,  ED+20 -3.05% -1.509 -1.875 -1.849 
ED ,  ED+30 -3.44% -1.401 -0.884 -1.798 
ED ,  ED+40 -3.11% -1.099 -0.091 -1.391 
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Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=102) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.11% 0.238 -0.569 -0.598 
AD1 0.64% 1.431 1.797 1.686 
AD1+1 -0.69% -1.559 0.022 -1.028 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.49% -0.780 0.022 -0.598 
AD2-1 -0.20% -0.448 -0.372 0.091 
AD2 0.74% 1.661 1.600 1.750 
AD2+1 0.48% 1.084 1.797 0.642 
AD2+1, AD3-1 3.09% 2.323* 1.600 3.410*** 
AD3-1 0.68% 1.528 2.191* 1.797 
AD3 0.63% 1.412 2.980* 2.434* 
AD3+1 0.00% -0.009 -0.175 -0.351 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.94% 1.097 1.008 -0.371 
ED-1 0.93% 2.101* 2.783** 2.307* 
ED 0.68% 1.522 1.403 1.024 
ED+1 0.33% 0.745 1.205 0.655 
AD1, ED+20  0.58% 0.175 1.403 -0.139 
AD1, ED+30  -0.24% -0.068 1.403 -0.449 
AD1, ED+40  0.14% 0.036 1.403 0.431 
AD2, ED+20  1.43% 0.537 1.205 -0.615 
AD2, ED+30 0.61% 0.201 0.022 0.130 
AD2, ED+40  0.99% 0.298 1.403 0.348 
AD3, ED+20  -2.40% -1.063 -1.160 -1.995* 
AD3, ED+30  -3.22% -1.211 -1.160 -1.399 
AD3, ED+40  -2.84% -0.943 0.614 -1.204 
ED ,  ED+20  -3.97% -1.948 -1.555 -2.005* 
ED ,  ED+30 -4.79% -1.935 -0.766 -2.158* 
ED ,  ED+40  -4.41% -1.548 -0.569 -1.653 
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Table 4 Regular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are international securities 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=17) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 1.10% 1.380 1.140 1.173 
AD1 0.82% 1.032 1.140 1.204 
AD1+1 0.87% 1.090 0.655 0.966 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.82% -0.537 0.170 -1.069 
AD2-1 0.15% 0.184 0.170 -0.086 
AD2 -0.11% -0.143 0.655 -0.539 
AD2+1 1.17% 1.463 0.655 0.456 
AD2+1, AD3-1 1.18% 0.496 -0.315 1.155 
AD3-1 0.43% 0.534 0.655 0.338 
AD3 1.41% 1.770 1.625 2.078* 
AD3+1 -0.63% -0.787 -0.800 -1.038 
AD3+1, ED-1 -1.83% -1.127 -2.256* -1.765 
ED-1 0.26% 0.325 -0.800 -0.076 
ED 0.32% 0.398 0.170 0.080 
ED+1 0.56% 0.703 0.170 0.183 
AD1, ED+20 (N=16) 7.58% 1.227 0.440 -0.673 
AD1, ED+30 (N=16) 10.75% 1.601 0.440 0.708 
AD1, ED+40 (N=16) 14.53% 2.015* 0.440 0.231 
AD2, ED+20 (N=16) 7.90% 1.578 0.440 -0.505 
AD2, ED+30 (N=16) 11.07% 1.958 -0.060 1.018 
AD2, ED+40 (N=16) 14.85% 2.381* 1.440 0.252 
AD3, ED+20 (N=16) 6.29% 1.479 0.940 -0.677 
AD3, ED+30 (N=16) 9.47% 1.892 0.440 -0.045 
AD3, ED+40 (N=16) 13.25% 2.342* 0.940 0.356 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=16) 6.23% 1.632 0.940 -0.398 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=16) 9.40% 2.028* -0.060 0.134 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=16) 13.18% 2.472* 0.440 0.436 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=16) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.08% 0.113 -0.403 -0.404 
AD1 0.86% 1.161 1.098 1.479 
AD1+1 0.73% 0.981 1.598 1.275 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -0.35% -0.112 1.598 -0.086 
AD2-1 0.29% 0.388 0.598 0.333 
AD2 0.64% 0.871 0.598 0.389 
AD2+1 1.01% 1.361 1.098 0.892 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -0.27% -0.121 -1.903 0.640 
AD3-1 -0.33% -0.448 1.098 -0.152 
AD3 0.80% 1.079 1.098 1.653 
AD3+1 -0.35% -0.476 -0.403 -0.273 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.81% -0.540 -1.403 -2.079* 
ED-1 0.28% 0.378 0.098 -0.385 
ED 0.51% 0.686 0.098 0.249 
ED+1 0.73% 0.990 0.598 0.359 
AD1, ED+20 4.93% 0.898 0.098 -0.549 
AD1, ED+30 7.90% 1.324 0.098 0.650 
AD1, ED+40 11.64% 1.816 0.598 0.372 
AD2, ED+20 4.42% 0.994 0.098 -0.688 
AD2, ED+30 7.40% 1.472 0.598 0.678 
AD2, ED+40 11.13% 2.008* 0.098 0.208 
AD3, ED+20 4.04% 1.070 0.098 -0.669 
AD3, ED+30 7.02% 1.579 0.598 0.186 
AD3, ED+40 10.75% 2.140* 1.098 0.598 
ED ,  ED+20 4.06% 1.197 0.098 -0.332 
ED ,  ED+30 7.03% 1.708 0.598 0.190 
ED ,  ED+40 10.77% 2.273* 0.598 0.606 
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Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=16) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.06% 0.078 -0.363 -0.343 
AD1 0.77% 1.022 0.638 1.481 
AD1+1 0.57% 0.753 1.128 1.164 
AD1+1, AD2-1 -1.50% -0.469 0.137 -0.403 
AD2-1 0.42% 0.550 0.638 0.519 
AD2 0.51% 0.677 0.137 0.163 
AD2+1 0.83% 1.097 1.638 0.883 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -0.38% -0.167 -0.863 0.564 
AD3-1 -0.26% -0.348 0.137 0.085 
AD3 0.58% 0.765 1.138 1.554 
AD3+1 -0.40% -0.524 -0.363 -0.344 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.76% -0.492 -0.863 -1.945 
ED-1 0.26% 0.344 0.137 -0.383 
ED 0.36% 0.479 0.137 0.134 
ED+1 0.73% 0.971 0.137 0.257 
AD1, ED+20  1.49% 0.265 1.138 -0.848 
AD1, ED+30  4.48% 0.735 0.137 0.501 
AD1, ED+40  7.46% 1.139 0.638 0.088 
AD2, ED+20  2.21% 0.487 -0.363 -0.902 
AD2, ED+30 5.21% 1.014 0.137 0.691 
AD2, ED+40  8.19% 1.446 0.638 0.003 
AD3, ED+20  2.08% 0.539 -0.863 -0.986 
AD3, ED+30  5.07% 1.117 0.137 0.052 
AD3, ED+40  8.05% 1.569 1.138 0.377 
ED ,  ED+20  2.26% 0.652 -0.363 -0.782 
ED ,  ED+30 5.25% 1.247 0.638 -0.045 
ED ,  ED+40  8.23% 1.701 1.138 0.332 
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Table 5 Regular deletions (full sample) 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=136) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.47% 1.005 0.483 0.324 
AD1 2.01% 4.330*** 3.061** 2.598** 
AD1+1 0.16% 0.342 -0.377 0.179 
AD1+1, AD2-1 4.39% 2.207* 2.202* 1.821 
AD2-1 0.52% 1.115 1.342 1.406 
AD2 0.82% 1.764 3.577*** 2.474* 
AD2+1 -0.90% -1.932 -0.893 -0.887 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -0.30% -0.262 -0.527 -1.758 
AD3-1 -0.73% -1.577 -2.956** -1.815 
AD3 -1.38% -2.975** -3.644*** -3.049** 
AD3+1 -0.70% -1.500 -2.440* -1.807 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.37% -0.480 0.160 -1.712 
ED-1 -0.65% -1.392 -1.237 -1.576 
ED 0.96% 2.070* 0.654 1.103 
ED+1 -0.03% -0.071 0.826 0.562 
AD1, ED+20 (N=129) 8.87% 2.447* 4.799*** 2.577* 
AD1, ED+30 (N=127) 8.32% 2.138* 3.937*** 1.606 
AD1, ED+40 (N=127) 9.02% 2.157* 4.471*** 1.980* 
AD2, ED+20 (N=129) 2.35% 0.805 2.680** 1.450 
AD2, ED+30 (N=127) 1.45% 0.445 1.802 1.046 
AD2, ED+40 (N=127) 2.15% 0.597 1.802 1.100 
AD3, ED+20 (N=129) 4.18% 1.684 4.975*** 1.905 
AD3, ED+30 (N=127) 3.23% 1.116 3.226** 1.386 
AD3, ED+40 (N=127) 3.92% 1.200 3.048** 1.551 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=129) 6.42% 2.863** 5.152*** 3.633*** 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=127) 5.44% 2.022* 4.471*** 3.021** 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=127) 6.14% 1.984* 4.115*** 2.811** 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=124) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.68% 1.402 0.983 0.793 
AD1 1.82% 3.756*** 2.242* 1.786 
AD1+1 -0.02% -0.041 -0.996 -0.056 
AD1+1, AD2-1 3.37% 1.628 2.242* 0.467 
AD2-1 0.48% 0.984 0.444 0.539 
AD2 0.48% 0.999 1.343 1.347 
AD2+1 -0.75% -1.544 -0.636 -1.122 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -1.62% -1.128 -1.175 -1.505 
AD3-1 -0.53% -1.099 -1.715 -1.547 
AD3 -1.51% -3.116** -3.334*** -3.363*** 
AD3+1 -0.85% -1.756 -1.895 -2.063* 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.93% -0.983 -0.996 -1.835 
ED-1 -0.63% -1.305 -2.435* -1.969* 
ED 1.25% 2.585** 1.523 1.437 
ED+1 -0.14% -0.288 -0.276 0.474 
AD1, ED+20 8.14% 2.269* 3.861*** 1.361 
AD1, ED+30 6.76% 1.735 2.962** 0.433 
AD1, ED+40 6.86% 1.638 3.142** 0.518 
AD2, ED+20 2.95% 1.022 2.602** 0.898 
AD2, ED+30 1.58% 0.483 2.063* 0.264 
AD2, ED+40 1.67% 0.464 1.703 -0.090 
AD3, ED+20 4.09% 1.664 3.681*** 0.805 
AD3, ED+30 2.72% 0.938 1.703 0.753 
AD3, ED+40 2.81% 0.859 1.883 0.246 
ED ,  ED+20 6.53% 2.943** 4.221*** 2.733** 
ED ,  ED+30 5.15% 1.912 3.502*** 1.864 
ED ,  ED+40 5.25% 1.694 2.782** 1.141 
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Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=124) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.51% 1.056 0.960 0.603 
AD1 1.75% 3.613*** 2.573* 1.774 
AD1+1 -0.01% -0.027 -1.012 -0.205 
AD1+1, AD2-1 3.25% 1.565 1.856 0.602 
AD2-1 0.41% 0.841 0.960 0.434 
AD2 0.32% 0.655 0.960 0.959 
AD2+1 -0.78% -1.604 -0.653 -1.030 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -1.38% -0.958 -1.191 -1.737 
AD3-1 -0.53% -1.083 -1.908 -1.498 
AD3 -1.42% -2.935** -3.521*** -3.213** 
AD3+1 -0.71% -1.467 -1.550 -1.753 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.81% -0.856 -0.653 -1.127 
ED-1 -0.64% -1.326 -2.087* -1.785 
ED 0.98% 2.025* 0.780 0.919 
ED+1 -0.14% -0.278 1.318 0.515 
AD1, ED+20  7.97% 2.217* 4.903*** 1.511 
AD1, ED+30  6.55% 1.676 3.827*** 0.353 
AD1, ED+40  6.83% 1.626 3.290*** 0.682 
AD2, ED+20  2.97% 1.026 2.752** 0.893 
AD2, ED+30 1.55% 0.473 2.573* 0.101 
AD2, ED+40  1.83% 0.505 1.856 0.004 
AD3, ED+20  4.03% 1.637 4.365*** 0.852 
AD3, ED+30  2.61% 0.900 2.573* 0.727 
AD3, ED+40  2.89% 0.880 2.931** 0.321 
ED ,  ED+20  6.27% 2.819** 4.723*** 2.708** 
ED ,  ED+30 4.85% 1.795 3.110** 1.742 
ED ,  ED+40  5.12% 1.650 4.006*** 1.202 
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Table 6 Regular deletions that are members of the S&P 500 Index 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=27) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 -0.52% -0.610 -0.704 -0.728 
AD1 1.97% 2.327* 2.379* 2.246* 
AD1+1 0.50% 0.585 0.452 0.935 
AD1+1, AD2-1 8.78% 2.414* 1.994* 1.766 
AD2-1 1.35% 1.600 1.608 1.925 
AD2 0.97% 1.151 0.838 1.070 
AD2+1 0.40% 0.471 0.452 0.714 
AD2+1, AD3-1 0.77% 0.332 0.067 -0.459 
AD3-1 -0.50% -0.595 -1.860 -1.534 
AD3 -1.16% -1.375 -1.475 -1.556 
AD3+1 -0.72% -0.855 -1.475 -1.350 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.80% -0.477 -0.704 -0.119 
ED-1 -0.54% -0.634 -0.704 -0.637 
ED 0.43% 0.513 -1.475 -0.788 
ED+1 0.81% 0.959 0.452 0.709 
AD1, ED+20 (N=25) 19.84% 2.953** 3.655*** 1.833 
AD1, ED+30 (N=25) 18.95% 2.590** 3.255** 1.211 
AD1, ED+40 (N=25) 20.86% 2.651** 3.655*** 1.942 
AD2, ED+20 (N=25) 8.48% 1.579 2.454* 1.192 
AD2, ED+30 (N=25) 7.59% 1.244 0.852 0.845 
AD2, ED+40 (N=25) 9.50% 1.406 2.053* 1.169 
AD3, ED+20 (N=25) 6.45% 1.386 2.854** 1.126 
AD3, ED+30 (N=25) 5.56% 1.014 1.252 0.829 
AD3, ED+40 (N=25) 7.47% 1.204 2.053* 0.856 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=25) 8.85% 2.109* 2.454* 2.333* 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=25) 7.95% 1.561 2.053* 1.867 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=25) 9.86% 1.682 2.454* 1.864 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=24) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.06% 0.084 -0.574 -0.280 
AD1 1.70% 2.487* 2.287* 2.177* 
AD1+1 0.05% 0.072 -0.166 0.396 
AD1+1, AD2-1 7.12% 2.422* 1.878 0.820 
AD2-1 0.96% 1.407 1.878 1.831 
AD2 0.75% 1.098 0.243 0.620 
AD2+1 0.69% 1.010 0.652 0.715 
AD2+1, AD3-1 1.71% 0.915 0.243 -0.403 
AD3-1 -0.01% -0.014 -0.983 -1.293 
AD3 -1.16% -1.693 -1.392 -1.903 
AD3+1 -1.00% -1.459 -1.392 -2.415* 
AD3+1, ED-1 -1.81% -1.348 -1.392 -2.543* 
ED-1 -0.81% -1.180 -1.801 -1.869 
ED 0.40% 0.582 -0.983 -1.076 
ED+1 0.89% 1.300 0.652 1.144 
AD1, ED+20 17.10% 3.406*** 3.513*** 0.672 
AD1, ED+30 16.62% 3.042** 3.104** 0.151 
AD1, ED+40 18.13% 3.084** 3.104** 0.744 
AD2, ED+20 8.27% 2.063* 1.469 0.309 
AD2, ED+30 7.80% 1.712 1.469 -0.013 
AD2, ED+40 9.30% 1.845 2.287* 0.086 
AD3, ED+20 5.81% 1.669 1.469 0.211 
AD3, ED+30 5.34% 1.303 0.243 0.245 
AD3, ED+40 6.84% 1.476 1.469 -0.142 
ED ,  ED+20 8.78% 2.801** 2.696** 1.992* 
ED ,  ED+30 8.31% 2.182* 1.469 1.456 
ED ,  ED+40 9.81% 2.240* 2.696** 1.107 
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Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=24) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 -0.15% -0.221 0.284 -0.392 
AD1 1.63% 2.349* 1.920 2.246* 
AD1+1 -0.06% -0.082 -0.125 0.089 
AD1+1, AD2-1 6.38% 2.138* 1.511 0.881 
AD2-1 0.80% 1.155 1.511 1.371 
AD2 0.70% 1.005 0.693 0.639 
AD2+1 0.53% 0.763 0.284 0.689 
AD2+1, AD3-1 1.29% 0.680 -0.534 -0.609 
AD3-1 -0.02% -0.023 -1.352 -1.270 
AD3 -1.18% -1.697 -1.352 -1.701 
AD3+1 -1.04% -1.503 -1.761 -2.380* 
AD3+1, ED-1 -1.40% -1.023 -0.943 -1.924 
ED-1 -0.61% -0.877 -1.352 -1.270 
ED 0.16% 0.228 -1.352 -1.454 
ED+1 0.87% 1.247 1.511 1.181 
AD1, ED+20  15.02% 2.948** 3.964*** 0.805 
AD1, ED+30  14.33% 2.583** 3.555*** 0.303 
AD1, ED+40  16.23% 2.720** 3.964*** 1.147 
AD2, ED+20  7.01% 1.722 1.920 0.498 
AD2, ED+30 6.32% 1.367 1.511 0.173 
AD2, ED+40  8.22% 1.606 2.329* 0.389 
AD3, ED+20  5.02% 1.421 2.329* 0.442 
AD3, ED+30  4.33% 1.041 1.102 0.459 
AD3, ED+40  6.23% 1.325 2.737** 0.066 
ED ,  ED+20  7.60% 2.387* 2.329* 1.925 
ED ,  ED+30 6.91% 1.787 1.511 1.388 
ED ,  ED+40  8.81% 1.981* 2.737** 1.179 
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Table 7 Regular deletions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are domestic securities 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=103) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.82% 1.606 0.905 0.858 
AD1 2.19% 4.289*** 2.486* 2.293* 
AD1+1 -0.14% -0.272 -0.874 -0.523 
AD1+1, AD2-1 3.33% 1.526 1.498 1.215 
AD2-1 0.31% 0.605 0.707 0.722 
AD2 0.85% 1.671 3.475*** 2.673** 
AD2+1 -1.36% -2.660** -1.467 -1.678 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -3.55% -2.306* -2.654** -2.044* 
AD3-1 -0.78% -1.535 -2.061* -1.247 
AD3 -1.49% -2.927** -3.049** -2.840** 
AD3+1 -0.72% -1.407 -1.863 -1.482 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.74% -0.744 -0.084 -0.355 
ED-1 -0.74% -1.448 -1.270 -1.709 
ED 1.16% 2.279* 1.498 1.813 
ED+1 -0.28% -0.550 0.707 0.233 
AD1, ED+20 (N=99) 5.92% 1.510 3.531*** 2.086* 
AD1, ED+30 (N=97) 5.27% 1.246 2.742** 1.289 
AD1, ED+40 (N=97) 5.13% 1.131 3.149** 1.449 
AD2, ED+20 (N=99) 0.36% 0.115 1.515 1.087 
AD2, ED+30 (N=97) -0.74% -0.209 1.316 0.775 
AD2, ED+40 (N=97) -0.87% -0.223 0.501 0.684 
AD3, ED+20 (N=99) 3.33% 1.244 3.733*** 1.999* 
AD3, ED+30 (N=97) 2.18% 0.696 2.742** 1.068 
AD3, ED+40 (N=97) 2.05% 0.578 1.927 1.501 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=99) 5.63% 2.328* 4.338*** 3.095** 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=97) 4.46% 1.529 3.557*** 2.629** 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=97) 4.32% 1.290 2.946** 2.258* 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=95) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.94% 1.674 1.290 1.142 
AD1 2.00% 3.562*** 1.701 1.509 
AD1+1 -0.27% -0.487 -1.177 -0.363 
AD1+1, AD2-1 2.49% 1.037 1.701 0.213 
AD2-1 0.36% 0.632 -0.560 -0.144 
AD2 0.45% 0.802 1.495 1.299 
AD2+1 -1.21% -2.151* -0.971 -1.684 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -2.63% -1.541 -1.793 -1.601 
AD3-1 -0.65% -1.155 -1.177 -1.167 
AD3 -1.64% -2.916** -2.821** -3.072** 
AD3+1 -0.86% -1.529 -1.382 -1.499 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.76% -0.693 -0.766 -1.774 
ED-1 -0.63% -1.118 -1.999* -1.685 
ED 1.53% 2.726** 2.112* 2.104* 
ED+1 -0.43% -0.769 -0.766 0.026 
AD1, ED+20 5.78% 1.384 2.523* 1.148 
AD1, ED+30 4.01% 0.883 1.701 0.335 
AD1, ED+40 3.21% 0.659 1.907 0.231 
AD2, ED+20 1.29% 0.382 2.112* 0.710 
AD2, ED+30 -0.48% -0.126 1.290 0.118 
AD2, ED+40 -1.28% -0.304 0.673 -0.336 
AD3, ED+20 3.47% 1.216 2.934** 1.193 
AD3, ED+30 1.70% 0.505 1.495 0.576 
AD3, ED+40 0.90% 0.237 1.084 0.414 
ED ,  ED+20 5.86% 2.277* 3.140** 2.312* 
ED ,  ED+30 4.09% 1.308 2.729** 1.530 
ED ,  ED+40 3.30% 0.916 1.290 0.717 
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Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=95) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 0.77% 1.369 0.822 0.922 
AD1 1.95% 3.475*** 2.254* 1.498 
AD1+1 -0.23% -0.410 -1.223 -0.430 
AD1+1, AD2-1 2.63% 1.096 1.436 0.411 
AD2-1 0.32% 0.570 0.209 -0.048 
AD2 0.26% 0.462 0.822 0.855 
AD2+1 -1.19% -2.127* -0.814 -1.549 
AD2+1, AD3-1 -2.17% -1.272 -1.427 -1.773 
AD3-1 -0.63% -1.129 -1.223 -1.086 
AD3 -1.52% -2.697** -3.064** -2.917** 
AD3+1 -0.66% -1.172 -0.814 -1.120 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.68% -0.628 -0.609 -0.763 
ED-1 -0.69% -1.225 -1.837 -1.667 
ED 1.24% 2.216* 1.640 1.650 
ED+1 -0.41% -0.732 0.618 0.069 
AD1, ED+20  6.49% 1.554 3.686*** 1.317 
AD1, ED+30  4.70% 1.037 2.459* 0.261 
AD1, ED+40  4.13% 0.847 1.640 0.349 
AD2, ED+20  1.90% 0.565 2.050* 0.726 
AD2, ED+30 0.12% 0.032 1.845 -0.065 
AD2, ED+40  -0.46% -0.109 0.822 -0.282 
AD3, ED+20  3.81% 1.338 3.277** 1.307 
AD3, ED+30  2.03% 0.605 2.254* 0.408 
AD3, ED+40  1.45% 0.382 1.640 0.439 
ED ,  ED+20  6.01% 2.336* 3.890*** 2.351* 
ED ,  ED+30 4.23% 1.353 2.459* 1.419 
ED ,  ED+40  3.65% 1.015 2.663** 0.775 
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Table 8 Regular deletions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are international securities 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model, and Fama-French time-series model  
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, the estimation period is from 41 
to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=6) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 -1.15% -0.938 0.046 -0.474 
AD1 -0.79% -0.649 -0.770 -1.039 
AD1+1 3.76% 3.075** 0.863 1.402 
AD1+1, AD2-1 2.91% 0.554 0.046 0.426 
AD2-1 0.36% 0.294 0.046 0.502 
AD2 -0.44% -0.356 0.863 -0.594 
AD2+1 1.14% 0.935 0.863 1.198 
AD2+1, AD3-1 1.08% 0.320 0.863 -0.145 
AD3-1 -0.91% -0.744 -1.587 -1.452 
AD3 -0.49% -0.398 -1.587 -0.995 
AD3+1 -0.23% -0.188 -0.770 -0.586 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.48% -0.193 0.863 0.229 
ED-1 0.42% 0.343 0.863 0.339 
ED -0.09% -0.074 0.046 -0.414 
ED+1 0.42% 0.342 0.046 0.669 
AD1, ED+20 (N=5) 12.26% 1.173 0.486 0.327 
AD1, ED+30 (N=5) 14.51% 1.276 0.486 0.352 
AD1, ED+40 (N=5) 25.30% 2.070* 0.486 0.874 
AD2, ED+20 (N=5) 11.03% 1.316 1.381 0.777 
AD2, ED+30 (N=5) 13.29% 1.398 1.381 0.767 
AD2, ED+40 (N=5) 24.07% 2.291* 2.275* 1.321 
AD3, ED+20 (N=5) 9.60% 1.324 2.275* 0.877 
AD3, ED+30 (N=5) 11.86% 1.391 1.381 0.984 
AD3, ED+40 (N=5) 22.65% 2.351* 2.275* 1.459 
ED ,  ED+20 (N=5) 9.73% 1.498 1.381 1.499 
ED ,  ED+30 (N=5) 11.98% 1.519 2.275* 1.117 
ED ,  ED+40 (N=5) 22.77% 2.509* 2.275* 1.748 
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Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=5) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 -1.33% -1.180 0.533 -0.530 
AD1 -1.13% -1.001 -1.258 -1.377 
AD1+1 4.47% 3.963*** 0.533 0.793 
AD1+1, AD2-1 2.06% 0.425 -0.363 -0.310 
AD2-1 0.43% 0.383 0.533 0.459 
AD2 -0.18% -0.160 -0.363 0.348 
AD2+1 1.13% 0.997 -0.363 0.448 
AD2+1, AD3-1 1.54% 0.487 1.428 -0.299 
AD3-1 -0.80% -0.707 -1.258 -0.931 
AD3 -0.70% -0.617 -1.258 -0.889 
AD3+1 0.04% 0.035 -0.363 -0.012 
AD3+1, ED-1 0.06% 0.027 1.428 1.142 
ED-1 0.15% 0.137 0.533 0.517 
ED 0.00% -0.004 0.533 -0.310 
ED+1 0.50% 0.439 0.533 0.657 
AD1, ED+20 9.94% 1.194 0.533 -0.354 
AD1, ED+30 11.78% 1.300 0.533 -0.132 
AD1, ED+40 22.09% 2.269* 0.533 0.257 
AD2, ED+20 9.01% 1.349 0.533 0.215 
AD2, ED+30 10.85% 1.432 1.428 0.490 
AD2, ED+40 21.16% 2.528* 0.533 0.934 
AD3, ED+20 7.66% 1.325 2.323* 0.299 
AD3, ED+30 9.49% 1.398 1.428 0.835 
AD3, ED+40 19.81% 2.582** 1.428 1.173 
ED ,  ED+20 8.29% 1.603 1.428 0.761 
ED ,  ED+30 10.13% 1.611 2.323* 0.614 
ED ,  ED+40 20.44% 2.828** 2.323* 1.187 
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Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=5) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD1-1 -1.22% -1.051 0.573 -0.399 
AD1 -1.49% -1.283 -1.219 -1.634 
AD1+1 4.36% 3.769*** 0.573 0.901 
AD1+1, AD2-1 0.06% 0.012 -0.323 -0.595 
AD2-1 0.21% 0.177 0.573 0.172 
AD2 -0.39% -0.334 -0.323 0.142 
AD2+1 0.95% 0.816 -0.323 0.435 
AD2+1, AD3-1 0.92% 0.286 1.468 -0.369 
AD3-1 -0.88% -0.761 -1.219 -1.055 
AD3 -0.86% -0.740 -1.219 -1.035 
AD3+1 -0.14% -0.125 -0.323 -0.124 
AD3+1, ED-1 -0.40% -0.167 1.468 0.848 
ED-1 0.05% 0.043 0.573 0.470 
ED -0.11% -0.092 -0.323 -0.394 
ED+1 0.36% 0.308 0.573 0.577 
AD1, ED+20  2.66% 0.311 -0.323 -0.828 
AD1, ED+30  4.68% 0.503 0.573 -0.460 
AD1, ED+40  13.57% 1.358 0.573 -0.056 
AD2, ED+20  4.08% 0.596 0.573 -0.220 
AD2, ED+30 6.10% 0.785 1.468 0.311 
AD2, ED+40  14.99% 1.746 0.573 0.744 
AD3, ED+20  3.55% 0.598 2.364* -0.284 
AD3, ED+30  5.56% 0.799 0.573 0.650 
AD3, ED+40  14.45% 1.836 1.468 0.959 
ED ,  ED+20  4.80% 0.904 1.468 0.372 
ED ,  ED+30 6.82% 1.057 1.468 0.474 
ED ,  ED+40  15.71% 2.118* 2.364* 1.028 
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Table 9 Abnormal return analysis for regular deletion on the annual basis 
Note: Reported on Panel A and Panel B are market-adjusted and market model abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with 
the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, respectively. For the market model abnormal return, 
the estimation period is from 41 to 240 days after the effective date. 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=136) 
Year   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
1997 -0.0035 -0.272 0.040 0.141 
1998 0.1029 7.332*** 2.786** 3.270** 
1999 0.0080 0.614 1.100 1.221 
2000 0.0091 0.519 1.959 0.902 
2001 -0.0258 -0.920 -1.594 -1.012 
2002 0.1185 5.540*** 4.152*** 3.091** 
2003 -0.0002 -0.011 0.078 -0.042 
2004 -0.0006 -0.066 -0.651 -0.515 
2005 -0.0034 -0.457 -0.424 -0.495 
2006 -0.0114 -0.836 -0.489 -1.210 
2007 -0.0098 -1.005 -0.174 -0.897 
2008 0.0254 2.177* 1.190 1.214 
2009 0.0007 0.055 1.134 0.174 
2010 0.0032 0.474 1.230 0.763 
 
 
Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=124) 
Year   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
1997 -0.0030 -0.195 -0.087 0.272 
1998 0.1123 6.068*** 2.668*** 3.035** 
1999 0.0071 0.550 1.040 1.253 
2000 0.0045 0.372 1.149 0.741 
2001 -0.0304 -1.126 -1.854 -1.407 
2002 0.1069 6.833*** 3.359*** 2.936** 
2003 -0.0093 -0.951 1.110 -0.704 
2004 -0.0013 -0.194 -1.059 -0.731 
2005 -0.0030 -0.459 0.124 -0.610 
2006 -0.0123 -1.163 -0.543 -1.400 
2007 -0.0074 -0.449 -0.404 -0.688 
2008 0.0230 1.801 1.143 1.072 
2009 -0.0001 -0.008 1.283 0.230 
2010 . . . . 
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Table 10 Irregular additions (full sample) 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model and Fama-French time-series model 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD and ED refer to the announcement date and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal 
return, the estimation period is from 41 to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=67) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.49% 0.974 0.208 1.060 
AD 1.11% 2.208* 1.674 2.412* 
AD+1 (N=46) 1.74% 2.742** 1.937 1.825 
AD+1, ED-1 (N=46) 1.16% 1.103 0.462 0.209 
ED-1 (N=45) -0.17% -0.261 -0.573 -0.524 
ED 0.92% 1.826 1.674 1.980* 
ED+1 -1.46% -2.921** -2.969** -4.142*** 
AD, ED+20  0.19% 0.077 -1.014 -2.434* 
AD, ED+30  -0.78% -0.269 -0.281 -2.619** 
AD, ED+40 0.55% 0.167 -0.036 0.038 
ED ,  ED+20  -1.43% -0.622 -0.770 -2.952** 
ED ,  ED+30  -2.40% -0.860 -0.770 -3.336*** 
ED ,  ED+40  -1.06% -0.331 0.208 -2.940** 
 
Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=67) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.26% 0.551 0.733 1.524 
AD 1.28% 2.737** 2.934** 3.116** 
AD+1 (N=46) 1.73% 2.952** 2.141* 2.606** 
AD+1, ED-1 (N=46) 1.41% 1.440 2.141* 0.562 
ED-1 (N=45) 0.03% 0.045 0.514 0.012 
ED 1.00% 2.142* 2.200* 2.817** 
ED+1 -1.37% -2.935** -2.936** -3.919*** 
AD, ED+20 1.91% 0.839 -0.246 -0.373 
AD, ED+30 0.45% 0.167 -0.490 -0.410 
AD, ED+40 1.11% 0.358 -0.001 1.736 
ED ,  ED+20 0.00% 0.000 -0.979 -0.341 
ED ,  ED+30 -1.46% -0.560 -0.490 -0.432 
ED ,  ED+40 -0.80% -0.269 -1.224 0.080 
 
Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=67) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.19% 0.404 0.990 1.397 
AD 1.26% 2.716** 2.703** 2.935** 
AD+1 (N=46) 1.69% 2.837** 2.166* 2.283* 
AD+1, ED-1 (N=46) 1.21% 1.222 1.575 0.461 
ED-1 (N=45) -0.09% -0.147 0.240 -0.230 
ED 0.93% 1.997* 2.703** 2.561* 
ED+1 -1.43% -3.089** -3.168** -4.058*** 
AD, ED+20  0.73% 0.324 -0.477 -0.776 
AD, ED+30  -0.67% -0.248 -0.722 -0.805 
AD, ED+40 -0.19% -0.061 0.012 1.496 
ED ,  ED+20  -1.05% -0.494 -0.722 -0.754 
ED ,  ED+30  -2.45% -0.950 -0.966 -0.792 
ED ,  ED+40  -1.97% -0.664 -0.966 -0.335 
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Table 11 Irregular additions that are members of the S&P 500 Index 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model and Fama-French time-series model 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD and ED refer to the announcement date and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal 
return, the estimation period is from 41 to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=4) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.00% 0.000 0.061 -0.005 
AD 2.50% 0.978 0.061 0.642 
AD+1 -1.92% -0.749 0.061 -0.830 
AD+1, ED-1    -1.22% -0.336 0.061 0.285 
ED-1  0.16% 0.061 0.061 -0.143 
ED  6.53% 2.551* 2.062* 2.205* 
ED+1 -3.60% -1.408 -0.939 -1.752 
AD, ED+20  -7.19% -0.574 0.061 -0.528 
AD, ED+30  7.54% 0.505 1.061 0.022 
AD, ED+40 -7.59% -0.447 0.061 -0.517 
ED ,  ED+20  -8.48% -0.723 1.061 -0.958 
ED ,  ED+30  6.25% 0.439 1.061 -0.233 
ED ,  ED+40  -8.88% -0.542 0.061 -0.619 
 
Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=4) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 -0.27% -0.114 0.000 -0.224 
AD 3.37% 1.436 0.000 0.839 
AD+1 -0.76% -0.323 1.000 0.385 
AD+1, ED-1 0.27% 0.082 0.000 1.109 
ED-1  0.26% 0.111 1.000 0.207 
ED  7.81% 3.333*** 2.000* 2.592* 
ED+1 -3.06% -1.307 -2.000* -1.832 
AD, ED+20 7.92% 0.690 1.000 0.524 
AD, ED+30 20.23% 1.481 1.000 1.114 
AD, ED+40 8.54% 0.550 1.000 0.189 
ED ,  ED+20 4.28% 0.399 1.000 -0.203 
ED ,  ED+30 16.60% 1.272 1.000 0.535 
ED ,  ED+40 4.91% 0.327 1.000 0.216 
      
Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=4) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.44% 0.014 0.078 -0.046 
AD 3.44% 1.344 0.078 0.841 
AD+1 -1.00% -0.391 1.079 0.189 
AD+1, ED-1 -0.49% -0.135 0.078 0.674 
ED-1 -0.23% -0.089 0.078 -0.057 
ED 7.30% 2.851** 2.080* 2.554* 
ED+1 -2.63% -1.026 -1.923 -1.552 
AD, ED+20  4.47% 0.357 1.079 0.245 
AD, ED+30  18.45% 1.236 1.079 0.898 
AD, ED+40 3.65% 0.215 1.079 -0.141 
ED ,  ED+20  1.52% 0.130 1.079 -0.369 
ED ,  ED+30  15.50% 1.087 1.079 0.433 
ED ,  ED+40  0.70% 0.043 1.079 -0.056 
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Table 12 Irregular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are domestic securities 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model and Fama-French time-series model 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD and ED refer to the announcement date and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal 
return, the estimation period is from 41 to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=55) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.39% 0.698 -0.291 0.609 
AD 0.91% 1.637 1.327 1.735 
AD+1(N=37) 2.34% 3.275** 2.327* 2.549* 
AD+1, ED-1 (N=37) 2.41% 2.019* 1.011 0.774 
ED-1 (N=36) 0.07% 0.100 -0.472 -0.211 
ED 0.13% 0.235 0.788 1.260 
ED+1 -1.47% -2.642** -2.989** -4.031*** 
AD, ED+20  1.02% 0.375 -0.831 -2.206* 
AD, ED+30  -0.91% -0.282 -0.021 -2.135* 
AD, ED+40 1.92% 0.522 0.248 0.455 
ED ,  ED+20  -1.30% -0.508 -1.100 -2.436* 
ED ,  ED+30  -3.23% -1.041 -0.831 -2.905** 
ED ,  ED+40  -0.39% -0.110 0.788 -2.494* 
 
Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=55) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.16% 0.325 0.198 1.096 
AD 1.09% 2.196* 2.628** 2.378* 
AD+1 (N=37) 2.29% 3.685*** 2.166* 3.204** 
AD+1, ED-1(N=37) 2.51% 2.415* 2.495* 1.035 
ED-1 (N=36) 0.25% 0.396 0.349 0.220 
ED 0.19% 0.381 1.548 2.063* 
ED+1 -1.38% -2.785** 2.771** -3.566*** 
AD, ED+20 2.44% 1.012 0.198 -0.104 
AD, ED+30 0.30% 0.106 -0.071 0.020 
AD, ED+40 2.36% 0.721 0.198 2.072* 
ED ,  ED+20 -0.06% -0.026 -0.611 0.137 
ED ,  ED+30 -2.19% -0.797 -0.341 -0.075 
ED ,  ED+40 -0.14% -0.044 -0.881 0.429 
       
Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=55) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.10% 0.202 0.482 0.993 
AD 1.07% 2.147* 2.372* 2.242* 
AD+1 (N=37) 2.14% 3.416*** 2.176* 2.792** 
AD+1, ED-1 (N=37) 2.32% 2.218* 1.847 0.978 
ED-1 (N=36) 0.24% 0.376 0.359 0.118 
ED 0.12% 0.234 1.832 1.723 
ED+1 -1.45% -2.924** -2.757** -3.669*** 
AD, ED+20  1.22% 0.504 -0.058 -0.474 
AD, ED+30  -0.89% -0.309 -0.328 -0.333 
AD, ED+40 1.14% 0.347 0.212 1.924 
ED ,  ED+20  -1.13% -0.496 -0.328 -0.241 
ED ,  ED+30  -3.25% -1.173 -0.598 -0.391 
ED ,  ED+40  -1.21% -0.380 -0.868 0.126 
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Table 13 Irregular additions that are not members of the S&P 500 Index and are international securities 
Note: Reported on Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C are market-adjusted, market model and Fama-French time-series model 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns with the Nasdaq Composite Index as the market proxy, expressed as percentage, 
respectively. AD and ED refer to the announcement date and the effective date, respectively. For the market model abnormal 
return, the estimation period is from 41 to 240 days after the effective date.  
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level.  
 
Panel A: Market Adjusted Returns (N=8) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 1.42% 1.351 1.323 1.640 
AD 1.74% 1.663 1.323 2.304* 
AD+1(N=5) 0.15% 0.099 -0.508 -0.721 
AD+1, ED-1(N=5) -6.21% -2.334* -1.402 -3.355*** 
ED-1 (N=5) -2.13% -1.432 -0.508 -0.925 
ED 3.50% 3.339*** 1.323 1.058 
ED+1 -0.34% -0.325 -0.092 -0.514 
AD, ED+20  -1.83% -0.360 -0.800 -1.370 
AD, ED+30  -4.04% -0.665 -1.507 -2.634** 
AD, ED+40 -4.78% -0.690 -0.800 -2.374* 
ED ,  ED+20  1.20% 0.250 -0.092 -1.927 
ED ,  ED+30  -1.01% -0.173 -0.800 -2.350* 
ED ,  ED+40  -1.74% -0.260 -1.507 -2.014* 
 
Panel B: Market Model Abnormal Returns (N=8) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 1.18% 0.942 1.601 1.762 
AD 1.55% 1.235 1.601 2.235* 
AD+1(N=5) -0.41% -0.233 -0.291 -1.192 
AD+1, ED-1 (N=5) -5.84% -1.857 -0.291 -3.242** 
ED-1(N=5) -1.74% -0.992 -0.291 -0.763 
ED 3.17% 2.524* 0.893 0.948 
ED+1 -0.47% -0.378 0.184 -0.638 
AD, ED+20 -4.74% -0.777 -1.942 -0.845 
AD, ED+30 -8.42% -1.155 -1.942 -1.972* 
AD, ED+40 -11.23% -1.354 -1.233 -1.616 
ED ,  ED+20 -1.73% -0.300 -1.942 -1.322 
ED ,  ED+30 -5.40% -0.773 -1.233 -1.516 
ED ,  ED+40 -8.22% -1.022 -1.942 -1.138 
       
Panel C: Fama-French time-series Model Abnormal Returns (N=8) 
Dates   ARt/CARt1,t2      T-test Generalized Sign         
Test 
   Rank Test 
AD-1 0.87% 0.676 1.540 1.553 
AD 1.50% 1.169 1.540 2.120* 
AD+1 (N=5) 0.50% 0.273 -0.316 -0.788 
AD+1, ED-1 (N=5) -5.65% -1.735 -0.316 -3.220** 
ED-1 (N=5) -2.30% -1.264 -0.316 -0.992 
ED 3.41% 2.653** 1.540 1.276 
ED+1 -0.29% -0.229 0.125 -0.548 
AD, ED+20  -4.13% -0.662 -1.998* -0.893 
AD, ED+30  -7.66% -1.029 -1.998* -1.998* 
AD, ED+40 -10.39% -1.225 -1.291 -1.798 
ED ,  ED+20  -1.17% -0.198 -1.291 -1.295 
ED ,  ED+30  -4.70% -0.657 -1.998* -1.519 
ED ,  ED+40  -7.42% -0.903 -1.291 -1.254 
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Table 14 Average percentage abnormal trading volume (  and rank test for the regular changes to the Nasdaq-100 
index around three potential announcement dates and the effective date 
 
                  
 
Regular Additions 
 
Regular Deletions 
 
Pre-event Estimation 
Period (N=131) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=128) 
 
Pre-event Estimation 
Period (N=136) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=124) 
Trading 
Day 
 
r(  
 
r(  
 
 
r(  
 
r(  
AD1-3 19.65% 1.176 -9.05% -0.901  2.54% 0.252 25.87% 1.831 
AD1-2 16.13% 1.304 -13.14% -0.968  7.17% 0.696 30.68% 1.947 
AD1-1 15.23% 0.965 -13.34% -1.174  0.58% 0.074 24.62% 1.616 
AD1 14.95% 1.047 -13.87% -1.034  0.61% 0.208 26.20% 1.848 
AD1+1 10.70% 0.410 -14.34% -1.201  7.40% 0.689 35.07% 2.304* 
AD1+2 16.83% 0.922 -11.56% -0.887  2.74% 0.430 29.09% 2.183* 
AD1+3 11.17% 0.545 -16.79% -1.701  0.99% 0.094 26.98% 1.987* 
AD2-3 18.56% 1.177 -11.93% -1.009  -14.47% -1.552 5.79% 0.096 
AD2-2 7.74% 0.395 -16.33% -1.049  -15.47% -1.115 9.91% 0.720 
AD2-1 2.07% -0.019 -26.85% -1.705  -11.46% -1.012 12.39% 0.811 
AD2 -7.26% -0.829 -41.30% -3.226**  -17.29% -1.210 8.68% 0.472 
AD2+1 7.42% 0.255 -18.97% -1.555  -9.18% -0.808 12.69% 0.776 
AD2+2 15.35% 0.760 -15.03% -1.348  -4.69% -0.258 16.79% 1.168 
AD2+3 32.84% 1.855 3.08% 0.235  5.72% 0.653 28.14% 1.803 
AD3-3 16.61% 0.926 -12.25% -1.011  0.11% -0.002 22.64% 1.635 
AD3-2 10.21% 0.320 -18.44% -1.510  -5.36% -0.270 19.93% 1.381 
AD3-1 11.16% 0.629 -18.85% -1.459  -6.37% -0.217 21.27% 1.408 
AD3 27.09% 1.872 -2.96% 0.079  1.45% 0.405 22.99% 1.669 
AD3+1 24.99% 1.449 -3.18% -0.143  -3.02% 0.026 18.85% 1.447 
AD3+2 11.86% 0.367 -17.45% -1.615  -2.66% -0.144 19.22% 1.207 
AD3+3 20.08% 1.125 -8.69% -0.737  -1.55% 0.062 24.01% 1.633 
ED-3 5.91% -0.017 -23.68% -1.939  -9.74% -0.732 11.74% 0.842 
ED-2 20.17% 0.899 -8.98% -0.822  -3.80% -0.171 20.84% 1.254 
ED-1 27.39% 1.536 0.31% 0.085  6.70% 0.872 32.37% 2.716** 
ED 119.93% 5.273*** 99.61% 5.978***  95.92% 6.247*** 121.01% 7.136*** 
ED+1 22.47% 1.299 2.30% 0.329  0.45% 0.423 22.00% 1.790 
ED+2 -1.13% -0.655 -31.25% -2.776**  -18.50% -1.829 1.23% -0.56 
ED+3 -0.62% -0.695 -34.71% -3.129**  -26.98% -2.282* -6.94% -0.972 
ED+4 -5.39% -0.810 -39.48% -3.068**  -37.58% -3.302** -14.03% -1.752 
ED+5 -8.77% -1.229 -36.67% -3.364***  -36.77% -3.234** -15.49% -1.908 
ED+6 -15.34% -1.609 -38.72% -3.227**  -42.29% -3.486*** -18.34% -2.190* 
ED+7 -10.99% -1.248 -36.46% -2.686**  -29.80% -2.473* -6.77% -1.096 
ED+8 -3.19% -0.625 -30.67% -2.003*  -27.94% -2.222* -5.77% -0.996 
ED+9 1.99% -0.326 -25.23% -1.527  -17.59% -1.385 -0.21% -0.212 
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ED+10 32.99% 1.996* 6.28% 0.836  -11.92% -0.766 10.99% 0.818 
ED+11 33.73% 1.939 4.86% 0.623  -6.93% -0.333 14.12% 1.144 
ED+12 32.95% 2.051* 4.86% 0.728  7.22% 0.709 28.70% 2.203* 
ED+13 31.87% 2.063* 4.32% 0.547  2.52% 0.492 25.54% 1.886 
ED+14 27.83% 1.604 -0.36% 0.247  -2.74% -0.008 21.55% 1.726 
ED+15 35.02% 2.292* 7.74% 1.038  -3.17% -0.091 21.66% 1.767 
ED+16 42.15% 2.672** 14.85% 1.466  -4.33% -0.218 20.55% 1.645 
ED+17 41.57% 2.522* 10.44% 1.038  1.55% 0.327 24.92% 2.082* 
ED+18 35.18% 2.123* 6.10% 0.532  -4.83% -0.137 16.24% 1.162 
ED+19 24.89% 1.610 -1.85% 0.043  -19.80% -1.603 1.00% 0.075 
ED+20 40.42% 2.398* 12.51% 1.05  -17.86% -1.442 3.42% 0.124 
ED+21 36.02% 2.040* 7.18% 0.801  -10.85% -0.621 12.41% 0.888 
ED+22 37.96% 2.233* 10.52% 0.823  -10.03% -0.678 14.62% 0.791 
ED+23 28.74% 1.764 0.01% 0.103  -19.89% -1.534 3.83% 0.057 
ED+24 29.65% 1.916 0.59% 0.229  -17.98% -1.450 4.57% -0.106 
ED+25 37.47% 2.364* 8.13% 0.863  -11.17% -0.923 12.29% 0.545 
ED+26 32.21% 2.108* 1.95% 0.483  -7.11% -0.646 18.37% 1.063 
ED+27 28.95% 1.823 3.16% 0.481  -12.70% -0.864 11.27% 0.642 
ED+28 26.53% 1.428 -0.72% -0.097  -17.19% -1.325 4.47% 0.002 
ED+29 28.00% 1.528 0.10% 0.070  -16.60% -1.273 6.36% 0.152 
ED+30 33.13% 1.744 4.45% 0.392  -9.64% -0.524 14.19% 0.987 
 
NOTE:  AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. Abnormal trading volume is estimated using an equally weighted market 
index with all Nasdaq stocks limiting to Nasdaq national market stocks only. The 200 trading days pre-event and post-event 
estimation period are starting from AD1-230 to AD1-31 and staring from ED+41 to ED+240, respectively. 
 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 15 Average percentage abnormal trading volume (  and rank test for the regular additions and deletions that are 
members of the S&P 500 Index around three potential announcement dates and the effective date 
 
                  
 
Regular Additions (S&P 500) 
 
Regular Deletions (S&P 500) 
 
Pre-event Estimation  
Period (N=13) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=10) 
 
Pre-event Estimation 
Period (N=27) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=24) 
Trading 
Day 
 
r(  
 
r(  
 
 
r(  
 
r(  
AD1-3 16.44% 0.545 -1.83% -0.207  6.76% 0.208 35.00% 2.070* 
AD1-2 25.84% 1.522 8.15% 0.994  6.73% 0.549 28.80% 1.516 
AD1-1 41.23% 1.883 30.20% 1.225  -6.18% -0.471 19.08% 1.401 
AD1 18.54% 0.873 2.75% -0.243  3.83% 0.502 30.48% 2.046* 
AD1+1 14.90% 1.195 7.76% 1.128  4.58% 0.537 33.95% 2.507* 
AD1+2 14.65% 0.706 -0.56% -0.053  4.32% 0.389 34.25% 2.206* 
AD1+3 20.17% 0.757 -7.38% -0.292  4.89% 0.056 35.30% 2.172* 
AD2-3 -2.31% -0.220 -32.52% -2.162*  1.59% -0.031 17.10% 0.734 
AD2-2 -26.14% -1.696 -39.39% -2.738**  -23.75% -1.435 6.90% 0.575 
AD2-1 -12.66% -1.138 -20.35% -1.067  -8.80% -0.569 13.05% 0.749 
AD2 -6.28% -0.648 -27.78% -1.741  -5.78% -0.195 17.50% 0.707 
AD2+1 -8.45% -0.864 -20.28% -1.605  -12.31% -1.141 12.46% 0.606 
AD2+2 2.75% 0.051 -18.13% -1.168  -5.15% -0.113 19.04% 1.017 
AD2+3 -10.70% -1.152 -22.75% -1.344  16.46% 0.903 45.93% 2.179* 
AD3-3 -13.27% -1.064 -29.44% -2.044*  6.60% 0.033 29.75% 1.900 
AD3-2 -29.86% -2.103* -44.49% -2.497*  4.35% 0.147 21.98% 1.433 
AD3-1 -11.54% -1.094 -32.66% -2.317*  5.54% 0.750 28.48% 1.908 
AD3 0.11% -0.403 -18.81% -1.346  10.88% 0.963 33.22% 1.797 
AD3+1 -7.85% -0.710 -22.76% -1.016  -2.54% 0.019 21.28% 1.302 
AD3+2 0.78% -0.132 -6.95% -0.319  -4.25% -0.015 23.81% 1.578 
AD3+3 -3.85% -0.450 -11.16% -0.634  -8.76% -0.683 13.83% 0.819 
ED-3 -3.53% -0.319 -12.50% -0.455  -16.40% -1.119 10.75% 0.789 
ED-2 -3.49% -0.422 -10.76% -0.577  -11.31% -0.623 10.71% 0.755 
ED-1 2.80% 0.014 -8.63% -0.492  1.27% 0.149 26.15% 1.680 
ED 100.08% 3.521*** 108.26% 4.367***  121.41% 5.290*** 150.93% 5.978*** 
ED+1 15.65% 0.550 6.72% 0.666  11.37% 0.874 32.63% 2.244* 
ED+2 -8.03% -0.617 -21.07% -1.170  -16.03% -1.010 6.09% 0.265 
ED+3 -7.59% -0.579 -30.89% -1.806  -37.03% -2.263* -20.73% -1.885 
ED+4 -2.80% -0.336 -17.49% -0.981  -55.34% -3.466*** -32.49% -2.565* 
ED+5 -21.01% -1.534 -32.37% -1.691  -42.39% -2.658** -23.48% -2.074* 
ED+6 -46.14% -2.883** -54.64% -3.087**  -57.91% -3.604*** -42.11% -2.969** 
ED+7 -43.75% -2.290* -48.40% -2.124*  -31.65% -2.157* -9.60% -1.142 
ED+8 -30.02% -1.950 -36.43% -2.021*  -29.02% -2.039* -6.51% -0.809 
ED+9 -26.28% -1.716 -38.74% -2.054*  -19.18% -1.345 0.57% -0.221 
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ED+10 11.91% 0.362 -6.85% -0.218  -1.38% 0.166 23.86% 1.485 
ED+11 28.62% 1.367 7.94% 0.851  4.31% 0.627 29.77% 2.019* 
ED+12 42.10% 1.632 21.46% 1.369  -2.05% -0.016 19.93% 1.168 
ED+13 29.81% 1.091 10.18% 0.522  -0.50% 0.148 21.30% 1.198 
ED+14 13.40% 0.477 -5.99% -0.007  -4.11% -0.157 22.28% 1.791 
ED+15 20.39% 1.055 -0.02% 0.315  -13.63% -0.472 11.88% 0.775 
ED+16 30.89% 0.850 12.56% 0.300  -30.27% -1.655 -3.70% -0.120 
ED+17 36.39% 1.306 15.28% 0.774  3.86% 0.712 24.14% 1.887 
ED+18 38.28% 1.980* 15.73% 1.084  -4.57% 0.044 16.68% 1.220 
ED+19 8.66% 0.599 -12.53% -0.551  -21.13% -1.253 1.07% 0.492 
ED+20 22.45% 1.252 1.12% 0.041  -12.84% -0.686 5.34% 0.381 
ED+21 41.04% 1.916 18.93% 1.699  -4.05% -0.536 18.86% 0.883 
ED+22 20.11% 0.943 -1.04% -0.044  1.07% 0.164 23.21% 1.363 
ED+23 13.56% 0.287 -7.51% -0.529  -19.65% -1.220 1.10% 0.309 
ED+24 38.86% 1.639 17.78% 0.477  -26.76% -1.920 -4.83% -0.548 
ED+25 30.66% 1.403 10.56% 0.422  -22.93% -1.640 0.06% -0.257 
ED+26 25.86% 1.334 5.28% 0.851  0.70% -0.331 26.31% 1.150 
ED+27 45.56% 1.661 24.97% 1.343  -21.01% -1.246 4.13% 0.361 
ED+28 11.11% 0.535 -9.55% -0.093  -21.29% -1.064 1.24% 0.064 
ED+29 10.64% 0.628 -8.71% -0.252  -13.73% -1.064 9.87% 0.213 
ED+30 41.65% 1.510 22.33% 0.725  -10.83% -0.463 13.42% 0.656 
 
NOTE:  AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. Abnormal trading volume is estimated using an equally weighted market 
index with all Nasdaq stocks limiting to Nasdaq national market stocks only. The 200 trading days pre-event and post-event 
estimation period are starting from AD1-230 to AD1-31 and staring from ED+41 to ED+240, respectively. 
 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 16 Average percentage abnormal trading volume (  and rank test for the regular additions that are not members 
of the S&P 500 Index around three potential announcement dates and the effective date 
 
                  
 
Regular Additions (US-based) 
 
Regular Additions (Non-US based) 
 
Pre-event Estimation  
Period (N=99) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=102) 
 
Pre-event Estimation 
Period (N=17) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=16) 
Trading 
Day 
 
r(  
 
r(  
 
 
r(  
 
r(  
AD1-3 18.33% 1.231 -6.97% -0.659  12.07% 0.180 -26.82% -1.503 
AD1-2 15.04% 1.285 -12.67% -0.921  8.76% 0.042 -29.44% -1.668 
AD1-1 13.31% 0.824 -13.68% -1.124  -0.70% -0.286 -38.38% -2.015* 
AD1 16.97% 1.323 -10.96% -0.635  -3.45% -0.712 -42.82% -2.125* 
AD1+1 10.83% 0.256 -12.93% -1.209  2.57% -0.113 -37.14% -1.781 
AD1+2 16.62% 0.901 -8.88% -0.583  13.89% 0.259 -35.53% -1.794 
AD1+3 11.75% 0.657 -12.67% -1.268  -5.99% -0.771 -48.90% -2.817** 
AD2-3 19.64% 1.159 -10.24% -0.854  23.78% 1.456 -9.84% -0.262 
AD2-2 7.39% 0.476 -15.52% -0.910  28.58% 1.189 -7.13% 0.122 
AD2-1 1.75% 0.021 -27.08% -1.732  6.21% 0.340 -29.43% -0.935 
AD2 -9.41% -0.974 -40.89% -3.049**  -6.83% -0.352 -52.35% -2.840** 
AD2+1 6.05% 0.170 -17.54% -1.313  14.82% 0.845 -27.26% -1.501 
AD2+2 16.83% 0.747 -11.90% -1.104  6.94% 0.524 -33.04% -1.572 
AD2+3 38.74% 2.354* 7.90% 0.712  24.24% 0.871 -11.51% -0.783 
AD3-3 22.03% 1.424 -6.78% -0.329  3.23% -0.057 -36.38% -2.342* 
AD3-2 13.97% 0.786 -14.00% -0.977  9.25% -0.069 -30.51% -1.972* 
AD3-1 12.67% 0.950 -17.37% -1.064  14.30% 0.246 -19.61% -1.499 
AD3 31.42% 2.348* 2.24% 0.687  12.92% 0.469 -26.21% -1.396 
AD3+1 28.21% 1.769 0.45% 0.128  24.70% 0.831 -14.02% -0.528 
AD3+2 11.62% 0.311 -14.83% -1.444  9.82% 0.293 -40.72% -2.125* 
AD3+3 23.10% 1.492 -4.54% -0.274  11.74% -0.028 -33.59% -2.146* 
ED-3 6.25% 0.043 -20.24% -1.704  -1.57% -0.492 -52.61% -2.767** 
ED-2 21.09% 1.011 -6.81% -0.632  23.93% 0.650 -21.68% -1.279 
ED-1 29.57% 1.689 2.94% 0.275  27.64% 1.061 -10.88% -0.339 
ED 114.62% 5.169*** 94.42% 5.798***  157.54% 4.202*** 127.28% 4.381*** 
ED+1 19.24% 1.07 1.72% 0.171  43.05% 1.916 3.23% 0.548 
ED+2 -5.55% -0.884 -34.55% -2.947**  23.06% 0.187 -16.56% -1.589 
ED+3 -4.70% -0.956 -36.63% -3.171**  24.42% 0.425 -24.86% -2.069* 
ED+4 -7.31% -0.869 -41.31% -3.237**  2.73% -0.459 -41.56% -2.041* 
ED+5 -7.79% -1.107 -35.22% -3.341***  -8.51% -0.894 -48.60% -2.661** 
ED+6 -12.29% -1.269 -35.00% -2.922**  -15.19% -1.329 -52.44% -2.710** 
ED+7 -4.55% -0.714 -30.91% -2.279*  -24.72% -1.815 -64.36% -3.163** 
ED+8 -1.06% -0.375 -28.71% -1.851  6.24% -0.057 -39.61% -1.463 
ED+9 5.88% 0.064 -21.11% -1.130  -0.30% -0.554 -43.05% -1.899 
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ED+10 35.20% 2.217* 8.95% 1.071  32.66% 1.218 -2.59% 0.123 
ED+11 34.22% 1.998* 6.09% 0.685  33.89% 1.174 -4.89% -0.128 
ED+12 33.71% 2.174* 6.47% 0.917  22.59% 0.871 -15.80% -0.871 
ED+13 34.16% 2.368* 7.41% 0.858  19.16% 0.487 -19.04% -0.991 
ED+14 28.63% 1.741 1.09% 0.385  31.98% 1.034 -6.04% -0.278 
ED+15 36.09% 2.326* 9.85% 1.202  37.63% 1.891 -0.83% 0.273 
ED+16 39.19% 2.602** 12.77% 1.396  67.33% 2.893** 29.57% 1.690 
ED+17 38.61% 2.410* 8.14% 0.991  62.96% 2.596** 22.07% 0.814 
ED+18 32.67% 1.991* 4.70% 0.457  48.57% 1.781 9.00% 0.162 
ED+19 24.61% 1.657 -0.66% 0.276  36.81% 1.328 -2.74% -0.517 
ED+20 42.34% 2.550* 15.54% 1.365  39.88% 1.404 0.34% -0.135 
ED+21 34.80% 2.006* 7.24% 0.783  40.36% 1.321 -0.52% -0.175 
ED+22 37.32% 2.242* 11.30% 0.951  53.04% 1.992* 12.81% 0.421 
ED+23 28.32% 1.824 0.43% 0.211  40.82% 1.654 2.07% 0.032 
ED+24 26.33% 1.68 -1.61% 0.144  44.27% 2.187* 3.86% 0.273 
ED+25 38.61% 2.451* 9.90% 1.080  34.80% 1.532 -4.66% -0.202 
ED+26 30.35% 2.076* 0.66% 0.436  47.56% 1.767 8.07% 0.152 
ED+27 26.38% 1.813 2.33% 0.563  34.30% 1.133 -5.20% -0.694 
ED+28 28.16% 1.52 2.21% 0.120  26.16% 0.969 -13.90% -0.913 
ED+29 29.11% 1.595 2.14% 0.260  32.06% 1.130 -7.39% -0.514 
ED+30 31.40% 1.669 3.62% 0.386  38.44% 1.406 -1.40% -0.025 
 
NOTE:  AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. Abnormal trading volume is estimated using an equally weighted market 
index with all Nasdaq stocks limiting to Nasdaq national market stocks only. The 200 trading days pre-event and post-event 
estimation period are starting from AD1-230 to AD1-31 and staring from ED+41 to ED+240, respectively. 
 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 17 Average percentage abnormal trading volume (  and rank test for the regular deletions that are not members 
of the S&P 500 Index around three potential announcement dates and the effective date 
 
                  
 
Regular Deletions (US-based) 
 
Regular Deletions (Non-US based) 
 
Pre-event Estimation  
Period (N=103) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=95) 
 
Pre-event Estimation 
Period (N=6) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=5) 
Trading 
Day 
 
r(  
 
r(  
 
 
r(  
 
r(  
AD1-3 -2.06% -0.208 21.91% 1.362  62.50% 2.667** 57.27% 2.730** 
AD1-2 4.63% 0.366 30.40% 1.829  52.61% 2.034* 44.86% 1.484 
AD1-1 0.80% 0.092 26.23% 1.517  27.26% 1.231 20.64% 0.756 
AD1 -1.47% -0.184 25.43% 1.563  21.70% 1.445 20.08% 1.055 
AD1+1 6.21% 0.509 34.60% 1.999*  40.51% 1.192 49.45% 0.967 
AD1+2 0.98% 0.262 27.43% 1.941  25.86% 0.929 35.76% 1.028 
AD1+3 -0.29% 0.141 25.02% 1.759  5.56% -0.204 24.48% 0.463 
AD2-3 -19.33% -2.175* 2.71% -0.173  -3.32% 0.061 10.11% 0.322 
AD2-2 -14.87% -1.131 10.93% 0.714  11.63% 1.081 5.05% 0.227 
AD2-1 -12.20% -1.137 13.06% 0.795  -10.70% -0.301 -3.47% 0.019 
AD2 -20.64% -1.638 7.21% 0.348  -11.53% 0.132 -5.66% 0.170 
AD2+1 -7.96% -0.644 13.63% 0.842  -16.07% -0.091 -4.02% -0.372 
AD2+2 -4.87% -0.312 16.27% 1.170  0.45% -0.020 15.82% 0.000 
AD2+3 2.87% 0.449 24.35% 1.585  6.31% 0.595 14.73% 0.006 
AD3-3 0.16% 0.14 22.64% 1.539  -29.80% -1.063 -11.68% -0.676 
AD3-2 -7.59% -0.382 20.30% 1.313  -10.72% -0.372 3.05% -0.166 
AD3-1 -9.15% -0.519 20.41% 1.159  -12.30% -0.599 3.05% 0.030 
AD3 0.29% 0.253 21.94% 1.617  -21.09% -0.516 -6.11% -0.658 
AD3+1 -3.36% -0.029 18.68% 1.404  0.52% 0.388 10.57% 0.184 
AD3+2 -2.76% -0.268 18.47% 1.053  6.10% 0.490 11.43% -0.308 
AD3+3 0.12% 0.281 27.22% 1.824  2.14% 0.560 11.91% 0.101 
ED-3 -8.43% -0.623 12.54% 0.878  -2.28% 0.367 1.39% -0.503 
ED-2 -2.81% -0.096 23.18% 1.314  12.85% 0.766 24.98% 0.415 
ED-1 7.01% 0.977 33.34% 2.779**  25.80% 1.279 43.67% 1.322 
ED 87.30% 6.119*** 112.64% 6.762***  129.12% 3.343*** 136.51% 3.468*** 
ED+1 -3.04% 0.16 19.85% 1.539  11.24% 0.574 11.95% 0.023 
ED+2 -19.49% -2.057* 0.62% -0.683  -12.75% -0.612 -10.58% -1.129 
ED+3 -23.73% -2.023* -2.49% -0.475  -37.52% -1.801 -25.49% -1.105 
ED+4 -30.77% -2.913** -6.78% -1.059  -74.54% -2.159* -63.10% -2.719** 
ED+5 -34.98% -3.249** -11.19% -1.434  -42.19% -1.378 -58.90% -2.690** 
ED+6 -37.44% -3.202** -10.24% -1.508  -55.26% -1.529 -58.15% -2.532* 
ED+7 -26.80% -2.371* -2.57% -0.806  -72.96% -1.519 -72.95% -1.836 
ED+8 -25.45% -2.103* -1.81% -0.728  -65.90% -1.270 -77.52% -2.374* 
ED+9 -15.99% -1.331 2.51% -0.011  -37.76% -0.428 -55.72% -1.579 
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ED+10 -11.17% -0.836 11.99% 0.829  -79.53% -2.325* -69.74% -2.386* 
ED+11 -9.68% -0.691 10.81% 0.771  -8.58% -0.062 1.92% 0.105 
ED+12 6.87% 0.672 28.62% 2.142*  60.57% 2.556* 72.23% 2.591* 
ED+13 2.07% 0.479 25.91% 1.827  26.58% 1.157 38.85% 1.690 
ED+14 -1.59% 0.107 22.85% 1.616  -18.56% -0.480 -6.54% 0.000 
ED+15 -1.28% -0.026 23.97% 1.911  11.69% 0.683 24.71% 0.924 
ED+16 1.20% 0.217 26.23% 2.020*  15.94% 0.987 29.21% 1.287 
ED+17 1.46% 0.201 26.13% 1.996*  -8.30% -0.220 5.57% 0.404 
ED+18 -3.08% -0.031 18.69% 1.243  -40.89% -1.445 -32.41% -1.339 
ED+19 -18.61% -1.577 2.62% 0.059  -36.67% -1.191 -30.27% -1.105 
ED+20 -19.16% -1.649 3.39% 0.018  -17.29% -0.565 -5.36% 0.099 
ED+21 -12.68% -0.662 11.49% 0.827  -8.81% 0.124 -1.05% 0.146 
ED+22 -12.60% -0.957 13.45% 0.595  -14.57% -0.305 -4.40% -0.345 
ED+23 -19.39% -1.536 5.65% 0.079  -31.07% -0.841 -17.53% -0.942 
ED+24 -14.73% -1.091 8.50% 0.201  -38.51% -1.349 -25.08% -1.251 
ED+25 -6.27% -0.435 17.93% 0.989  -49.44% -1.682 -36.08% -1.632 
ED+26 -9.98% -0.823 16.28% 0.843  10.09% 0.513 19.95% 1.146 
ED+27 -11.92% -0.819 12.57% 0.579  13.40% 0.937 20.71% 1.076 
ED+28 -20.69% -1.695 1.24% -0.345  71.92% 2.336* 81.22% 2.737** 
ED+29 -19.79% -1.45 3.62% -0.046  30.97% 0.897 41.47% 1.427 
ED+30 -9.94% -0.614 14.34% 0.941  2.02% 0.587 15.08% 0.930 
 
NOTE:  AD1, AD2, AD3, and ED refer to the first trading day of November, the last trading day of November, the actual 
announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. Abnormal trading volume is estimated using an equally weighted market 
index with all Nasdaq stocks limiting to Nasdaq national market stocks only. The 200 trading days pre-event and post-event 
estimation period are starting from AD1-230 to AD1-31 and staring from ED+41 to ED+240, respectively. 
 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 18 Average percentage abnormal trading volume (  and rank test for the irregular additions including the full 
sample and securities that are members of the S&P 500 Index around the announcement date and the effective date 
 
                  
 
Irregular Additions (Full Sample) 
 
Irregular Additions (S&P 500) 
 
Pre-event Estimation  
Period (N=62) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=67) 
 
Pre-event Estimation  
Period (N=4) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=4) 
Trading 
Day 
 
r(  
 
r(  
 
 
r(  
 
r(  
AD-3 24.17% 1.224 -5.69% -1.253  54.52% 1.046 -37.26% -1.278 
AD-2 17.79% 0.802 -14.41% -2.236*  81.81% 1.296 -8.59% -0.018 
AD-1 24.15% 1.011 -5.16% -1.026  61.34% 0.755 -26.92% -0.696 
AD 42.28% 2.072* 15.02% 1.066  69.95% 1.077 -16.89% -0.487 
AD+1  54.62% 2.289* 23.46% 2.387*  52.83% 0.934 -41.28% -1.528 
ED-1 40.52% 1.382 8.10% 0.449  66.27% 1.319 -25.03% -0.97 
ED 132.63% 5.183*** 104.73% 8.010***  132.89% 2.144* 50.61% 1.712 
ED+1 68.74% 3.635*** 41.21% 4.803***  88.83% 1.656 5.62% 0.533 
ED+2 41.67% 2.261* 13.61% 1.696  63.60% 0.947 -17.20% -0.509 
ED+3 33.15% 1.636 5.77% 0.782  82.50% 1.173 6.48% 0.521 
ED+4 27.51% 1.229 2.88% 0.466  79.17% 1.042 -3.99% 0.479 
ED+5 31.62% 1.539 5.63% 0.664  57.48% 0.746 -25.00% -0.467 
ED+6 33.00% 1.569 3.59% 0.300  57.96% 0.761 -32.56% -0.898 
ED+7 31.00% 1.379 6.88% 0.679  136.20% 2.260* 50.51% 2.089* 
ED+8 23.89% 0.978 -1.41% -0.300  112.20% 1.817 24.69% 1.024 
ED+9 33.62% 1.655 6.71% 0.262  108.69% 1.742 22.87% 1.101 
ED+10 30.45% 1.591 6.38% 0.884  103.38% 1.802 17.92% 0.994 
ED+11 30.12% 1.534 3.09% 0.341  94.31% 1.757 5.94% 0.413 
ED+12 33.56% 1.851 4.67% 0.357  95.46% 1.782 3.34% 0.269 
ED+13 32.16% 1.492 2.19% 0.050  104.45% 1.913 11.45% 0.611 
ED+14 38.34% 1.884 8.60% 0.673  92.63% 1.566 22.29% 1.227 
ED+15 32.14% 1.753 1.25% 0.157  84.02% 1.440 -7.40% -0.126 
ED+16 46.05% 2.688** 16.65% 1.879  97.25% 1.872 0.83% 0.263 
ED+17 38.56% 2.203* 10.63% 1.341  94.82% 1.847 1.18% 0.251 
ED+18 41.85% 2.217* 13.05% 1.673  121.31% 2.179* 23.31% 1.311 
ED+19 37.72% 2.122* 8.88% 1.247  129.39% 2.335* 42.80% 2.035* 
ED+20 37.90% 2.138* 9.04% 1.278  115.63% 1.983* 22.20% 1.197 
ED+21 23.83% 1.168 -4.19% -0.672  119.03% 2.023* 19.79% 1.018 
ED+22 17.61% 0.744 -12.50% -1.535  122.14% 2.003* 26.12% 1.059 
ED+23 30.83% 1.333 1.72% -0.453  100.34% 1.646 6.92% 0.335 
ED+24 33.73% 1.664 1.57% -0.311  128.34% 2.234* 32.36% 1.604 
ED+25 35.65% 2.035* 6.03% 0.748  116.19% 2.079* 19.27% 1.053 
ED+26 35.26% 1.755 7.05% 0.511  122.90% 2.149* 30.14% 1.383 
ED+27 26.10% 1.378 -2.39% -0.251  103.15% 1.913 9.27% 0.509 
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ED+28 25.30% 1.146 -1.60% -0.216  94.90% 1.762 8.04% 0.425 
ED+29 32.00% 1.449 2.85% 0.353  90.43% 1.716 1.29% 0.239 
ED+30 29.85% 1.716 -0.55% 0.163  99.86% 1.822 3.98% 0.156 
 
NOTE:  AD and ED refer to the announcement date and the effective date, respectively. Abnormal trading volume is estimated 
using an equally weighted market index with all Nasdaq stocks limiting to Nasdaq national market stocks only. The 200 trading 
days pre-event and post-event estimation period are starting from AD1-230 to AD1-31 and staring from ED+41 to ED+240, 
respectively. 
 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 19 Average percentage abnormal trading volume (  and rank test for the irregular additions that are not 
members of the S&P 500 Index around the announcement date and the effective date 
 
                  
 
Irregular Additions (US-based) 
 
Irregular Additions (Non-US based) 
 
Pre-event Estimation 
 Period (N=50) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=55) 
 
Pre-event Estimation 
Period (N=8) 
Post-event Estimation 
Period (N=8) 
Trading 
Day 
 
r(  
 
r(  
 
 
r(  
 
r(  
AD-3 24.87% 1.394 -0.94% -0.621  4.61% 0.061 -22.57% -1.518 
AD-2 12.02% 0.507 -15.73% -2.427*  21.81% 1.015 -8.24% -0.638 
AD-1 14.58% 0.740 -9.73% -1.296  65.33% 1.660 37.18% 0.790 
AD 33.30% 1.777 11.38% 0.849  84.61% 2.829** 56.01% 1.603 
AD+1 45.61% 2.099* 24.25% 2.424*  117.34% 2.857* 69.35% 2.757** 
ED-1 29.38% 1.022 6.85% 0.364  93.44% 1.857 43.63% 1.387 
ED 123.14% 5.403*** 100.30% 7.633***  191.84% 3.994*** 162.27% 4.218*** 
ED+1 58.80% 3.774*** 36.72% 4.595***  120.84% 2.740** 89.83% 2.852** 
ED+2 39.19% 2.409* 16.14% 1.857  46.22% 1.554 11.61% 0.810 
ED+3 26.12% 1.504 3.63% 0.411  52.43% 1.601 20.13% 1.190 
ED+4 20.04% 1.069 0.96% 0.081  48.39% 1.293 19.56% 1.093 
ED+5 26.00% 1.590 5.54% 0.805  53.79% 1.164 21.61% 0.278 
ED+6 29.82% 1.561 5.42% 0.446  40.40% 1.408 9.07% 0.398 
ED+7 20.27% 0.888 2.56% 0.021  45.48% 1.669 14.82% 0.824 
ED+8 13.76% 0.446 -5.62% -0.867  43.05% 1.687 14.42% 0.829 
ED+9 24.90% 1.399 3.28% -0.325  50.62% 1.601 22.19% 1.139 
ED+10 20.24% 1.190 2.11% 0.219  57.75% 1.999* 29.97% 1.801 
ED+11 20.87% 1.353 -1.03% 0.047  55.81% 1.151 30.03% 0.792 
ED+12 28.30% 1.871 4.33% 0.381  35.53% 0.796 7.68% -0.093 
ED+13 25.90% 1.348 0.54% -0.144  35.16% 0.835 8.90% 0.167 
ED+14 33.29% 2.011* 7.72% 0.769  42.80% 0.625 7.86% -0.884 
ED+15 28.15% 1.835 1.09% 0.219  31.09% 0.732 6.70% -0.014 
ED+16 43.43% 2.897** 19.62% 2.072*  36.80% 1.087 4.13% 0.213 
ED+17 35.54% 2.353* 12.33% 1.470  29.31% 0.706 3.68% 0.130 
ED+18 35.82% 2.234* 12.71% 1.540  39.79% 0.937 10.30% 0.315 
ED+19 27.83% 1.936 4.36% 0.649  53.76% 1.430 22.96% 0.982 
ED+20 25.77% 1.864 2.93% 0.610  74.86% 2.076* 44.46% 1.871 
ED+21 11.05% 0.816 -10.17% -1.159  56.11% 1.092 24.93% 0.380 
ED+22 2.51% 0.242 -21.18% -2.225*  59.78% 1.122 27.87% 0.514 
ED+23 22.71% 1.306 -0.70% -0.526  46.77% 0.424 15.78% -0.278 
ED+24 22.78% 1.451 -3.83% -0.835  54.88% 1.032 23.27% 0.236 
ED+25 27.97% 1.945 4.37% 0.596  43.37% 1.181 10.84% 0.069 
ED+26 27.21% 1.673 4.81% 0.253  41.73% 0.732 10.92% 0.019 
ED+27 17.62% 1.138 -5.39% -0.645  40.58% 1.040 12.44% 0.708 
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ED+28 15.31% 0.696 -6.18% -0.657  52.90% 1.648 25.06% 0.940 
ED+29 26.52% 1.371 1.69% 0.200  37.08% 0.698 11.61% 0.486 
ED+30 21.92% 1.512 -3.30% -0.162  44.43% 1.413 16.07% 0.991 
 
NOTE:  AD and ED refer to the announcement date, and the effective date, respectively. Abnormal trading volume is estimated 
using an equally weighted market index with all Nasdaq stocks limiting to Nasdaq national market stocks only. The 200 trading 
days pre-event and post-event estimation period are starting from AD1-230 to AD1-31 and staring from ED+41 to ED+240, 
respectively. 
 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 20 Descriptive statistics for the percentage of institutional shareholdings and the number of institutional 
shareholders around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions (full sample) 
  Parameters 
 Month Average Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev 
Panel A: Number of Institutional Investors 
Regular Addition 
(N=91) 
AD-2Month 398 388 1096 24 188 
AD-1Month 413 404 1217 105 192 
ED+ 1Month 443 432 1381 110 203 
ED+ 2Month 445 413 1570 15 214 
Regular Deletion 
(N=97) 
AD-2Month 381 349 787 64 185 
AD-1Month 368 336 786 63 180 
ED+ 1Month 363 328 781 69 185 
ED+ 2Month 349 300 805 62 188 
Irregular Addition 
(N=45) 
AD-2Month 305 253 666 76 172 
AD-1Month 319 268 685 2 176 
ED+1Month 372 302 711 94 179 
ED+2Month 380 314 748 98 182 
Panel B: Percentage of Institutional Shareholdings 
Regular Addition (S&P) 
(N=91) 
AD-2Month 63.81% 69.18% 95.50% 0.71% 24.45% 
AD-1Month 64.54% 72.36% 96.77% 0.70% 23.53% 
ED+ 1Month 65.83% 72.59% 95.24% 0.70% 23.35% 
ED+ 2Month 65.08% 68.59% 97.31% 0.64% 23.65% 
Regular Deletion (S&P) 
(N=97) 
AD-2Month 56.48% 56.50% 97.84% 1.02% 22.92% 
AD-1Month 55.32% 56.96% 98.69% 0.95% 23.59% 
ED+ 1Month 55.01% 57.26% 97.24% 1.09% 23.85% 
ED+ 2Month 56.44% 59.10% 96.49% 1.06% 24.51% 
Irregular Addition (S&P) 
(N=45) 
AD-2Month 51.90% 47.77% 96.24% 3.61% 27.14% 
AD-1Month 51.38% 48.29% 96.87% 1.76% 27.59% 
ED+1Month 55.10% 53.19% 99.58% 9.34% 25.08% 
ED+2Month 52.99% 50.81% 97.14% 9.34% 23.81% 
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Table 21 Mean difference of changes in institutional ownership following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions (full 
sample) 
Institutional ownership difference is defined as the average of both the number of institutional shareholders and the percentage of 
institutional shareholding for two months preceding the index changes minus average of both indicators for two months 
following the index changes for each firm. 
 
Group N Parameters 
Mean (Median) 
Difference 
T Test Sign Test 
Singed–rank 
Test 
Regular Addition 91 
Number of Institutional 
Shareholders 
43.73 6.58 39.5 1789 
(36.5) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Shareholdings 
1.56% 2.34 15.5 903 
(1.12%) (0.0217) (0.0015) (0.0002) 
Regular Deletion 97 
Number of Institutional 
Shareholders 
-15.46 -4.07 -17.5 -1133.5 
(-13) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (<0.0001) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Shareholdings 
-0.27% -0.51 6.5 98.5 
(-0.60%) (0.6119) (0.2229) (0.7250) 
Irregular Addition 45 
Number of Institutional 
Shareholders 
69.29 7.19 21.5 516.5 
(58.5) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Shareholdings 
4.22% 2.6 10.5 286.5 
(3.08%) (0.0127) (0.0025) (0.0007) 
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Table 22 Descriptive statistics for the percentage of institutional shareholdings and the number of institutional 
shareholders around Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions (sub samples) 
 Parameters 
 Month Average Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev 
Panel A: Number of Institutional Investors 
Regular 
Addition (S&P) 
(N=5) 
AD-2Month 710 708 913 535 135 
AD-1Month 718 730 906 539 132 
ED+ 1Month 764 777 953 573 138 
ED+ 2Month 731 731 929 532 199 
Regular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Dom) 
(N=76) 
AD-2Month 381 379 1096 24 181 
AD-1Month 396 397 1217 105 187 
ED+ 1Month 428 428 1381 110 199 
ED+ 2Month 440 412 1570 15 218 
Regular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Int) 
(N=10) 
AD-2Month 369 348 551 184 118 
AD-1Month 386 365 575 196 126 
ED+ 1Month 394 394 556 211 123 
ED+ 2Month 399 406 539 230 107 
Regular 
Deletion (S&P) 
(N=22) 
AD-2Month 592 636 787 314 159 
AD-1Month 575 606 786 296 158 
ED+ 1Month 581 614 781 298 158 
ED+ 2Month 572 615 805 276 167 
Regular 
Deletion 
(NonSP_Dom) 
(N=73) 
AD-2Month 321 300 612 64 140 
AD-1Month 310 271 612 63 136 
ED+ 1Month 301 266 622 69 138 
ED+ 2Month 289 265 630 62 141 
Regular 
Deletion 
(NonSP_Int) 
(N=2) 
AD-2Month 210 210 241 179 44 
AD-1Month 204 204 240 168 51 
ED+ 1Month 200 200 235 165 49 
ED+ 2Month 180 180 218 142 54 
Irregular 
Addition (S&P) 
(N=4) 
AD-2Month 347 352 543 142 222 
AD-1Month 343 335 553 148 212 
ED+1Month 494 516 618 325 123 
ED+2Month 511 541 637 325 132 
Irregular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Dom) 
(N=35) 
AD-2Month 311 289 666 76 170 
AD-1Month 328 302 685 85 172 
ED+1Month 370 301 703 94 176 
ED+2Month 374 314 710 98 177 
Irregular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Int) 
(N=6) 
AD-2Month 240 206 556 98 167 
AD-1Month 251 224 590 2 191 
ED+1Month 302 236 711 117 209 
ED+2Month 323 271 748 129 217 
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 Parameters 
 Month Average Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev 
Panel B: Percentage of Institutional Shareholdings 
Regular 
Addition (S&P) 
(N=5) 
AD-2Month 79.42% 91.39% 92.97% 50.70% 18.96% 
AD-1Month 79.78% 88.73% 92.20% 54.15% 16.40% 
ED+ 1Month 80.29% 87.26% 93.72% 55.54% 16.23% 
ED+ 2Month 72.52% 71.36% 90.93% 55.26% 17.86% 
Regular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Dom) 
(N=76) 
AD-2Month 66.94% 72.27% 95.50% 1.87% 20.80% 
AD-1Month 67.75% 72.86% 96.77% 22.15% 19.52% 
ED+ 1Month 69.20% 74.54% 95.24% 26.12% 19.05% 
ED+ 2Month 69.74% 74.18% 97.31% 23.36% 19.23% 
Regular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Int) 
(N=10) 
AD-2Month 32.16% 20.03% 78.43% 0.71% 29.68% 
AD-1Month 32.90% 21.51% 77.85% 0.70% 29.94% 
ED+ 1Month 32.99% 20.12% 77.78% 0.70% 30.02% 
ED+ 2Month 28.29% 19.63% 64.36% 0.64% 23.93% 
Regular 
Deletion (S&P) 
(N=22) 
AD-2Month 62.84% 64.30% 90.44% 29.42% 16.74% 
AD-1Month 61.43% 63.33% 92.78% 27.93% 16.61% 
ED+ 1Month 61.47% 62.48% 92.17% 27.45% 16.60% 
ED+ 2Month 63.51% 63.33% 96.49% 28.77% 17.62% 
Regular 
Deletion 
(NonSP_Dom) 
(N=73) 
AD-2Month 56.02% 55.25% 97.84% 8.95% 23.07% 
AD-1Month 54.83% 56.41% 98.69% 7.94% 24.11% 
ED+ 1Month 54.40% 56.59% 97.24% 7.08% 24.45% 
ED+ 2Month 55.83% 58.21% 95.90% 9.63% 24.82% 
Regular 
Deletion 
(NonSP_Int) 
(N=2) 
AD-2Month 5.91% 5.91% 10.80% 1.02% 6.92% 
AD-1Month 5.92% 5.92% 10.89% 0.95% 7.02% 
ED+ 1Month 5.99% 5.99% 10.89% 1.09% 6.93% 
ED+ 2Month 4.50% 4.50% 7.94% 1.06% 4.87% 
Irregular 
Addition (S&P) 
(N=4) 
AD-2Month 28.78% 17.90% 75.70% 3.61% 33.27% 
AD-1Month 30.37% 18.40% 81.11% 3.58% 35.61% 
ED+1Month 49.48% 47.81% 74.94% 27.35% 22.72% 
ED+2Month 50.33% 48.60% 76.77% 27.35% 23.66% 
Irregular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Dom) 
(N=35) 
AD-2Month 58.37% 58.48% 96.24% 11.79% 24.90% 
AD-1Month 58.52% 58.61% 96.87% 11.50% 23.99% 
ED+1Month 60.38% 61.54% 99.58% 15.23% 23.61% 
ED+2Month 57.60% 57.81% 97.14% 16.40% 22.75% 
Irregular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Int) 
(N=6) 
AD-2Month 29.54% 29.75% 47.77% 9.09% 16.80% 
AD-1Month 23.72% 17.74% 50.16% 1.76% 19.93% 
ED+1Month 28.93% 26.04% 52.71% 9.34% 19.62% 
ED+2Month 30.16% 30.81% 53.44% 9.34% 18.37% 
 
90 
 
Table 23 Mean difference of changes in institutional ownership following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions (sub 
samples) 
Institutional ownership difference is defined as the average of both the number of institutional shareholders and the percentage of 
institutional shareholding for two months preceding the index reconstitutions subtracted from average of both indicators for two 
months following the index reconstitutions for each firm. 
 
Group N Parameters 
Mean 
Difference T Test Sign Test 
Signed-rank 
Test 
Irregular 
Addition (SP) 
4 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
157.63 
1.98 2 5 
(0.1420) (0.1250) (0.1250) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
20.33% 
1.47 1 4 
(0.2368) (0.6250) (0.2500) 
Irregular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Dom) 
35 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
59.6 
8.38 16.5 314 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
2.60% 
2.44 8.5 170 
(0.0203) (0.0060) (0.0038) 
Irregular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Int) 
6 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
66.92 
3.22 3 10.5 
(0.0235) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
2.91% 
0.76 1 4.5 
(0.4817) (0.6875) (0.4375) 
Regular 
Addition (SP) 
5 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
60.2 
2.95 2.5 7.5 
(0.0422) (0.0625) (0.0625) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
0.39% 
0.36 1.5 2.5 
(0.7345) (0.3750) (0.6250) 
Regular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Dom) 
76 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
45.95 
5.98 34 1271.5 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
2.10% 
2.86 14 719 
(0.0054) (0.0018) (0.0001) 
Regular 
Addition 
(NonSP_Int) 
10 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
18.55 
1.91 3 16.5 
(0.0886) (0.1094) (0.1055) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
-1.88% 
-0.84 0 -0.5 
(0.4213) (1.0000) (1.0000) 
Regular Deletion 
(SP) 
22 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
-1.75 
-0.25 -3 -22.5 
(0.8023) (0.2863) (0.4780) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
0.89% 
1.42 3 48.5 
(0.1716) (0.2863) (0.1173) 
Regular Deletion 
(NonSP_Dom) 
73 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
-19.55 
-4.33 -13.5 -724.5 
(<0.0001) (0.0021) (<0.0001) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
-0.61% 
-0.89 3.5 -51.5 
(0.3747) (0.4828) (0.7793) 
Regular Deletion 
(NonSP_Int) 
2 
Number of Institutional  
Shareholders 
-17 
-5.67 -1 -1.5 
(0.1112) (0.5000) (0.5000) 
Percentage of Institutional 
Share Holdings 
-0.67% 
-0.89 0 -0.5 
(0.5380) (1.0000) (1.0000) 
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Table 24 Descriptive statistics for the number of all shareholders around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions  
 
Group N Mean Median Max Min St. Dev 
Regular 
Addition 
Pre_event 98 19053.01 825.5 400000 6 57905.88 
Post_event 98 25765.65 1198.5 900000 4 104665.1 
Regular 
Deletion 
Pre_event 95 16687.66 1600 850000 91 87844.74 
Post_event 95 17465.28 1824 935000 93 96389.64 
Irregular 
Addition 
Pre_event 43 8525.09 760 77906 62 17105.75 
Post_event 43 14097.79 1478 165518 105 31634.15 
 
 
Table 25 Mean difference of changes in the number of all shareholders following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions  
 
Group N Mean(Median) T Test Sign Test Signed-rank Test 
Regular Addition 98 
6712.643 1.148152 10.5 725.5 
(40) (0.2537) (0.0417) (0.0083) 
Regular Deletion 95 
777.621 0.487562 -8.5 -187.5 
(-24) (0.6270) (0.1002) (0.4893) 
Irregular Addition 43 
5572.698 1.70328 6 206.5 
(109) (0.0959) (0.0884) (0.0081) 
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Table 26 Descriptive statistics for the number of market makers around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions (full 
sample) 
  Parameters 
 Month Average Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev 
Regular 
Addition 
Two Months Before AD 45.99 44.65 98.30 14.26 15.67 
Two Months After ED 49.92 48.47 106.63 17.20 14.96 
Regular 
Deletion 
Two Months Before AD 56.04 58.19 98.29 22.71 15.70 
Two Months After ED 56.37 57.07 98.21 23.00 15.74 
Irregular 
Addition 
Two Months Before AD 43.17 42.04 72.19 9.89 14.91 
Two Months After ED 47.56 46.79 77.25 9.46 14.29 
 
 
Table 27 Mean Difference of changes in the number of market makers following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions 
(full sample) 
The difference of changes in the number of market makers is defined as the average of both the number of market makers for two 
months before the month of the announcement date minus average of both indicators for two months following the month of the 
effective date for each firm. 
 
Group N Mean(Median) T Test Sign Test Signed-rank Test 
Regular Addition 136 
3.926630 11.77655 43 3976.5 
(3.969444) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Regular Deletion 136 
0.334402 1.333648 5 456 
(0.213447) (0.1846) (0.4404) (0.3237) 
Irregular Addition 67 
4.385994 6.972892 20.5 981 
(3.307143) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
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Table 28 Descriptive statistics for the number of market makers around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions (sub 
samples) 
 
Panel A Regular Additions 
  Parameters 
 Month Average Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev 
S&P 500 Index 
members 
Two Months Before AD 57.40 59.00 81.40 32.33 14.71 
Two Months After ED 58.62 58.53 79.07 40.43 12.41 
Domestic 
Securities 
Two Months Before AD 43.97 43.58 98.30 14.26 15.80 
Two Months After ED 48.34 47.68 106.63 17.20 15.44 
International 
Securities 
Two Months Before AD 47.22 47.07 69.00 27.40 10.76 
Two Months After ED 50.96 48.05 69.80 26.00 11.16 
 
Panel B Regular Deletions 
  Parameters 
 Month Average Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev 
S&P 500 Index 
members 
Two Months Before AD 63.69 63.63 90.39 32.32 16.69 
Two Months After ED 63.09 64.96 88.00 30.18 16.51 
Domestic 
Securities 
Two Months Before AD 54.31 55.23 98.29 22.71 15.08 
Two Months After ED 54.93 55.64 98.21 23.00 15.33 
International 
Securities 
Two Months Before AD 51.24 51.68 68.80 31.92 12.57 
Two Months After ED 50.92 52.01 69.65 32.06 12.47 
 
Panel C Irregular Additions 
  Parameters 
 Month Average Median Maximum Minimum St. Dev 
S&P 500 Index 
members 
Two Months Before AD 58.30 64.02 66.55 38.59 13.19 
Two Months After ED 65.06 67.63 77.25 47.75 12.42 
Domestic 
Securities 
Two Months Before AD 42.63 42.73 72.19 9.89 15.41 
Two Months After ED 46.78 46.15 72.73 9.46 14.29 
International 
Securities 
Two Months Before AD 39.31 39.44 47.83 31.73 6.22 
Two Months After ED 44.13 42.27 61.80 34.10 9.50 
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Table 29 Mean difference of changes in the number of market makers following the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions 
(sub samples) 
The difference of changes in the number of market makers is defined as the average of both the number of market makers for two 
months before the month of the announcement date minus average of both indicators for two months following the month of the 
effective date for each firm. 
 
Panel A Regular Additions 
Group N Mean(Median) T Test Sign Test Signed-rank Test 
S&P 500 Index 
members 
13 
1.222298 1.308185 0.5 11.5 
(0.494118) (0.2153) (1.0000) (0.4548) 
Domestic Securities 104 
4.367189 11.69636 36 2441 
(4.508922) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
International 
Securities 
17 
3.736876 3.769711 6.5 69.5 
(2.141026) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0003) 
 
Panel B Regular Deletions 
Group N Mean(Median) T Test Sign Test Signed-rank Test 
S&P 500 Index 
members 
27 
-0.60052 -0.99315 -3.5 -35 
(-0.57919) (0.3298) (0.2478) (0.4107) 
Domestic Securities 103 
0.617526 2.175252 8.5 499 
(0.400000) (0.0319) (0.1145) (0.1009) 
International 
Securities 
6 
-0.31876 -0.42917 0 -1.5 
(-0.35043) (0.6857) (1.0000) (0.8438) 
 
Panel C Irregular Additions 
Group N Mean(Median) T Test Sign Test Signed-rank Test 
S&P 500 Index 
members 
4 
6.767698 3.58182 2 5 
(6.842366) (0.0372) (0.1250) (0.1250) 
Domestic Securities 55 
4.149393 6.152903 15.5 640 
(3.307143) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
International 
Securities 
8 
4.821777 1.990187 3 17 
(2.701190) (0.0869) (0.0703) (0.0156) 
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Table 30 Changes in liquidity for regular additions to the Nasdaq-100 Index 
The paired t-test (t), sign test(z), and Wilcoxon rank sum test (r) are used to assess the significance of changes in liquidity. For 
each indicator, test statistics are shown in the first row and the p-value in the bracket. 
 
 
Mean (Median) t z r Mean (Median) t z r Mean (Median) t z r
Absolute Spread -0.02762 -5.1396 -44 -3414.5 -0.04270 -8.05437 -46 -3656 -0.05734 -8.84425 -47.5 -3906.5
(-0.01767) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.02133) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.02952) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Relative Spread -0.00043 -3.43136 -32.5 -2737 -0.00066 -4.4482 -38.5 -2751 -0.00106 -6.04086 -42.5 -3122
(-0.00042) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.00044) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.00063) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Dollar Volume 0.397314 5.930422 28.5 2636 0.45226 5.639477 35.5 2656 0.587038 6.598725 38.5 3046
(0.286730) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.346591) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.503617) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Illiquidity Ratio -195E-12 -2.79412 -30 -2061 -241E-12 -2.57076 -28.5 -2130.5 -545E-12 -4.08333 -41.5 -2847
(-96E-12) (0.0060) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-145E-12) (0.0112) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-225E-12) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Zero Return -0.00218 -1.70692 1 74.5 -0.00415 -2.70736 -8 -662 -0.00493 -2.88656 -11.5 -1239
(0.00000) (0.0902) (0.9204) (0.7989) (0.00000) (0.0077) (0.1332) (0.0214) (-0.00370) (0.0045) (0.0469) (0.0015)
Absolute Spread 0.02645 0.918968 -0.5 -4.5 0.00701 0.630143 -2 -15 -0.00089 -0.16715 -1.5 -11.5
(-0.00011) (0.3762) (1.0000) (0.7869) (-0.00217) (0.5404) (0.3877) (0.2578) (-0.00293) (0.8700) (0.5811) (0.4548)
Relative Spread 0.00018 0.398595 -2.5 -22.5 -0.00005 -0.20728 -3.5 -23.5 -0.00026 -1.2429 -2.5 -20.5
(-0.00016) (0.6972) (0.2668) (0.1272) (-0.00022) (0.8393) (0.0923) (0.1099) (-0.00020) (0.2376) (0.2668) (0.1677)
Dollar Volume 0.435115 3.777125 5.5 39.5 0.427691 3.391474 4.5 38.5 0.499803 4.273595 4.5 42.5
(0.295530) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.288975) (0.0054) (0.0225) (0.0046) (0.359969) (0.0011) (0.0225) (0.0012)
Illiquidity Ratio -193E-12 -1.4293 -5 -37 -183E-12 -1.70124 -4.5 -33.5 -238E-12 -2.23856 -4.5 -40.5
(-412E-13) (0.1784) (0.0063) (0.0015) (-58E-12) (0.1146) (0.0225) (0.0171) (-151E-12) (0.0449) (0.0225) (0.0024)
Zero Return -0.00256 -0.56193 2 0.5 0.000855 0.230174 0.5 2 0.000293 0.091668 0.5 -1.5
(0.00000) (0.5845) (0.3438) (0.9727) (0.000000) (0.8218) (1.0000) (0.8477) (0.000000) (0.9285) (1.0000) (0.9102)
Absolute Spread -0.03555 -6.43949 -38 -2210 -0.05109 -8.28384 -38.5 -2374.5 -0.06768 -8.72087 -39.5 -2473.5
(-0.02014) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.02828) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.04170) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Relative Spread -0.00052 -3.47102 -27.5 -1698.5 -0.00075 -4.10221 -31.5 -1698.5 -0.00121 -5.53279 -34.5 -1929.5
(-0.00052) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.00050) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.00071) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Dollar Volume 0.375815 4.763973 18.5 1460.5 0.424797 4.468892 25.5 1462.5 0.562248 5.28643 28.5 1706.5
(0.286730) (<0.0001) (0.0004) (<0.0001) (0.346591) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.520626) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Illiquidity Ratio -189E-12 -2.24291 -21.5 -1146 -216E-12 -1.92174 -19.5 -1193.5 -562E-12 -3.44492 -31.5 -1649.5
(-12E-11) (0.0270) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (-171E-12) (0.0574) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (-264E-12) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Zero Return -0.00142 -0.96911 1 154 -0.00449 -2.41751 -5 -393.5 -0.00571 -2.69398 -10.5 -807.5
(0.00000) (0.3347) (0.9099) (0.4456) (0.00000) (0.0174) (0.3143) (0.0574) (-0.00370) (0.0082) (0.0439) (0.0043)
Absolute Spread -0.01995 -2.71596 -5.5 -52.5 -0.02884 -2.70839 -5.5 -58.5 -0.03668 -3.08455 -6.5 -63.5
(-0.01689) (0.0153) (0.0127) (0.0110) (-0.01450) (0.0155) (0.0127) (0.0038) (-0.02389) (0.0071) (0.0023) (0.0013)
Relative Spread -0.00037 -2.54977 -2.5 -47.5 -0.00054 -2.452 -3.5 -45.5 -0.00076 -2.94712 -5.5 -52.5
(-0.00042) (0.0214) (0.3323) (0.0232) (-0.00044) (0.0261) (0.1435) (0.0305) (-0.00050) (0.0095) (0.0127) (0.0110)
Dollar Volume 0.501196 2.501544 4.5 50.5 0.664228 2.749652 5.5 56.5 0.806863 3.273367 5.5 67.5
(0.279950) (0.0236) (0.0490) (0.0150) (0.350116) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0056) (0.562076) (0.0048) (0.0127) (0.0005)
Illiquidity Ratio -236E-12 -1.37672 -3.5 -38.5 -44E-11 -1.69007 -4.5 -39 -671E-12 -2.10142 -5.5 -50.5
(-42E-12) (0.1876) (0.1435) (0.0714) (-6E-11) (0.1104) (0.0490) (0.0656) (-207E-12) (0.0518) (0.0127) (0.0150)
Zero Return -0.00654 -2.27917 -2 -19 -0.00588 -2.01719 -3.5 -20.5 -0.00413 -1.62736 -1.5 -26.5
(0.00000) (0.0367) (0.3877) (0.1421) (-0.00556) (0.0608) (0.0654) (0.0742) (-0.00370) (0.1232) (0.6072) (0.1396)
SP (N=13)
NonSP_Dom 
(N=105)
NonSP_Int 
(N=17)
90-day 180-day 270-day
Regular Addition
Full Sample 
(N=135)
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Table 31 Changes in liquidity for regular deletions to the Nasdaq-100 Index 
The paired t-test (t), sign test(z), and Wilcoxon rank sum test (r) are used to assess the significance of changes in liquidity. For 
each indicator, test statistics are shown in the first row and the p-value in the bracket. 
 
 
 
 
  
Mean (Median) t z r Mean (Median) t z r Mean (Median) t z r
Absolute Spread 0.00860 0.961465 -10 -517.5 0.00153 0.284824 -17 -1357 -0.00712 -1.56268 -28 -2424.5
(-0.00089) (0.3381) (0.0978) (0.2413) (-0.00340) (0.7762) (0.0039) (0.0018) (-0.00876) (0.1205) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Relative Spread 0.00170 1.291585 -4 -25 0.002352 1.729798 2 526 0.002324 1.689984 2 371
(-0.00005) (0.1988) (0.5425) (0.9550) (0.000085) (0.0860) (0.7941) (0.2336) (0.000074) (0.0934) (0.7941) (0.4015)
Dollar Volume -0.17838 -2.8506 -12 -1258 -0.42247 -5.65066 -32 -2435 -0.52307 -6.11146 -31 -2609
(-0.14425) (0.0051) (0.0449) (0.0039) (-0.30236) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.35122) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Illiquidity Ratio 3.44E-9 1.565545 9 865 5.753E-9 2.371978 14.5 1538 5.827E-9 2.428574 14 1446
(4.5E-11) (0.1199) (0.1387) (0.0491) (1.21E-10) (0.0191) (0.0141) (0.0003) (7.52E-11) (0.0165) (0.0184) (0.0009)
Zero Return 0.002346 0.805946 8.5 330 0.005007 1.862076 7 601.5 0.004104 1.831088 4.5 570
(0.000000) (0.4217) (0.1354) (0.3592) (0.000000) (0.0648) (0.2191) (0.0805) (0.001852) (0.0694) (0.4709) (0.1510)
Absolute Spread 0.00623 0.817837 -1 -22.5 0.00377 0.604708 -1 -15.5 0.00082 0.122179 -2 -57.5
(-0.00106) (0.4212) (0.8450) (0.5778) (-0.00183) (0.5508) (0.8450) (0.7019) (-0.00304) (0.9037) (0.5572) (0.1475)
Relative Spread 0.00042 0.594464 -3 -44.5 0.00074 1.06625 -1 5.5 0.00062 0.841993 -1 -5.5
(-0.00019) (0.5575) (0.3269) (0.2665) (-0.00013) (0.2965) (0.8450) (0.8921) (-0.00017) (0.4078) (0.8450) (0.8921)
Dollar Volume -0.05626 -0.52248 -2 -27.5 -0.26882 -2.08739 -4 -69.5 -0.36149 -2.41222 -5 -81.5
(-0.07301) (0.6059) (0.5572) (0.4957) (-0.16717) (0.0472) (0.1686) (0.0769) (-0.29039) (0.0235) (0.0755) (0.0356)
Illiquidity Ratio 1.79E-10 0.732207 0 2.5 7.68E-10 1.527744 1 25.5 8.94E-10 1.596075 1 15.5
(-19E-12) (0.4709) (1.0000) (0.9508) (2.85E-11) (0.1391) (0.8450) (0.5278) (1.38E-11) (0.1230) (0.8450) (0.7019)
Zero Return 0.000855 0.134123 4.5 35 0.00171 0.260687 1.5 28.5 -0.00104 -0.20713 0 2
(0.000000) (0.8944) (0.0931) (0.2969) (0.00556) (0.7965) (0.6900) (0.4537) (0.00000) (0.8376) (1.0000) (0.9559)
Absolute Spread 0.00541 0.495339 -10 -385.5 -0.00284 -0.48969 -16 -1016 -0.01280 -2.77287 -25 -1616
(-0.00097) (0.6215) (0.0569) (0.1864) (-0.00458) (0.6254) (0.0018) (0.0003) (-0.01122) (0.0066) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Relative Spread 0.00209 1.214152 -2 66 0.002879 1.612679 2 309 0.002888 1.601703 2 256
(-0.00002) (0.2276) (0.7644) (0.8218) (0.000085) (0.1100) (0.7644) (0.2903) 0.000074 (0.1124) (0.7644) (0.3814)
Dollar Volume -0.22502 -2.93514 -10 -870 -0.48452 -5.31105 -26 -1524 -0.58943 -5.64843 -24 -1610
(-0.19154) (0.0041) (0.0569) (0.0024) (-0.36111) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.39263) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Illiquidity Ratio 4.465E-9 1.542147 9 618.5 7.356E-9 2.309032 13.5 1019.5 7.42E-9 2.356469 13 993
(5.3E-11) (0.1262) (0.0886) (0.0328) (1.58E-10) (0.0230) (0.0086) (0.0003) (1.17E-10) (0.0204) (0.0120) (0.0005)
Zero Return 0.002431 0.700908 3 61.5 0.006054 1.940591 4.5 336.5 0.005143 1.945552 2 312.5
(0.000000) (0.4850) (0.5943) (0.7996) (0.000000) (0.0552) (0.3800) (0.1270) (0.000000) (0.0545) (0.7572) (0.2406)
Absolute Spread 0.072102 1.055166 1 3.5 0.064822 1.042416 0 2.5 0.05301 0.952204 -1 -1.5
(0.002000) (0.3396) (0.6875) (0.5625) (0.000306) (0.3450) (1.0000) (0.6875) (-0.00121) (0.3847) (0.6875) (0.8438)
Relative Spread 0.000600 1.216931 1 6.5 0.000581 1.248044 1 5.5 0.000275 0.524259 1 3.5
0.000181 (0.2779) (0.6875) (0.2188) (0.000445) (0.2673) (0.6875) (0.3125) (0.000309) (0.6225) (0.6875) (0.5625)
Dollar Volume 0.06963 0.377748 0 -0.5 -0.05408 -0.22922 -2 -4.5 -0.11719 -0.43698 -2 -4.5
(-0.04724) (0.7211) (1.0000) (1.0000) (-0.12138) (0.8278) (0.2188) (0.4375) (-0.25124) (0.6804) (0.2188) (0.4375)
Illiquidity Ratio 4.8E-10 0.819207 0 -0.5 6.32E-10 1.001725 0 2.5 5.77E-10 0.877363 0 2.5
(-315E-13) (0.4499) (1.0000) (1.0000) (7E-11) (0.3625) (1.0000) (0.6875) (1.41E-10) (0.4204) (1.0000) (0.6875)
Zero Return 0.007407 1.348409 1 4 0.001852 0.597614 1 1.5 0.009084 2.911995 2.5 7.5
(0.005556) 0.2354 0.6250 0.2500 (0.002778) (0.5761) (0.6250) (0.7500) (0.008734) (0.0333) (0.0625) (0.0625)
NonSP_Dom 
(N=100)
NonSP_Int 
(N=6)
Full Sample 
(N=132)
SP (N=26)
90-day 180-day 270-day
Regular Deletion
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Table 32 Changes in liquidity for irregular additions to the Nasdaq-100 Index 
The paired t-test (t), sign test(z), and Wilcoxon rank sum test (r) are used to assess the significance of changes in liquidity. For 
each indicator, test statistics are shown in the first row and the p-value in the bracket. 
 
  
Mean (Median) t z r Mean (Median) t z r Mean (Median) t z r
Absolute Spread -0.05070 -2.78904 -15.5 -693 -0.06044 -4.62274 -14.5 -758 -0.06903 -5.38746 -16.5 -799
(-0.01422) (0.0069) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (-0.02617) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (<0.0001) (-0.04591) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Relative Spread -0.00127 -3.44512 -9.5 -688 -0.00139 -5.0519 -16.5 -805 -0.00147 -5.50756 -18.5 -823
(-0.00036) (0.0010) (0.0271) (<0.0001) (-0.00055) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.00066) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Dollar Volume 0.609316 7.400205 20.5 909 0.798746 7.251189 24.5 950 0.901848 7.689421 22.5 989
(0.618308) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.761868) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.792100) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Illiquidity Ratio -313E-12 -5.34559 -16.5 -803 -441E-12 -4.83146 -21.5 -891 -549E-12 -2.90513 -19.5 -779
(-172E-12) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-249E-12) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-265E-12) (0.0050) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Zero Return -0.00905 -2.73218 -6 -224 -0.01101 -2.9099 -13 -392 -0.01149 -3.47368 -16 -540.5
(0.00000) (0.0081) (0.0884) (0.0028) (-0.00556) (0.0049) (0.0005) (0.0004) (-0.00370) (0.0009) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Absolute Spread -0.02898 -4.93238 -2 -5 -0.6086 -2.82254 -2 -5 -0.07931 -3.04008 -2 -5
(-0.03109) (0.0160) (0.1250) (0.1250) (-0.04497) (0.0666) (0.1250) (0.1250) (-0.05716) (0.0559) (0.1250) (0.1250)
Relative Spread -0.00045 -1.16413 0 -2 -0.00041 -0.53103 0 -1 -0.00076 -0.76102 0 -1
(-0.00046) (0.3285) (1.0000) (0.6250) (-0.00015) (0.6322) (1.0000) (0.8750) (-0.00036) (0.5020) (1.0000) (0.8750)
Dollar Volume 0.304025 0.775949 0 2 0.29477 0.448439 0 0 0.473617 0.665858 0 1
(0.193601) (0.4943) (1.0000) (0.6250) (-0.09589) (0.6842) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.190515) (0.5531) (1.0000) (0.8750)
Illiquidity Ratio -662E-13 -0.8218 0 -2 -109E-12 -0.38422 0 -1 -235E-12 -0.57481 0 -1
(-645E-13) (0.4714) (1.0000) (0.6250) (-257E-13) (0.7264) (1.0000) (0.8750) (-495E-13) (0.6057) (1.0000) (0.8750)
Zero Return -0.00833 -1.5667 -1 -1.5 -0.01322 -2.52169 -2 -5 -0.01018 -1.83411 -2 -5
(-0.00556) (0.2152) (0.5000) (0.5000) (-0.00978) (0.0860) (0.1250) (0.1250) (-0.00515) (0.1640) (0.1250) (0.1250)
Absolute Spread -0.05672 -2.58272 -11.5 -450 -0.06692 -4.42302 -12.5 -523 -0.07655 -5.18382 -13.5 -554
(-0.01422) (0.0125) (0.0027) (<0.0001) (-0.02028) (<0.0001) (0.0010) (<0.0001) (-0.04352) (<0.0001) (0.0004) (<0.0001)
Relative Spread -0.00147 -3.32784 -8.5 -493 -0.00159 -4.94801 -16.5 -604 -0.00170 -5.52495 -18.5 -610
(-0.00037) (0.0016) (0.0300) (<0.0001) (-0.00057) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-0.00070) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Dollar Volume 0.619787 6.716782 17.5 619 0.798131 6.59603 21.5 662 0.900339 6.956275 19.5 686
(0.628350) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.679434) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.785400) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Illiquidity Ratio -35E-11 -5.17235 -14.5 -572.5 -441E-12 -4.33636 -18.5 -635 -543E-12 -2.42517 -16.5 -533
-172E-12 (<0.0001) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (-273E-12) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (-27E-11) (0.0187) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Zero Return -0.00961 -2.40766 -3.5 -140.5 -0.01164 -2.54899 -8.5 -226.5 -0.01226 -3.07173 -11 -321.5
(0.00000) (0.0195) (0.3105) (0.0158) (-0.00556) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0044) (-0.00370) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0002)
Absolute Spread -0.02013 -1.16512 -2 -11 -0.01563 -0.51335 0 -4 -0.01218 -0.45164 -1 -5
(-0.01089) (0.2821) (0.2891) (0.1484) (-0.00586) (0.6235) (1.0000) (0.6406) (-0.01018) (0.6652) (0.7266) (0.5469)
Relative Spread -0.00028 -0.97562 -1 -5 -0.00048 -1.3743 0 -7 -0.00021 -0.95537 0 -5
(-0.00005) (0.3618) (0.7266) (0.5469) (-0.00017) (0.2117) (1.0000) (0.3828) (-0.00003) (0.3712) (1.0000) (0.5469)
Dollar Volume 0.689972 3.32072 3 17 1.054964 4.253443 3 17 1.126336 4.286385 3 17
(0.649911) (0.0128) (0.0703) (0.0156) (1.017946) (0.0038) (0.0703) (0.0156) (1.018830) (0.0036) (0.0703) (0.0156)
Illiquidity Ratio -182E-12 -1.34458 -2 -10 -604E-12 -2.14406 -3 -14 -748E-12 -2.21867 -3 -14
(-14E-11) (0.2207) (0.2891) (0.1953) (-314E-12) (0.0692) (0.0703) (0.0547) (-293E-12) (0.0620) (0.0703) (0.0547)
Zero Return -0.00556 -1.52753 -1.5 -5 -0.00556 -1.52753 -2.5 -7.5 -0.00685 -2.33006 -3 -13
(-0.00556) (0.1705) (0.3750) (0.3125) (-0.00833) (0.1705) (0.1250) (0.2344) (-0.01111) (0.0526) (0.0703) (0.0703)
NonSP_Int 
(N=8)
90-day 180-day 270-day
Irregular Addition
Full Sample 
(N=67)
SP (N=4)
NonSP_Dom 
(N=55)
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Table 33 Regression analysis on regular additions and regular deletions around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions 
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted abnormal return on the announcement date. The independent variables are 
including four liquidity measures which we discussed in liquidity analysis section and three control variables. The liquidity 
measures are relative bid-ask spread, dollar volume, illiquidity ratio, and zero-return ratio. The control variables are firm size and 
two dummy variables. Firm size is defined as the market value of each particular security on the day AD-30.  International 
security dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is an international security, and zero otherwise. S&P 500 Index membership 
dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is a member of S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. 
Panel A: Regular Additions       
Constant 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
∆ Relative Spread -0.295    
(0.012)    
∆ Dollar Volume  0.001   
 (<0.001)   
∆ ILLIQ   -421827.847  
  (0.005)  
∆ Zero Return    -0.018 
   (0.124) 
Size 1.401E-10 1.404E-10 1.359E-10 1.239E-10 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) 
International 
Securities Dummy 
-7.797E-5 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.910) (0.520) (0.722) (0.834) 
S&P 500 Index 
Membership 
Dummy 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.966) (0.558) (0.648) (0.637) 
N 136 136 136 136 
Adjusted R2 9% 16% 10% 6.1% 
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Table 33 Continued 
 
 
  
Panel B : Regular Deletions       
Constant -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
∆ Relative Spread -0.041    
(0.001)    
∆ Dollar Volume  0.001   
 (<0.001)   
∆ ILLIQ   -29816.768  
  (<0.001)  
∆ Zero Return    -0.021 
   (0.004) 
Size 1.392E-9 1.106E-9 1.304E-9 1.364E-9 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
International Securities Dummy -2.536E-5 -1.807E-5 -1.192E-5 -1.079E-5 
(0.902) (0.925) (0.952) (0.959) 
S&P 500 Index Membership Dummy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.559) (0.550) (0.652) (0.634) 
N 136 136 136 136 
Adjusted R2 41.7% 48.5% 45.1% 40% 
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Table 34 Regression analysis on regular index changes around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions 
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted abnormal return on the announcement date. The independent variables are 
including four liquidity measures which we discussed in liquidity analysis section and four control variables. The liquidity 
measures are relative bid-ask spread, dollar volume, illiquidity ratio, and zero-return ratio. The control variables are firm size and 
two dummy variables. Firm size is defined as the market value of each particular security on the day AD-30.  International 
security dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is an international security, and zero otherwise. S&P 500 Index membership 
dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is a member of S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. Regular addition dummy variable, 
which is equal to one for regular additions, and zero for regular deletions. 
          
Constant -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
∆ Relative Spread -0.058    
(<0.001)    
∆ Dollar Volume  0.001   
 (<0.001)   
∆ ILLIQ   -42017.693  
  (<0.001)  
∆ Zero Return    -0.201 
   (<0.001) 
Size 1.548E-10 1.691E-10 1.488E-10 1.588E-10 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
International 
Securities Dummy 
0.000 9.445E-5 0.000 0.000 
(0.423) (0.664) (0.436) (0.831) 
S&P 500 Index 
Membership Dummy 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.535) (0.564) (0.679) (0.535) 
Regular Addition 
Dummy 
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 272 272 272 272 
Adjusted R2 40.7% 49.7% 42.9% 40.8% 
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Table 35 Regression analysis on irregular additions around the Nasdaq-100 Index reconstitutions 
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted abnormal return on the announcement date. The independent variables are 
including four liquidity measures which we discussed in liquidity analysis section and three control variables. The liquidity 
measures are relative bid-ask spread, dollar volume, illiquidity ratio, and zero-return ratio. The control variables are firm size and 
two dummy variables. Firm size is defined as the market value of each particular security on the day AD-30.  International 
security dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is an international security, and zero otherwise. S&P 500 Index membership 
dummy variable is equal to one if a stock is a member of S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. 
          
Constant 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
(0.008) (0.052) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
∆ Relative Spread -0.358    
(0.093)    
∆ Dollar Volume  0.001   
 (0.008)   
∆ ILLIQ   -356862.059  
  (0.209)  
∆ Zero Return    0.005 
   (0.743) 
Size 1.243E-10 1.357E-10 1.077E-10 9.041E-11 
(0.026) (0.011) (0.046) (0.094) 
International 
Securities Dummy 
0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.911) (0.445) (0.566) (0.596) 
S&P 500 Index 
Membership 
Dummy 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.243) (0.239) (0.241) (0.264) 
N 67 67 67 67 
Adjusted R2 4.1% 10.6% 2.1% 0.2% 
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Table 36 Summary of results  
The table below reports the summary of results for each analysis. “↑” and ”↓” refer to significant increase and decrease, respectively. For the trading volume analysis, “AD” and 
“ED” refer to the announcement date and the effective date, respectively. Four liquidity measures are dollar volume ($Vol), illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ), relative spread (Rel_Spread), 
and zero return ratio (Zero_Ret). “PPH”, “LH”, “IAH” refer to price pressure hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis, and investor awareness hypothesis, respectively. 
 
  
N Abnormal Return Market Makers Shareholders
AD ED Shareholders Shareholdings $Vol ILLIQ Rel_Spread Zero_Ret
Full Sample 136 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
S&P 500 Index member 13 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ - - - N/A ↑ ↑ - -
NonS&P 500 Domestic 104 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ N/A ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
NonS&P 500 International 17 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ - - ↑ N/A ↑ ↑ ↑ -
Full Sample 136 ↓(Transitory) - ↑ ↓ - - - ↓ ↓ - -
S&P 500 Index member 27 ↓(Transitory) - ↑ - - - N/A ↓ - - -
NonS&P 500 Domestic 103 ↓(Transitory) - ↑ ↓ - - N/A ↓ ↓ - -
NonS&P 500 International 6 ↓(Transitory) - ↑ - - - N/A - - - -
Full Sample 67 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
S&P 500 Index member 4 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ - - - N/A - - - -
NonS&P 500 Domestic 55 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ N/A ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
NonS&P 500 International 8 ↑(Transitory) - ↑ ↑ - - N/A ↑ - - -
Support HypothesesTrading Volume Liquidity
PPH, LH, IAH
PPH, LH, IAH
PPH, LH
PPH, LH, IAH
PPH
PPH, LH, IAH
PPH
PPH, LH, IAH
Regualar 
Additions
Regular 
Deletions
Irregular 
Additions
Institutional Ownership
PPH, LH, IAH
PPH
PPH, LH, IAH
PPH
103 
 
References 
Amihud, Y., 2002, Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects, Journal of 
Financial Markets 5, 31-56. 
Amihud, Y. and H. Mendelson, 1986, Liquidity and stock returns, Financial Analysts Journal 
42, 43-48. 
Annual Changes To Nasdaq-100 Index. (December 29, 1997). Business Wire. Retrieved from 
Lexis-Nexis. 
Annual Changes To Nasdaq-100 Index. (December 11, 2000). Business Wire. Retrieved from 
Lexis-Nexis. 
Annual Changes To the Nasdaq-100 Index. (December 11, 2000). PR Newswire. Retrieved from 
Lexis-Nexis. 
Baker, H. K., G. E. Powell and D. G. Weaver, 1999, Does NYSE listing affect firm visibility?, 
Financial  Management 28, 46-54. 
Becker-Blease, J. R. and D. L. Paul, 2006, Stock liquidity and investment opportunities: 
Evidence from index additions, Financial Management 35, 35-51. 
Bessembinder, H., 2003, Trade execution costs and market quality after decimalization, Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 747-777. 
Bessembinder, H. and H. M. Kaufman, 1997, A comparison of trade execution costs for NYSE 
and NASDAQ-listed stocks, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 287-310. 
Biktimirov, E. N., 2004, The effect of demand on stock prices: Evidence from index fund 
rebalancing, Financial Review 39, 455-472. 
Biktimirov, E. N., A. R. Cowan and B. D. Jordan, 2004, Do demand curves for small stocks 
slope down?, Journal of Financial Research 27, 161-178. 
Campbell, C.J. and C. E. Wasley, 1993, Measuring security price performance using daily 
NASDAQ returns, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 73-92. 
Campbell, C.J. and C. E. Wasley, 1996, Measuring abnormal daily trading volume for samples 
of  NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ securities using parametric and nonparametric test statistics, 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 6, 309-326. 
Chen, H., G. Noronha and V. Singal, 2004, The price response to S&P 500 index additions and 
deletions:  Evidence of Asymmetry and a new explanation, Journal of Finance 59, 1901-1929. 
104 
 
Chen, H., G. Noronha, and V. Singal, 2006, Index changes and losses to index fund investors, 
Financial Analysts Journal 62, 31-47. 
Chordia, T., R. Roll, and A. Subrahmanyam, 2001, Market liquidity and trading activity, Journal 
of Finance 56, 501-530. 
Corrado, Charles J., 1989, A nonparametric test for abnormal security-price performance in 
event studies, Journal of Financial Economics 23(2), 385-396. 
Cowan, Arnold R. Eventus software, version 8.0 (Cowan Research LC, Ames, Iowa, 2005) 
Cowan, Arnold R. Eventus 8.0 User’sGuide, Standard Edition 2.1. (Cowan Research LC, Ames, 
Iowa, 2007) 
Cowan, Arnold R., 1992, Nonparametric Event Study Tests, Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting 2(4), 343-258 
Denis, D. K., J. J. Mcconnell, A. V. Ovtchinnikov and Y. Yu, 2003, S&P 500 index additions 
and earnings expectations, Journal of Finance 58, 1821-1840. 
Dhillon, U. and H. Johnson, 1991, Changes in the Standard and Poor’s 500 list, Journal of 
Business 64, 75- 85. 
Edmister R.O., A.S. Graham, and W.L. Pirie, 1994, Excess returns of index replacement stocks: 
Evidence of liquidity and substitutability, Journal of Financial Research 17, 333-346.  
Elliott, W. B., B. F. Van Ness, M. D. Walker, and R. S. Warr, 2006, What drives the S&P 500 
inclusion effect? An analytical survey, Financial Management 35, 31-48. 
Elliott, W. B. and R. S. Warr, 2003, Price pressure on the NYSE and NASDAQ: Evidence from 
S&P 500 index changes, Financial Management 32, 85-99. 
Ellis, K., R. Michaely and M. O’Hara, 2002, The making of a dealer market: From entry to 
equilibrium in the trading of NASDAQ stocks, Journal of Finance 57, 2289-2316. 
Erwin, G. R. and J. M. Miller, 1998, The liquidity effects associated with addition of a stock to 
the S&P 500 index: Evidence from bid/ask spreads, Financial Review 33, 131-146. 
Foerster, S. R. and G. A. Karolyi, 1999, The effects of market segmentation and investor 
recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States, Journal of 
Finance 54, 981-1013. 
Harris, L. and E. Gurel, 1986, Price and volume effects associated with changes in the S&P 500 
list: New evidence for the existence of price pressures, Journal of Finance 41, 815-829. 
105 
 
Huang, R. D. and H. R. Stoll, 1996, Dealers versus auction markets: A paired comparison of 
execution costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE, Journal of Financial Economics 41, 313-357. 
Jain, P. C., 1987, The effect on stock price of inclusion in or exclusion from the S&P 500, 
Financial Analysts Journal 43, 58-65. 
Jain, P. K. and J. Kim, 2006, Investor recognition, liquidity, and exchange listings in the 
reformed markets, Financial Management 35, 21-42. 
Kadlec, G. B. and J. J. McConnell, 1994, The effect of market segmentation and illiquidity on 
asset prices: Evidence from exchange listings, Journal of Finance 49, 611-636. 
Kappou, K., C. Brooks and C. Ward, 2010, The S&P 500 index effect reconsidered: Evidence 
from overnight and intraday stock price performance and volume, Journal of Banking & Finance 
34, 116-126. 
Kaul, A., V. Mehrotra and R. Morck, 2000, Demand curves for stocks do slope down: New 
evidence from an index weights adjustment, Journal of Finance 55, 893-912. 
Lang, M. H., K. V. Lins and D. P. Miller, 2003, ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: Does cross listing 
in the  United States improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value?, 
Journal of Accounting Research 41, 317-345. 
Lesmond, D. A., J. P. Ogden, and C. A. Trzcinka, 1999, A new estimate of transaction costs, 
Review of Financial Studies 12, 1113-1141. 
Lynch, A. W. and R. R. Mendenhall, 1997, New evidence on stock price effects associated with 
changes in the S&P 500 index, Journal of Business 70, 351-383. 
Masulis, R. W., and L. Shivakumar, 2002, Does market structure affect the immediacy of stock 
price response to news?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 617-648. 
NASDAQ announces the Annual Re-Ranking of the NASDAQ-100 Index. (December 11, 2009). 
Globe Newswire. Retrieved from NASDAQ OMX. 
NASDAQ-100 Index. (Jul 4, 2011). Retrieved from 
http://dynamic.nasdaq.com/dynamic/nasdaq100_activity.stm.   
Shankar, S. G. and J. M. Miller, 2006, Market reaction to changes in the S&P small cap 600 
index,  Financial Review 41, 339-360. 
Shleifer, A., 1986, Do demand curves for stocks slope down?, Journal of Finance 41, 579-590. 
Sprent, Peter., 1989,  Applied nonparametric statistical Methods, Chapman and Hall, London. 
106 
 
Weston. J. P., 2000. Competition on the NASDAQ and the impact on recent market reforms, 
Journal of Finance 55, 2565-2598. 
Zhou, H., 2011, Asymmetric changes in stock prices and investor recognition around revisions to 
the S&P 500 index, Financial Analysts Journal 67, 72-84. 
 
    
 
 
 
